



Feasibility Study on establishing an EU-Africa Task Force for policy cooperation and dialogue on International Ocean Governance

Final report

[Written by Ramboll]
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establishing an EU-Africa Task
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FEASIBILITY STUDY ON ESTABLISHING AN EU-AFRICA TASK FORCE FOR POLICY COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG MARITIME AFFAIRS AND FISHERIES

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FINAL REPORT

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Contents

Abstract	i
Synthèse	ii
Executive summary	iii
Résumé	viii
1. Introduction	1
2. Methodology	2
3. The potential for a “blue” Task Force	6
4. Options for the establishment of a “blue” Task Force	10
5. Elements of the “blue” Task Force	62
6. Conclusions	86
Appendix 1 – Overview table of the main characteristics across each Task Force	90
Appendix 2 – Concept note summarising findings of Task 1 Desk Research	94
Appendix 3 – Concept note summarising findings of Task 1 Stakeholder consultations	112
Appendix 4 – Overview of key stakeholders	136
Appendix 5 – Call for applications	145
Appendix 6 - Rules of Procedure	152
Appendix 7 – Communication strategy	159

Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Description
AfCFTA	<i>The African Continental Free Trade Area</i>
AU	<i>African Union</i>
COMESA	<i>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</i>
COMHAFAT	<i>Conference on Fisheries Cooperation Among African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean</i>
EAC	<i>East African Community</i>
EEAS	<i>European External Action Service</i>
EEZs	<i>Exclusive Economic Zones</i>
ECOWAS	<i>Economic Community of West African States</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
IGAD	<i>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</i>
IUU	<i>Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing</i>
RFMOs	<i>Regional Fisheries Management Organisations</i>
RSCs	<i>Regional Seas Conventions</i>
SADC	<i>Southern African Development Community</i>
SERICA	<i>The Seas, Rivers, Islands and Coastal Areas Intergroup of the European Parliament</i>
SFPAs	<i>Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements</i>
SRFC	<i>Subregional Fisheries Commission</i>
MOWCA	<i>Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa</i>

Glossary

Term	Description
Design element	<i>This refers to the various structural components of a Task Force. These include the mandate, thematic and geographical scope, membership and establishment of the Task Force and its working modalities.</i>
Mandate	<i>The "authority given to an elected group of people to perform an action" or the key objectives that the Task Force will aim to achieve.</i>
Work streams	<i>This can be understood as the thematic scope of the Task Force, i.e. what themes, issues or questions the Task Force members are going to discuss in the course of the initiative.</i>
Geographical scope	<i>The geographical scope determines the geographical areas (national, regional and local) that the Task Force will look into over the course of its work.</i>
Establishment	<i>The establishment defines who has the responsibility for setting up, hosting and coordinating the Task Force, including covering the underlying costs and following up on the delivery of the mandate.</i>
Membership	<i>The members of the Task Force (i.e. the actors that will be in charge of carrying out the work in the context of the initiative).</i>
Working modalities	<i>The internal mechanics of the Task Force, such as the organisational set-up, meetings, working groups, division of work and reporting on recommendations.</i>

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Abstract

The ties that bind Africa and the European Union (EU) are broad and deep. They are the results of history, geographical proximity and shared interests expressed through bilateral and multilateral agreements. The EU is determined to strengthen its relations with the African Union and its states and build a stronger political partnership based on mutual commitments, shared responsibility and joint action.

Ocean governance, including fisheries and the blue economy, has been identified as one of the areas in which cooperation between the two continents should be scaled up. To put this in motion and as a good example of enhanced cooperation, the setting up of a dedicated Task Force has been considered. This study analyses the feasibility of and modalities for establishing an EU-Africa "blue" Task Force. Specifically, it examines the thematic and geographical scope, possible work streams of common interest, profiles for membership, working modalities (including a roadmap to the end of 2022) and a communications strategy. In order to gather a sound evidence base, it followed a mixed methodological approach: a detailed desk review as well as consultations of stakeholders in the EU and in Africa.

The study recommends the setting up of an EU-Africa "blue" Task Force following a two-step approach: first, a strategic alignment between the EU and Africa on key priorities and objectives in ocean governance; second, the development of shared action plans with the objective of achieving tangible progress on the ground.

Synthèse

Les liens qui unissent l’Afrique et l’Union européenne (UE) sont étroits et profonds. Ils sont le fruit de l’histoire, de la proximité géographique et d’intérêts communs exprimés par des accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux. L’UE est déterminée à renforcer ses relations avec l’Union africaine et ses États et à construire un partenariat politique plus fort, fondé sur des engagements mutuels, une responsabilité partagée et une action conjointe.

La gouvernance des océans, y compris la pêche et l’économie bleue, a été reconnue comme l’un des domaines dans lesquels la coopération entre les deux continents devrait être intensifiée. Dans cette optique, et comme un bon exemple de coopération renforcée, la création d’une task-force dédiée a été envisagée. La présente étude analyse la faisabilité et les modalités de mise en place d’une task-force «bleue» UE-Afrique. Plus précisément, elle examine la portée thématique et géographique, les éventuels axes de travail d’intérêt commun, les profils des membres, les modalités de travail (y compris une feuille de route jusqu’à la fin de 2022) et une stratégie de communication. Afin de rassembler une base factuelle solide, l’étude a suivi une approche méthodologique mixte: une analyse documentaire détaillée ainsi que des consultations de parties prenantes dans l’UE et en Afrique.

L’étude recommande la mise en place d’une task-force «bleue» UE-Afrique suivant une approche en deux étapes: premièrement, un alignement stratégique entre l’UE et l’Afrique sur les priorités et objectifs clés en matière de gouvernance des océans; deuxièmement, l’élaboration de plans d’action communs dans le but de réaliser des progrès tangibles sur le terrain.

Executive summary

Purpose and scope of the study

The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the feasibility of and modalities for setting up an EU-Africa “blue” Task Force. In doing so, the study [1] reflects upon the thematic and geographical scope, [2] proposes work streams of common interest between the EU and Africa on international ocean governance, and formulates proposals for [3] its membership, [4] working modalities (including a roadmap to the end of 2022), and [5] a communications strategy.

The “blue” Task Force would contribute to promoting closer cooperation with Africa on international ocean governance. It would be in line with the statement issued by the European Commission in the context of the launch of the Africa-Europe Foundation¹, which indicated that the new Task Forces should identify an area for long-term cooperation, the main objectives of that cooperation, and then define which steps need to be taken to achieve those objectives.

The scope of this study covers all EU countries subject to the Integrated Maritime Policy and countries that are members of the African Union.

Overview of methodology

The methodology for this feasibility study followed an evidence-based approach that aimed to establish the need for a “blue” Task Force, as well as its design and working modalities. Three main tasks were carried out to structure the study:

- **Task 1: What will the “blue” Task Force do?** – The aim of Task 1 was to explore the objectives and scope of the “blue” Task Force, and specifically to identify possible mandates, work streams of common interest between the EU and Africa and the geographic scope of the initiative. For this, desk research and stakeholder consultations (online surveys and interviews) were carried out to gather data.
- **Task 2: How will the “blue” Task Force be set up?** – The aim of Task 2 was to propose and assess possible options for how the “blue” Task Force would work. Desk research and targeted interviews were used to examine existing EU-Africa Task Forces to identify examples of best practice.
- **Task 3: How will the “blue” Task Force work?** – The final task triangulated the data gathered and analysis from Tasks 1 and 2 and further developed one single option for the design of the Task Force. This included the drafting of specific working modalities, membership profiles, geographical scope, work streams of common interest, a calendar of activities and a communications strategy.

The potential for a “blue” Task Force

The study found that there is a clear need for a dedicated Task Force on international ocean governance between the EU and Africa. Evidence from the desk research and stakeholder consultations reiterated this need. From the review of relevant strategy documents and literature, several topic areas, such as the blue economy and maritime security, were highlighted as areas of common interest that would benefit from increased collaboration. Strategies such as the EU’s 2020 comprehensive strategy with Africa and the AU’s “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want” also emphasise the need for increased cooperation and partnership between the EU and Africa on these topics.

¹ See here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2271

Stakeholder consultations revealed general agreement that an EU-Africa Task Force could increase and improve the level of cooperation between the two continents and expand the sharing of knowledge and capacity building in the context of ocean governance.

Crucially, such an initiative was also seen as a potential vehicle for increasing momentum around ocean governance and acting as an opportunity to achieve tangible progress on common objectives in this area. This agreement is summarised succinctly in the following quotes from stakeholders:

"...Political initiatives, especially when they are at this level, can have a substantial leverage effect to put actors around the table and make people take decisions and act. Africa needs that kind of effort." [Representative of the European Union in Africa]

"...The success of such [a] Task Force would be subject to acceptance by African partners. The level of acceptance depends on the ownership and understanding of the benefits." [Member State of the European Union]

Existing EU-Africa Task Forces show the potential for increased cooperation and dialogue between the EU and Africa on areas of common interest. Across each of the Task Forces that were analysed, one important outcome was the development of, and agreement on, a set of recommendations or actions for increased cooperation between Europe and Africa.

Possible options for a “blue” Task Force

As part of Task 2 of the study, different options for each of the design elements of the Task Force (i.e. mandate, work streams of common interest, geographical scope, establishment, membership and working modalities) were identified. These included a description of the possible implications of selecting each option, as well as an indication of their main strengths and weaknesses.

From the analysis of the different options for each design element, two options were recommended. These options included a proposal for each design element of the Task Force, as outlined in the table below.

Table 0.1. Proposed options for the possible design of a “blue” Task Force

	Option – Operational Task Force	Option – Two-Phase Task Force
Mandate	To define a shared action plan to achieve actionable progress on existing objectives	To define common objectives and subsequently define a shared action plan
Geographical scope	An overarching continental mandate, with specific work streams looking at regional specificities	An overarching continental mandate, with a focus towards regional specificities where relevant
Work streams of common interest	A specific and pre-defined thematic scope	Broad topical scope, not defined beforehand
Membership	Medium size, Standing Membership, Policy experts + Experts + Civil society	Medium size, Standing Membership and ad hoc engagement, Policy experts + Experts + Civil society
Working modalities	Secretariat + Chairs, Different working groups + Plenary	Flexible structure: working groups created as needed

	Option – Operational Task Force	Option – Two-Phase Task Force
Establishment	The Task Force is established jointly by the EU and Africa	The Task Force is established jointly by the EU and Africa

Selected Task Force design

The “Two-Phase Task Force” design was identified as the preferred option. This decision was based on the need for common objectives on ocean governance between the EU and Africa to be defined before the development of shared action plan(s). Similarly, the Two-Phase Task Force approach was seen to enable greater ownership by the Task Force members, which would be crucial in achieving strategic alignment on the key priorities between the EU and Africa.

Mandate

The study found that while some common objectives regarding international ocean governance between the EU and Africa are already being pursued, these objectives have not yet been commonly agreed upon or fully defined. As such, the study suggests that the Task Force operates under the following mandate.

The Task Force will [1] aim to achieve strategic alignment on the key priorities and objectives between the two continents on international ocean governance and select the main work streams the Task Force will focus on. It will also [2] aim to produce a shared action plan to achieve tangible progress on the agreed set of common priorities and objectives.

To fulfil this mandate, the Task Force will be organised in two “phases”, as described below.

- **Phase 1 – Strategic:** The Task Force members will have an open-ended discussion on different possible common priorities and objectives between the EU and Africa on international ocean governance. Subsequently, the members will be asked to prioritise and select the key areas of cooperation they want to work on in the subsequent phase of the Task Force (i.e. work streams of common interest).
- **Phase 2 – Operational:** The Task Force members will develop a concrete action plan to achieve actionable progress on the common priorities and objectives identified in Phase 1, in relation to each respective work stream selected. The output of this work will be a document outlining a set of actions and recommendations, including the definition of a timeline and the identification of relevant key actors who should implement these actions on the ground.

Membership

The membership of the Task Force will be medium in size. The Task Force will have up to 31 standing members comprising EU and African policy-makers as well as civil society representatives. These members will be selected by both the EU and the AU, starting from a long list of possible members as drawn up by them with the help of the Secretariat of the Task Force. The members of the Task Force will be in charge of defining the work streams of common interest between the EU and Africa, as well as the respective key priorities and objectives to be pursued.

Working modalities

Two chairpersons will steer the work of the Task Force. The EU and the AU will select the chairpersons with the support of the Secretariat. One chairperson will represent the EU continent, and the other the African continent.

A permanent secretariat will support the work of the Task Force by facilitating the smooth running of day-to-day operations e.g. organising meetings, correspondence with the Task Force members and other experts, and setting up stakeholder consultation activities.

A 20-person expert panel will be created following a call for experts to support the work of the Task Force. This expert panel will support discussion or provide specific input and insights on different issues at hand in the form of hearings. The experts may come from different institutions, and from academic/scientific or technical/advisory backgrounds. The spectrum of world views gained from these experts will cover multidisciplinary aspects of the topics under discussion in the Task Force.

The organisation and working modalities of the Task Force will operate within a framework that provides some flexibility. In Phase 1, the Task Force will operate in a plenary. Once the main priorities have been agreed upon, the Task Force members and chairpersons will decide how best to organisationally proceed under Phase 2. Should more specific thematic areas be identified, the Task Force may disband into **working groups** consisting of the standing members. Each working group will produce a draft of the shared action plan for the subtopic of its concern, which will be subsequently discussed in a plenary with the entire Task Force. The working groups may call upon the expert panel to assist in the gathering of information and development of the shared action plans.

As part of this study, draft versions of the Rules of Procedure (see Appendix 6) and a call for experts (see Appendix 5), which could be used for establishing the Task Force, have been produced.

Calendar of activities

A minimum of three months has been allocated for the preparation work of the Task Force before its establishment. This work will include the selection and appointment of the secretariat, chairpersons and Task Force members. It is anticipated that the Task Force will be established in the second half of 2021.

The Task Force will operate over a 12-month period and be structured across six meetings. A stocktaking event could take place alongside the UN Ocean Conference that is scheduled for mid-2022.

The Task Force will aim to present the main results and action plans as part of the 7th African Union-EU summit. This summit is expected to take place at the end of the second half of 2022 and will provide an important opportunity for the Task Force to present its work to a wide and diverse audience at an international level.

Communications strategy

The communications strategy comprises two main goals: [1] to ensure that the Task Force and the work it produces is recognised internationally; and [2] to raise awareness of cooperation between the EU and Africa on international ocean governance more generally. To operationalise the communications strategy, a mixed method approach has been developed. This includes the development of an accessible and wide-reaching online presence through the use of websites and social media platforms. The presentation of results at conferences and events is also a central

element, not only to raise awareness of the Task Force's topic area, but also to ensure the shared action plans can be recognised and enacted.

Résumé

Objectif et portée de l'étude

L'objectif de cette étude est de fournir une analyse de la faisabilité de la mise en place d'une task-force «bleue» UE-Afrique ainsi que de ses modalités. Ce faisant, l'étude 1) se penche sur la portée thématique et géographique, 2) propose des axes de travail d'intérêt commun entre l'UE et l'Afrique concernant la gouvernance internationale des océans, et formule des propositions pour 3) la composition de la task-force, 4) les modalités de travail (y compris une feuille de route jusqu'à la fin de 2022), et 5) une stratégie de communication.

La task-force «bleue» contribuerait à promouvoir une coopération plus étroite avec l'Afrique en matière de gouvernance internationale des océans. Elle serait conforme à la déclaration publiée par la Commission européenne dans le cadre du lancement de la Fondation Afrique-Europe², qui indiquait que les nouvelles task-forces devraient identifier un domaine de coopération à long terme, les principaux objectifs de cette coopération, puis définir les mesures à prendre pour atteindre ces objectifs.

Le champ d'application de cette étude recouvre tous les pays de l'UE soumis à la politique maritime intégrée et les pays membres de l'Union africaine.

Aperçu de la méthodologie

La méthodologie de cette étude de faisabilité a suivi une approche fondée sur des données probantes qui visait à établir la nécessité d'une task-force «bleue», ainsi que sa conception et ses modalités de travail. Trois tâches principales ont été réalisées pour structurer l'étude:

- **Tâche 1: Que fera la task-force «bleue»?** - L'objectif de la tâche 1 était d'examiner les objectifs et la portée de la task-force «bleue», et plus particulièrement de déterminer les mandats éventuels, les axes de travail d'intérêt commun entre l'UE et l'Afrique et la portée géographique de l'initiative. Pour ce faire, des travaux de recherche documentaire et des consultations de parties prenantes (enquêtes et entretiens en ligne) ont été menés pour recueillir des données.
- **Tâche 2: Comment la task-force «bleue» sera-t-elle mise en place?** - L'objectif de la tâche 2 était de proposer et d'évaluer les options possibles pour le fonctionnement de la task-force «bleue». Des travaux de recherche documentaire et des entretiens ciblés ont été menés pour examiner les task-forces UE-Afrique existantes afin de recenser des exemples de bonnes pratiques.
- **Tâche 3: Comment la task-force «bleue» fonctionnera-t-elle?** - La tâche finale a porté sur la triangulation des données recueillies et l'analyse des tâches 1 et 2 et a développé plus avant une option unique pour la conception de la task-force. Cette conception comprenait la rédaction de modalités de travail spécifiques, le profil des membres, la portée géographique, les axes de travail d'intérêt commun, un calendrier d'activités et une stratégie de communication.

Le potentiel d'une task-force «bleue»

L'étude a conclu qu'il existe une nécessité évidente de créer une task-force dédiée à la gouvernance internationale des océans entre l'UE et l'Afrique. Les données probantes issues de la recherche documentaire et les consultations des parties prenantes ont confirmé cette

² Voir ici: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_20_2271

nécessité. L'examen de la littérature et des documents stratégiques pertinents a mis en évidence plusieurs domaines thématiques, tels que l'économie bleue et la sécurité maritime, en tant que domaines d'intérêt commun qui bénéficieraient d'une collaboration accrue. Des stratégies telles que la stratégie globale 2020 de l'UE avec l'Afrique et l'«Agenda 2063: L'Afrique que nous voulons» de l'Union Africaine (UA) soulignent également la nécessité d'une coopération et d'un partenariat accrus entre l'UE et l'Afrique sur ces sujets.

Les consultations des parties prenantes ont révélé un accord général sur le fait qu'une task-force UE-Afrique pourrait accroître et améliorer le niveau de coopération entre les deux continents et accroître le partage des connaissances et le renforcement des capacités dans le contexte de la gouvernance des océans. Il est essentiel de noter qu'une telle initiative a également été considérée comme un moyen potentiel d'intensifier la dynamique de la gouvernance des océans et de réaliser des progrès tangibles sur les objectifs communs dans ce domaine. Cet accord est résumé succinctement dans les citations suivantes des parties prenantes:

«...Les initiatives politiques, surtout lorsqu'elles se situent à ce niveau, peuvent avoir un effet de levier substantiel pour réunir les acteurs autour de la table et amener les personnes à prendre des décisions et à agir. L'Afrique a besoin de ce genre d'effort.»
[Représentant de l'Union européenne en Afrique]

«...Le succès d'une telle task-force serait soumis à l'acceptation des partenaires africains. Le niveau d'acceptation dépend de l'appropriation et de la compréhension des avantages.»
[État membre de l'Union européenne]

Les task-forces UE-Afrique existantes montrent le potentiel d'une coopération et d'un dialogue accrus entre l'UE et l'Afrique dans des domaines d'intérêt commun. Un résultat important de l'analyse de chacune des task-forces a été l'élaboration et l'adoption d'une série de recommandations ou d'actions visant à renforcer la coopération entre l'Europe et l'Afrique.

Options éventuelles pour une task-force «bleue»

Dans le cadre de la tâche 2 de l'étude, différentes options pour chacun des éléments de conception de la task force (c'est-à-dire le mandat, les axes de travail d'intérêt commun, la portée géographique, la mise sur pied, la composition et les modalités de travail) ont été établies. Celles-ci comprenaient une description des implications possibles de chaque option, ainsi qu'une indication de leurs principaux points forts et points faibles.

À partir de l'analyse des différentes options pour chaque élément de conception, deux options ont été recommandées. Ces options comprenaient une proposition pour chaque élément de conception de la task-force, comme indiqué dans le tableau ci-dessous.

Tableau 0.1. Options proposées pour la conception éventuelle d'une task-force «bleue»

	Option - Task-force opérationnelle	Option - Task-force en deux phases
Mandat	Définir un plan d'action commun pour réaliser des progrès exploitables sur les objectifs existants.	Définir des objectifs communs et ensuite définir un plan d'action commun.
Portée géographique	Un mandat continental global, avec des axes de travail spécifiques englobant les spécificités régionales.	Un mandat continental global, avec un accent mis sur les spécificités régionales, le cas échéant.
Axes de travail d'intérêt commun	Un champ thématique spécifique et prédéfini	Un champ thématique large, non défini au préalable
Composition	Taille moyenne, membres permanents, experts politiques + experts + société civile	Taille moyenne, membres permanents et implication ad hoc, experts politiques + experts + société civile.
Modalités de travail	Secrétariat + présidents, différents groupes de travail + plénière	Structure flexible: groupes de travail créés selon les besoins
Mise sur pied	La task-force est établie conjointement par l'UE et l'Afrique.	La task-force est établie conjointement par l'UE et l'Afrique.

Conception choisie de la task-force

La conception de la «task-force en deux phases» a été retenue comme option préférée. Cette décision s'est fondée sur la nécessité de définir des objectifs communs en matière de gouvernance des océans entre l'UE et l'Afrique avant d'élaborer un ou plusieurs plans d'action communs. De même, l'approche de la task-force en deux phases a été considérée comme permettant une plus grande appropriation par les membres de la task-force, ce qui serait crucial pour atteindre un alignement stratégique sur les priorités clés entre l'UE et l'Afrique.

Mandat

L'étude a révélé que si l'UE et l'Afrique poursuivent déjà certains objectifs communs en matière de gouvernance internationale des océans, ces objectifs n'ont pas encore fait l'objet d'un accord commun ou d'une définition complète. Dès lors, l'étude semble indiquer que la task-force fonctionne selon le mandat suivant.

La task-force 1) aura pour objectif de réaliser un alignement stratégique sur les priorités et les objectifs clés entre les deux continents en matière de gouvernance internationale des océans et de sélectionner les principaux axes de travail sur lesquels la task-force se concentrera. Elle aura également pour objectif 2) de produire un plan d'action commun afin de réaliser des progrès tangibles sur l'ensemble des priorités et objectifs communs convenus.

Pour remplir ce mandat, la task-force sera organisée en deux «phases», comme décrit ci-après.

- **Phase 1 – stratégique:** Les membres de la task-force auront une discussion ouverte sur les différentes priorités et objectifs communs possibles entre l'UE et l'Afrique concernant la gouvernance internationale des océans. Ensuite, il sera demandé aux membres d'établir des

priorités et de sélectionner les principaux domaines de coopération sur lesquels ils souhaitent travailler au cours de la phase suivante de la task-force (c'est-à-dire les axes de travail d'intérêt commun).

- **Phase 2 – opérationnelle:** Les membres de la task-force élaboreront un plan d'action concret pour réaliser des progrès exploitables sur les priorités et objectifs communs établis dans la phase 1, en relation avec chaque axe de travail respectif sélectionné. Le résultat de ce travail sera un document décrivant une série d'actions et de recommandations, y compris la définition d'un calendrier et l'identification des acteurs clés pertinents qui devraient mettre en œuvre ces actions sur le terrain.

Composition

La composition de la task-force sera de taille moyenne. Elle comptera jusqu'à 31 membres permanents comprenant des décideurs politiques européens et africains ainsi que des représentants de la société civile. Ces membres seront sélectionnés par l'UE et l'UA, à partir d'une longue liste de membres potentiels établie par ces dernières avec l'aide du secrétariat de la task-force. Les membres de la task-force seront chargés de définir les axes de travail d'intérêt commun entre l'UE et l'Afrique, ainsi que les priorités et objectifs clés respectifs à poursuivre.

Modalités de travail

Deux présidents dirigeront les travaux de la task-force. L'UE et l'UA choisiront les présidents avec le soutien du Secrétariat. L'un des présidents représentera le continent européen, et l'autre le continent africain.

Un secrétariat permanent soutiendra les travaux de la task-force en facilitant le bon déroulement des opérations quotidiennes, par exemple l'organisation des réunions, la correspondance avec les membres de la task-force et d'autres experts, et la mise en place d'activités de consultation des parties prenantes.

Un panel d'experts de 20 personnes sera créé suite à un appel à experts pour soutenir le travail de la task-force. Ce panel d'experts soutiendra la discussion ou apportera des contributions et des points de vue spécifiques sur les différentes questions abordées sous la forme d'auditions. Les experts peuvent provenir de différentes institutions, et avoir une formation universitaire/scientifique ou technique/de conseil. Le spectre des visions du monde acquises par ces experts couvrira les aspects multidisciplinaires des sujets discutés par la task-force.

L'organisation et les modalités de travail de la task-force s'inscriront dans un cadre offrant une certaine souplesse. Au cours de la phase 1, la task-force fonctionnera en séance plénière. Une fois les principales priorités convenues, les membres et les présidents de la task-force décideront de la meilleure façon de procéder sur le plan organisationnel lors de la phase 2. Si des domaines thématiques plus spécifiques sont établis, la task-force pourra se diviser en **groupes de travail** composés des membres permanents. Chaque groupe de travail produira un projet de plan d'action commun pour le sous-thème qui le concerne, qui sera ensuite discuté en séance plénière avec l'ensemble de la task-force. Les groupes de travail peuvent faire appel au groupe d'experts pour les aider à recueillir des informations et à élaborer les plans d'action communs.

Dans le cadre de cette étude, des versions provisoires du règlement intérieur (voir Appendix 6) et un appel aux experts (voir Appendix 5), qui pourraient être utilisés pour établir la task-force, ont été produits.

Calendrier des activités

Une période minimale de trois mois a été allouée au travail de préparation de la task-force avant sa mise sur pied. Ce travail comprendra la sélection et la nomination du secrétariat, des présidents et des membres de la task-force. Il est prévu que la task-force soit mise en place au cours du second semestre 2021.

La task-force opérera sur une période de 12 mois et tiendra six réunions. Un bilan pourrait être dressé en même temps que se tiendra la conférence des Nations unies sur les océans, prévue pour la mi-2022.

La task-force aura pour objectif de présenter les principaux résultats et plans d'action dans le cadre du 7^e sommet Union africaine-UE. Ce sommet devrait avoir lieu à la fin du second semestre de 2022 et constituera une occasion importante pour la task-force de présenter ses travaux à un public large et diversifié au niveau international.

Stratégie de communication

La stratégie de communication comprend deux objectifs principaux: 1) faire en sorte que la task-force et ses travaux soient reconnus au niveau international; et 2) sensibiliser à la coopération entre l'UE et l'Afrique sur la gouvernance internationale des océans de manière plus générale. Pour rendre opérationnelle la stratégie de communication, une approche mixte a été élaborée. Elle comprend le développement d'une présence en ligne accessible et étendue grâce à l'utilisation de sites internet et de plateformes de médias sociaux. La présentation des résultats lors de conférences et d'événements est également un élément central, non seulement pour sensibiliser au domaine thématique de la task-force, mais aussi pour s'assurer que les plans d'action communs puissent être reconnus et mis en œuvre.

1. Introduction

This document is the final report for the project “Feasibility study on establishing an EU-Africa Task Force for Policy Cooperation and Dialogue on International Ocean Governance”.

The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the feasibility and modalities for setting up an EU-Africa “blue” Task Force. In particular, it reflects upon its thematic and geographical scope, work streams of common interest, its membership and working modalities and communications strategy.

The scope of the study covers all EU countries subject to the Integrated Maritime Policy and countries that are members of the African Union.

The report is organised into two parts. The first part will present the methodology used in the study as well as the main options which were developed as part of Tasks 1 and 2:

- **Chapter 2: Methodology.**
- **Chapter 3: The potential for a “blue” Task Force.** This section will outline the rationale of the European Commission in developing an ocean governance agenda with Africa through an integrated and coherent approach to ocean-related matters.
- **Chapter 4: Options for the establishment of a “blue” Task Force.** This constitutes the output of Tasks 1 and 2, and as such it contains:
 - a description of the options for the mandate, work streams of common interest and geographic scope of a “blue” Task Force;
 - a description of the options for the establishment, membership, working modalities of a “blue” Task Force;
 - overarching considerations regarding the creation of the “blue” Task Force;
 - assessment of the recommended options for the creation of the “blue” Task Force.

The second part will describe how the task force will be set up, according to the work carried out under Task 3 (Chapter 5), as well as the main conclusions from the study.


- **Chapter 5: Elements of the “blue” Task Force.** This constitutes the output of Task 3, and as such it contains:
 - the mandate;
 - work streams of common interest;
 - the working modalities of the Task Force, including the rules of procedure, to ensure that the work of the “blue” Task Force is inclusive, efficient and transparent;
 - proposals for a geographically- and gender-balanced membership;
 - a proposal for a calendar with main milestones for the work of the Task Force;
 - a communications strategy to ensure the timely and appropriate visibility of the task force.
- **Chapter 6: Conclusions**

The main body of the report is accompanied with a set of appendices. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the existing Task Forces that were examined, while Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 present concept notes summarising the findings from the stakeholder consultations and desk research. Appendix 4 presents the mapping of the key stakeholders. Appendix 5 displays a call for applications, Appendix 6 the draft rules of procedure, while Appendix 7 presents a communications strategy for the Task Force.

2. Methodology

This chapter provides an overview of the methodology adopted in this study. It presents the different phases and accompanying tools, as well as a brief overview of the mitigations and limitations of the study. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the tasks that were conducted and their main outputs. A selection of methods was used in each task, as described in the following sections.

Figure 2.1 Overview of the study tasks and main outputs



2.1 Desk research

Two types of desk research were carried out as part of this study: [1] Opportunities and challenges for ocean governance cooperation between the EU and Africa; and [2] an assessment of existing Task Force designs to identify best practices. Together, they provide both contextual and baseline information, which fed into Tasks 1 and 2 on the creation of options for a possible "blue" Task Force.

2.1.1 Desk research 1: Opportunities and challenges for cooperation in ocean governance between the EU and Africa

The first part of the desk research aimed to examine the main areas of opportunities and challenges relating to international ocean governance between the EU and Africa. This corresponds to the three main research questions that guided the research:

- What are the areas of common interest on ocean governance between the EU and Africa?
- What are the current challenges to EU-Africa cooperation on ocean governance?
- What are the opportunities for EU-Africa cooperation on ocean governance?

Following the identification and screening of relevant literature, the documentary evidence was processed and analysed. The results of the desk research were then collated in a short note presenting the answers for each research question (see Appendix 2). The evidence collected constitutes a basis for drafting the mandate, work streams, focused regions and countries under Tasks 1 and 2.

2.1.2 Desk research 2: Assessment of task force designs to identify best practices

The second part of the desk research included an assessment of past and present Task Forces to identify best practices that could be adopted as part of the design of a “blue” Task Force. Overall, six Task Forces were selected, including thematic EU-Africa Task Forces and Task Forces set up by the European Commission with other regions of the world and whose assessment was deemed relevant³.

Evidence pertaining to the Task Forces was collected and analysed according to the key design elements of a Task Force (i.e. their establishment, working modalities and membership). Interviews were also carried out with individuals involved in their establishment and implementation in order to gather further insights and information on the characteristics and functioning of the Task Forces. From triangulation of the interviews and desk research, conclusions were drawn on the key success factors and good practices, as well as pitfalls to avoid when establishing a Task Force. Similar to the above-mentioned desk-based research, the information fed into Tasks 1 and 2 on the design of options for a possible “blue” Task Force.

2.2 Stakeholder consultation

Stakeholder consultations were carried out to reach a larger number of stakeholders and to enhance the credibility of the study. As such, three types of stakeholder consultations were conducted: an online survey, a group interview with European Commission services and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and face-to-face interviews with other stakeholder groups. A total of **67 stakeholders were consulted**, as summarised in the table below.

³ These included Task Force Rural Africa, EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments, Digital Economy Task Force, Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Task Force, Support Group for Ukraine and Iran Task Force.

Table 2.1 Overview of consultation tool utilised per stakeholder type and number of stakeholders consulted per stakeholder type

Stakeholder type	Consultation tool utilised			Number of stakeholders consulted
	Survey	Group interview	Interview	
European Union stakeholders	✓	✓	✓	33
European Commission Services and EU Agencies		✓	✓	10
EU Delegations and Fisheries Attachés	✓		✓	15
EU Member States	✓			8
African Union stakeholders			✓	13
African Union bodies			✓	3
AU Member States			✓	10
International and regional organisations			✓	6
International organisations (UN bodies, other)			✓	3
Regional organisations (RSCs, RFMOs, other)			✓	3
Academia			✓	6
NGOs			✓	4
Industry associations/Business forums/private sector			✓	2
Other (EU programmes and projects)			✓	3
Total				67

2.2.1 Interviews

In the group interview with European Commission services and EEAS, **eight participants representing seven different departments** were present. These departments included DG MARE, DG INTPA⁴, DG RTD, DG NEAR, DG AGRI, EEAS General Secretariat and the delegation of the European Union to the African Union. The group interview aimed to act as a forward-looking exercise on the objectives and possible set-up of the Task Force.

The remaining interviews targeted 11 stakeholder categories⁵, of which **36 interviews were conducted**. A full list of the stakeholders consulted is presented in Appendix 3.

The aim of the interviews was to collect evidence for the needs assessment in the diagnosis phase of the study, and to identify the desirable objectives for the Task Force. The interviews also acted as a source of information for the design and analysis of the options for the establishment of the Task Force.

⁴ Previously named DG DEVCO

⁵ This includes European Union Agencies, EU-Africa projects/programmes, African Union Agencies, African Regional Economic Communities, AU Member States, UN bodies, Regional Seas Conventions, Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, NGOs, Industry associations and Academia.

2.2.2 Online surveys

A short online survey to gather feedback from two specific stakeholder types – [1] EU delegations and Fisheries Attachés and [2] national authorities within EU Member States – was launched over a five-week period. In total, **23 responses were gathered**. The survey closely followed the interview questions, looking into stakeholders' needs, and opportunities and challenges of setting up a "blue" Task Force. Similar to the interviews, the online survey results were analysed and fed into the development and design of possible options for a "blue" Task Force.

A concept note summarising the findings from the stakeholder consultations can be found in Appendix 3.

3. The potential for a “blue” Task Force

This chapter describes the potential for a “blue” Task Force in order to delineate the background and context of the study. As such, it highlights previous cooperation between the EU and Africa, while detailing the rationale for establishing a Task Force on international ocean governance. For further information on the context of establishing a “blue” Task Force, see Appendix 2.

EU-Africa relations have gained a high profile on the EU’s external action agenda

The EU and Africa have a long tradition as partners in trade and collaboration in development through bilateral agreements with African States as well as multilateral agreements, such as the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 (currently being renewed)⁶.

As with overall EU-Africa relations, the collaboration between the EU and the African Union (AU), or its predecessor the “Organisation of African Unity”, has intensified. This has been manifested in five EU-AU summits since 2000. The relationship between both continental organisations has increasingly put its focus on reciprocal benefits, global challenges and improving the lives of citizens on both continents. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the 2nd EU-AU summit in 2007⁷ laid the foundations and was renewed at the most recent summit in 2017.

In this context, the European Commission adopted a Communication on a new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs in 2018⁸ to implement the agreements of the 2017 summit. More specifically, it aimed to shape collaboration after the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 and build on the principles of partnership, dialogue and ownership to create economic benefits for citizens in Africa and in the EU. The Communication proposed several courses of action where joint strategic development was necessary, such as agriculture, digital solutions and energy. For each of these topics, an EU-Africa Task force was set up in the end of 2018 or in January 2019 (see Appendix 1).

In the more recent Commission Communication “Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa”⁹, the many benefits that arise from enhanced collaboration to create sustainable and inclusive development are once again stressed. With shared international commitments such as the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and joint commitment to address the unsustainable management of natural resources in the 2017 Abidjan Declaration, promoting environmental and social sustainability has become a clear focus of the EU-Africa relations.

Ocean governance is one of the areas of focus for collaboration towards sustainable development between the EU and AU. SDG-14 calls for conservation and the sustainable use of marine resources. This is reflected in Proposed Action 1 of the recent strategy with Africa:

“...Europe and Africa are allies in the development of sustainable energy, transport solutions, farming, circular and blue economies which can underpin Africa’s economic growth...” (p. 2)

“...In partnership with Africa, the EU should encourage better ocean governance, including the development of a sustainable fisheries and blue economy...” (p. 4). (European

⁶ Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2291

⁷ Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf

⁸ Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/africaeuropealliance_en

⁹ European Commission (2020). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/communication-eu-africa-strategy-join-2020-4-final_en.pdf

Commission (2020). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa).

Current EU-Africa cooperation on ocean governance is strong but lacking alignment

The EU and the Member States of the AU share sea basins, such as the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Cooperation between the EU and Africa on ocean-related issues is articulated in a wide variety of mechanisms and initiatives involving several actors at different levels. This cooperation mainly revolves around issues such as the blue economy, including sustainable fisheries and IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing and maritime security. This cooperation takes the form of continental, regional and country-level political dialogue, joint programmes, joint involvement in international and regional organisations and participation in multilateral or bilateral agreements between the EU and several African countries.

Cooperation on maritime issues has a strong tradition in the EU and the Member States of the AU. The Barcelona Convention of 1976¹⁰ established the framework for cooperation between shoreline countries of the Mediterranean. With a focus on preventing ocean pollution, it laid the foundations for promoting sustainable development across the sea basin and protecting its marine resources. Bilaterally, the EU has Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) with ten African countries, ensuring the development of sustainable fisheries in the EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) of those countries. The partnerships offer support for coastal communities and clear legal frameworks for fishing activities. Additionally, governance of the oceans is organised through several Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). The EU and the Member States of the AU cooperate in multiple RFMOs governing the ocean waters they share. The EU also cooperates with several of the AU Members in combating IUU fishing through bilateral dialogues and regional programmes.

However, cooperation on ocean governance also matters beyond direct neighbourhoods. The migratory nature of most fish stocks creates strong interdependencies between activities taking place in different parts of the oceans and between EEZs of individual states and the high seas. Consequently, both Africa and the EU have an interest in the sustainable management of marine resources that form important parts of their economies and offer even more potential in the area of the blue economy, as was once again confirmed in the EU Blue Economy Report 2019¹¹.

The current mechanisms of cooperation can be strengthened to ensure they produce concrete and relevant impacts for stakeholders on the ground. To this end, enhanced coordination, consistency, transparency and evaluation of the existing cooperation initiatives would be welcome. Greater involvement of African partners, including local communities, in the design and implementation of the initiatives is also crucial to promoting buy-in and ensuring the initiatives respond to the needs on the ground.

The scope of EU-Africa cooperation can be expanded beyond the current extensive focus on fisheries. Cooperation on additional topics, such as emerging sectors of the blue economy and ecosystem-based management, could be reinforced.

EU-Africa cooperation on ocean governance is challenged by several factors. These include the fragility and weak governance capacity of states, weak cooperation between relevant authorities, limited involvement of local communities in decision-making, corruption and unfavourable business environments. The uneven distribution of investments, as well as the lack of scientific knowledge and insufficient cooperation between countries within the African continent also

¹⁰ Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/international-cooperation/regional-sea-conventions/barcelona-convention/index_en.htm

¹¹ European Commission (2019). The EU Blue Economy Report. 2019. Publications Office of the European Union. Luxembourg.

constitute hindering factors. In addition, the underlying complexity of the continent, with its broad diversity of interests and weak stakeholder representation, also plays a role in impeding fruitful cooperation on ocean-related issues. Despite this, an overall lack of prioritisation has slowed progress in this field.

There is therefore an opportunity to coordinate and streamline initiatives for cooperation between the EU and Africa. An overarching strategy for ocean governance should increase the effectiveness and efficiency of EU-Africa actions to promote sustainable development in the maritime sector and tap into the potential of the blue economy for both continents.

The need for a dedicated task force

In this context, a dedicated task force on ocean governance would be an asset for developing important strategies and recommendations for the future development of EU-Africa relations in this area. The high relevance of the blue economy for both continents and the shared use of many marine resources creates a promising environment for joint efforts. The relevance is stressed in strategy documents of the European Commission, such as the comprehensive strategy with Africa and the agenda for the future of our oceans¹² as well as AU strategies such as Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want¹³.

The 2020 communication on the comprehensive strategy with Africa places a focus on ocean governance, including the blue economy as an essential area of partnership. This focus has also been reflected in AU-level strategies such as the Africa Blue Economy Strategy¹⁴, which details the need for action in Africa's blue economy across five key thematic areas¹⁵, including fisheries, coastal tourism and maritime security. In 2018, the communication on a new Africa-Europe Alliance stressed agriculture, digital economy, energy and transport as critical economic areas for increased focus. For each of these areas a dedicated task force was established to provide strategic recommendations. However, a similar task force has not been established for ocean governance. The existing approaches differed from one task force to another but proved to be successful in promoting cooperation. With the increased focus on ocean governance, such a mechanism for developing a joint strategy with specific action points also becomes increasingly relevant.

The establishment of an EU-Africa "blue" Task Force on ocean governance would be welcomed by the stakeholders consulted¹⁶. The initiative could increase the level of cooperation between the two continents and expand the sharing of knowledge and capacity building in the context of ocean governance. It could increase the momentum around ocean governance and could be an opportunity to achieve progress on existing objectives or to agree on common principles in the area of ocean governance. Building on an enhanced understanding of needs and opportunities, the initiative could foster the adoption of an integrated approach to ocean-related cooperation and promote implementation of the international framework on the management of ocean resources between the EU and Africa.

¹² JOIN(2016) 49 - International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans

¹³ Available at: <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview>

¹⁴ African Union (2019). Africa's Blue Economy Strategy. Available at: https://osf.io/3vy94/?view_only=ea6924dc03bd4f728f5635e81ee6bfc6

¹⁵ These include: [1] Fisheries, aquaculture, conservation and sustainable aquatic ecosystems; [2] Shipping/transportation, trade, ports, maritime security, safety and enforcement; [3] Coastal and maritime tourism, climate change, resilience, environment, infrastructure; [4] Sustainable energy and mineral resources and innovative industries; [5] Policies, institutional and governance, employment, job creation and poverty eradication, innovative financing.

¹⁶ 25 out of the 36 interviewed stakeholders explicitly express a need for a blue Task Force. These cover all types of stakeholders.

A “blue” Task Force with a clear mandate can therefore provide added value in building such a strategy that addresses the needs of citizens in the EU and the AU. Coupled with an experienced membership and wealth of expertise, a “blue” Task Force poses an important opportunity to further strengthen the existing areas of cooperation between the EU and Africa, and all relevant stakeholders.

4. Options for the establishment of a “blue” Task Force

This chapter presents the results from Task 1 on the options for the establishment of a “blue” Task Force, and Task 2 on the elements of a “blue” Task Force. As such, it presents the following:


1. an overview of the design elements of the Task Force and interlinkages, including the definition of each element (i.e. mandate, work streams of common interest, geographical scope, establishment, membership and working modalities).
2. lessons learned from existing Task Forces on each of these elements, including best practices and pitfalls to avoid.
3. description of possible options for each of the above-mentioned elements in the context of the EU-Africa “blue” Task Force, including the implications of selecting each option, strengths and weaknesses.
4. overarching considerations for the establishment of the Task Force.
5. recommendations for the most viable options for the EU-Africa “blue” Task Force, and assessment of these options (SWOT analysis and cost assessment).

4.1 Design elements of the Task Force

Task Forces are made up of several design elements: the mandate, thematic and geographical scope, membership, establishment of the Task Force and working modalities. As part of this study, a series of options and recommendations is proposed for each of these elements, tailored to a possible EU-Africa “blue” Task Force.

All design elements of the Task Force are closely interlinked, and the selection of the mandate (i.e. the purpose of the Task Force) has a particularly large bearing on the selection of the other elements. An overview of the main linkages between the Task Force design elements are presented in the figure below.

Figure 4.1 Overview of interlinkages between Task Force design elements



The following sections describe and assess possible options for each of the design elements of the Task Force (section 4.1 to section 4.7), followed by an analysis of the best combination of elements based on possible mandates (section 4.9). This section takes into account the interconnectedness of the design elements of the Task Force.

4.2 Mandate

4.2.1 Definition of the mandate

In general terms, a mandate can be defined as “the authority given to an elected group of people to perform an action”¹⁷. In our understanding, the mandate of the Task Force specifies “what the ‘blue’ Task Force will do”, i.e. what the members of the Task Force will be tasked to achieve (or given the authority to achieve) with their work.

The definition of the mandate is a crucial step when setting up a Task Force, as this has an influence on many other elements making up the initiative, such as thematic and geographical scope, membership and working modalities. For the Task Force to be effective, it is important that all these elements are tailored to the mandate and are conducive to its attainment.

As per the original objective of this study, the overarching aim of the “blue” Task Force should be to promote closer cooperation between the EU and Africa on the international ocean governance agenda, an agenda that the European Commission aims to develop with Africa with the ambition of establishing an integrated and coherent approach to ocean-related matters.

Against this backdrop, there can be multiple options for the mandate, as presented below in section 4.2.3.

4.2.2 Lessons learned from existing Task Forces and best practices

Crucial to the success of any Task Force is a clear and concise mandate. With respect to the EU-Africa specific Task Forces, an important aspect that linked them all together was the statement delivered by President Jean-Claude Juncker in his 2018 State of the Union address, with the new and ambitious “Africa-Europe alliance”, with the aim of boosting investment in Africa, strengthening trade, creating jobs and investing in education and skills. The mandates for each Task Force therefore came under the broader mandate of the “Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs” to:

“...promote a substantial increase of private investment from both Africans and Europeans, boost trade, enhance job creation and contribute to sustainable and inclusive development, promoting standards of modern and sustainable technology, environmental and labour protection, and responsible business conduct.” (European Commission Communication, 2018, p. 1)¹⁸

The table below provides an overview of the mandate from each of the Task Forces.

¹⁷ Oxford dictionary. 2020. Available at: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/mandate>

¹⁸ European Commission. 2018. Communication on a new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs: taking our partnership for investment and jobs to the next level. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0643&from=EN>

Table 4.1. Overview of the mandates per Task Force

Task Force	Mandate description
Task Force Rural Africa (TFRA)	To advise the European Commission on how best to contribute to sustainable development and job creation in Africa’s agri-food sector and rural economy.
EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments (SEI Platform)	To identify the enablers for public and private investments in Africa that will improve access to sustainable energy, boost industrialisation and job creation and fight climate change.
Digital Economy Task Force (DETF)	To provide a platform for partnership based on a shared understanding of how an already fast-evolving African digital transformation can achieve cross-border integration and bring benefits to all citizens.
Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Task Force (AEATTF)	To exchange views and deliver recommendations to enhance transport cooperation. The Task Force, consisting of three clusters (Connectivity and Infrastructure, Road Safety and Aviation), is to deliver tailor-made recommendations.
Support Group for Ukraine* (SGU)	To provide a focal point, structure, overview and guidance for the Commission’s work to support Ukraine, through the initial and crucial early phases of its transition. The Support Group would also help mobilise Member State expertise and further enhance coordination with other donors and the International Financing Institutions.
Iran Task Force* (ITF)	To support the EU High Representative, Josep Borrell, in his role as coordinator of the Joint Commission responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). To develop a coherent framework for bilateral engagement with Iran in close cooperation with the European Commission services.

**Not EU-Africa specific*

From consultation with members of the existing Task Forces, the importance of setting a clear and effective mandate was strongly emphasised. This is due to its impact on almost every part of the design and implementation of the Task Force, namely the composition of its members, working modalities and output. Despite this, several challenges remained in the setting of the mandates. One main challenge lies in the setting of the specific thematic mandates. Despite there being a clear mandate from the Commission in 2018, each EU-Africa Task Force was required to develop their own specific mandate.

Collaboration in defining the thematic mandate is essential. For many of the Task Forces, it was clear that utilising the existing relationships between Directorate-Generals (DGs) of the European Commission and the AU was crucial to the development of a working mandate. In addition, the collaboration between the responsible DG and the EU-African Alliance was also important in exchanging ideas and identifying areas of common interest for establishing a mandate, which supports overall cooperation between the EU and Africa. While collaboration with the EU-African Alliance and the African Union (AU) was deemed vital in the setting of a mandate, from consultations it was also noted that involvement with other key parts of the EU services was important. Specifically, the involvement of DG DEVCO and the European External Action Service (EEAS) was important in the initial stages, due to their important function in supporting international dialogue

and cooperation. To exclude DG INTPA and the EEAS in the creation of the mandate for a Task Force would therefore be problematic and subsequently reduce its legal and thematic legitimacy.

It is important to strike a balance between meeting the needs of the thematic objectives and boosting the political objectives of increasing cooperation between the EU and Africa.

Indeed, while the mandate of the Task Forces required the meeting of thematic objectives, it was also important that they took into account the broader, more strategic actions of increasing international cooperation between the EU and Africa and also internally between Commission services and other relevant DGs. This was often taken into account through the mandate being high-level and strategic, with the core objectives of improving international cooperation rather than specific thematic issues.

The need for diplomatic legitimacy may limit the design and use of the Task Force, by moving it away from a more operational approach towards being more strategic and operating at a higher level of governance.

These findings were broadly consistent with the two non-EU-Africa Task Forces¹⁹; however, their contexts drastically shape their decision-making. For example, in the Task Forces for Iran and Ukraine, their mandates were set at a high political level and not by the DG responsible for implementation. In addition, these mandates were much more specific in meeting one core objective, compared to the EU-Africa Task Forces, which operated with a broader scope of covering several thematic areas. Interestingly, the similarities between the EU-Africa and non-EU-Africa Task Forces lie in the legitimacy of their mandates. For example, while the EU-Africa Task Forces largely operated with broader mandates covering several thematic areas, their legitimacy lay in the broader political objectives set by President Juncker in the establishment of the EU-Africa Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs. Despite some limitations that diplomatic legitimacy may have on the design of a Task Force, basing the mandate on a higher political objective or action can help to bring validity and purpose to the work of the Task Force.

Good Practice Example - Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Task Force

In the initial stages of the Task Force, there was no specific framework in which to develop a working mandate. As such, the Task Force utilised the existing relationships with the EU-Africa Alliance and was able to work together in close collaboration to identify common actions or activities within the field of transport. This close collaboration with the African counterparts from the start was important in setting a mandate that worked for all and brought legitimacy to the objectives they set in the areas of Aviation, Connectivity, Infrastructure and Road Safety.

4.2.3 Options

As indicated by the consulted stakeholders, the Task Force should guide and advise policy-making in relation to ocean governance and inform cooperation between the EU and Africa in this context.


Several options can be envisaged for the mandate of the “blue” Task Force. These can be divided into two categories, based on their underlying assumptions: [1] the common objectives²⁰ of the EU and Africa on ocean-related matters are *not* known and still need to be defined, or [2]

¹⁹ SGU and IF

²⁰ By “objective”, we mean overarching policy objectives and strategies e.g. as included in the Africa Blue Economy Strategy adopted by the African Union, or the International Ocean Governance Agenda adopted by the European Commission.

the common objectives of the EU and Africa on ocean-related matters have already been defined and are known.

Figure 4.2 Overview of options for the mandate and their main strengths and weaknesses



Option #1: Strategic Task Force - Align strategies and set common overarching priorities and objectives

The mandate of the “blue” Task Force is to achieve a high-level strategic alignment of positions, priorities and objectives between the EU and Africa on international ocean governance. The Task Force will aim to “match” the interests of the EU with those of the African continent and try to set overarching common objectives and priorities in the realm of international ocean governance.

The output would be a report or statement outlining the global vision and leadership of EU-Africa cooperation on ocean-related matters i.e. where the EU and Africa want to go in terms of international ocean governance. The selection of this option is most appropriate if there is a need to update the policy agenda, or if there are emerging priorities that require renewed strategic dialogue between the EU and Africa.

Implications

- A broad thematic scope: the specific work streams of common interest should not be defined beforehand, but rather be left open for the members of the Task Force to define based on interest and internal priorities.
- A continental geographical scope: if the overarching strategies need to be aligned, these should pertain to Africa as a continent and not just to specific regions.
- A political and credible membership: as a minimum, the authorities in charge of implementing the strategies agreed upon will need to be involved, and this includes national authorities and relevant international organisations such as the African Union.
- It is important that such a Task Force takes into account existing global and regional priorities and is consistent with them when setting the common overarching objectives, e.g. it is in line

with Agenda 2030 or the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy, Africa Blue Economy Strategy, etc.

Strengths

- It would provide a targeted forum for discussion.
- Overall cooperation could increase due to the development of a shared understanding of the common objectives.
- It would constitute a solid common ground for future EU-Africa work on ocean-related matters.

Weaknesses

- The mandate is too broad to achieve tangible outcomes, and it could be seen as one more high-level discussion with little impact on the ground.
- This mandate might overlap or add little value to other ongoing political dialogues between the EU and Africa or existing binding commitments on international ocean governance.
- The local specificities may be overlooked: with a high-level political mandate, it will not be possible to look into specific regional or local problems or needs.
- This mandate would only represent the basis for future work, and it would call for subsequent action to put the overarching strategy and common objectives into practice.

Option #2: Operational Task Force – Define a shared action plan to achieve actionable progress on existing objectives

The Task Force mandate aims to define a shared and concrete action plan to achieve actionable progress on existing common objectives on ocean-related issues between the EU and Africa. Building on the assumption that the definition of the problem is well-known and that the common objectives are already defined, the action plan should advise on how to make progress and implement actions on the ground (i.e. objectives exist, but how to get there?), and it should propose solutions to address existing challenges and gaps. The action plan should aim to trigger concrete action on the ground.

Implications

- A specific and well-defined thematic and geographical scope, as it would be difficult to define concrete actions for a broad variety of work streams.
- A membership comprising, as a minimum, experts in the field, members that have experience working on the ground and are aware of the concrete problems that need to be addressed.
- A regional or continental and regional geographical scope. Given that the Task Force will aim to propose solutions to concrete challenges on the ground, it is important that the initiative looks into the regional specificities.
- A structure comprising different working groups: this would allow the members of the Task Force to focus and go in-depth when assessing problems and proposing relevant solutions.

Strengths

- The Task Force would aim to produce tangible results on the ground, and this could enhance its credibility towards stakeholders.
- The process of defining an action plan will increase collaboration between stakeholder groups by establishing shared actions and priorities.

- An operational Task Force would not overlap with existing initiatives but rather add value to what is already in place.
- It would fit into the political ambition [as expressed in the “Comprehensive strategy with Africa”] and translate it into concrete actions on the ground.

Weaknesses

- The aim to be concrete and specific might require excluding certain issues from the discussion (i.e. not everything can be discussed), which might generate discontent with some stakeholders.
- It might be difficult for members to agree on concrete actions within the scope of the Task Force.

Option #3: Operational Task Force - Define a shared action plan and follow up on its implementation

In addition to creating a shared action plan as outlined in option #2, the Task Force would have the authority to follow up, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the plan.

Implications

- Different types of members might be envisaged for reasons of credibility and length of the engagement: part of the members would be in charge of devising the action plan, while another part – with a mid- to long-term mandate – would be in charge of following up on the implementation of the plan.
- It is important that the members in charge of the follow-up are particularly credible and ideally independent from the institutions in charge of implementing the action plan.

Strengths

- The follow-up would encourage a concrete implementation of the actions on the ground. This would address the concerns of some stakeholders with regards to the effectiveness of the existing cooperation initiatives.

Weaknesses

- The follow-up process might create additional burden and bureaucracy for the actors involved in the implementation of the action plan.
- More resources and additional time would be needed to maintain the structure of the Task Force in the follow-up phase.

Option #4: Operational Task Force - Coordinate existing and future initiatives

The Task Force would have the mandate to coordinate, streamline and harmonise existing and future cooperation initiatives in the field of ocean governance between the EU and Africa. Building on the assumption that several initiatives (e.g. cooperation projects and programmes) are already in place but do not always act in a coordinated way, the mandate of this Task Force would be to

take stock of the current available mechanisms and activities and to ensure they are used in a more strategic and coordinated manner.

If gaps in these mechanisms are identified, the Task Force should formulate concrete actions to address these gaps. The aim would be to ensure that resources are used efficiently, that existing and future cooperation initiatives contribute to existing cooperation objectives, and that existing platforms are strengthened.

Implications

A coordinating mandate calls for:

- A membership that comprises, as a minimum, representatives from the institutions that put in place and manage the existing cooperation initiatives.
- The establishment of a structure that will remain in place for the medium- to long-term.

Strengths

- This would address the concerns of some stakeholders with regards to the effectiveness of the initiatives put in place so far, i.e. many resources have been disbursed but this does not always correspond to improvements on the ground.

Weaknesses

- If the Task Force is put in place for a long period of time, substantial resources would be needed to maintain this structure.
- The Task Force might have a limited impact if it is put in place only temporarily.

Option #5: Two- or three-phase Task Force

Another possibility would be to have a Task Force that works in different phases combining two or more different options presented above. There could be a first Task Force aimed at identifying and agreeing on the common overarching objectives (option #1), then option #2 to create a detailed action plan/work programme over "x" years to achieve them, including by looking into existing initiatives (option #4), then option #3 to follow up on its implementation. Different combinations could be envisaged.

Implications

- Different types of membership might be required over time.
- A long-term process and not a one-off event, sending the signal that there is no "quick fix" and that the investment made by the EU in this initiative is serious, will add to the credibility of the initiative.

Strengths

- This approach could establish a strong basis for future action, as the common objectives are defined and the shared action plan is drawn up within the same initiative.
- A strong sense of ownership, as the Task Force would be "responsible" for/involved in the different phases of this new EU-Africa approach.
- Consistency between overarching objectives and proposed actions.

- The flexibility of the “phase approach” would allow different concerns and needs to be addressed in the course of the same initiative, and hopefully appropriate solutions and actions.

Weaknesses

- This could turn into a long process, meaning the investment (in terms of resources and political investment) would need to be sustained and remain coherent.
- Results are seen only in the long-run, and this might create discontent among stakeholders who expect results in the short term.

4.3 Work streams of common interest

4.3.1 Definition of work streams of common interest

The work streams of common interest make up the thematic scope of the Task Force i.e. what themes, issues or questions the Task Force members are going to discuss in the course of the initiative. The selection of work streams of common interest is closely connected with the mandate.

4.3.2 Lessons learned from existing Task Forces and best practices

The thematic scope is ultimately set and defined according to the mandate. Thus, when assessing the different work streams, it is important to understand how they interconnect with the mandate (see Table 4.1). The table below provides an overview of the key themes from each of the Task Forces and to what degree they directly stem from the original mandate.

Table 4.2. Overview of work streams of common interest in existing Task Forces

Task Force	Description
Task Force Rural Africa (TFRA)	<p>Key themes: African sustainable agriculture, agribusiness and agro-industrial development, employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in African rural areas.</p> <p>Link to mandate: Overall topic area stems from mandate, but becomes more operationalised into the subtopics named above.</p>
EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments (SEI Platform)	<p>Key themes: sustainable energy, energy efficiency and the challenge of clean cooking solutions.</p> <p>Link to mandate: Closely related to the mandate, while also broken down into more granular topics such as clean cooking solutions</p>
Digital Economy Task Force (DETF)	<p>Key themes: digital transformation, digital literacy, market integration, gender equality and digital security</p> <p>Link to mandate: Overall topic area stems from mandate, but becomes more operationalised into the subtopics named above.</p>
Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Task Force (AEATTF)	<p>Key themes: transport connectivity, efficient and sustainable transport infrastructure, Road Safety, Aviation.</p> <p>Link to mandate: Directly correlated to the mandate across the specific topic areas above.</p>
Support Group for Ukraine* (SGU)	<p>Key themes: implementation of the Association Agreement, sharing of advice, expertise and financial cooperation</p>

Task Force	Description
	Link to mandate: Overall topic area stems from mandate, but becomes more operationalised into the subtopics named above.
Iran Task Force* (ITF)	<p>Key themes: National and continental protection of the JCPOA between the EU and Iran.</p> <p>Link to mandate: Directly correlated to the mandate across the specific topic areas above.</p>

**Not EU-Africa specific*

As shown in the table above, all of the Task Forces are focused on topics that were pre-defined in the original mandate. Regardless of the number of thematic areas, each work stream was identified before the development of the Task Forces and pre-set by the European Commission and the African Union. This is a crucial distinction when comparing the possible options for an EU-Africa Task Force on ocean governance, whereby the thematic areas are not strictly set at a high political level.

The key difference between the existing Task Forces is in the characteristics of the mandate – either strategic or broad. If the mandate is more strategic and specific, then the thematic scope of the Task Force invariably examines only one or two main topic areas. By contrast, when a broader mandate is adopted, a wide range of topic areas are often examined throughout the duration of the Task Force. For example, the Digital Economy Task Force set a mandate to “provide a platform for partnership...on a shared understanding of how an already fast-evolving African digital transformation can achieve cross-border integration and bring benefits to all citizens”. Under this mandate, the topical areas of the Task Force were not pre-set, but rather a series of key topics were chosen, such as digital transformation and fair market competition, which were then broken down further into subtopics. By contrast, the Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Task Force set a clear mandate that would look into three specific topic areas: road safety, aviation and connectivity. This decision to set the topic areas was imperative to the creation of the working groups which would then explore these topics in more detail (see section 4.7.2).

A hybrid approach between the thematic scope being set at the mandate stage or later on was a good solution. This flexible approach included a mandate which was operational, in that the main thematic areas were pre-set; however additional thematic areas were able to be added throughout the course of the Task Force. This approach was used in the EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments and Task Force Rural Africa.


Good Practice Example - EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments

While the broader topics of the Task Force included boosting industrialisation, sustainable energy and job creation, and guided the main approach used, a flexible approach was used in the thematic scope. In particular, when specific topics emerged and were required to be examined by the Task Force, such as “clean cooking solutions”, additional expertise was invited to provide input. This approach allowed the Task Force to focus on the main thematic areas that were originally set, while also being able to “zoom-in” to specific topics as and when required.

4.3.3 Options

From the analysis of the work streams of common interest from existing Task Forces, the following options can be envisaged for the work streams of the “blue” Task Force.

Figure 4.3 Overview of options for the work streams of common interest and their main strengths and weaknesses



Option #1: Broad thematic scope - Work streams of common interest are not defined beforehand

The Task Force will be set with a broad thematic scope and the members of the Task Force themselves will be in charge of defining the work streams they will work on. This definition exercise can take place as soon as the Task Force is established, and it should take into account the issues that are most urgent to nations and regions in the continent.

In this case, either:

- The Task Force is set with a very general mandate e.g. the Task Force will address topics related to ocean governance.
- The Task Force is set with an operational mandate, with pre-set thematic areas e.g. the Task Force will address specific aspects within ocean governance such as the blue economy and ocean science, and subsequently the members will decide which topics within these pre-set thematic areas will become concrete work streams. The members will also be able to propose additional work streams.

Implications

- This option is most suited for a high-level political mandate where the common objectives will be defined in the Task Force. A broad thematic scope will give the freedom to the members to define their priorities in terms of work streams.
- This option might require a flexible or very inclusive type of membership: as the work streams of common interest are not pre-defined, the membership should be able to adapt to all the possible themes that could be addressed within the Task Force, as well as having sufficient legitimacy to decide on the work streams of common interest.

- Clear rules on how the selection of the thematic scope is going to work will need to be established from the get-go.

Strengths

- By giving the Task Force members the possibility of deciding on the specific thematic scope of the Task Force, this option could create more ownership of its work and buy-in on its outcomes.
- A broad thematic scope might make the Task Force flexible enough to address the interlinkages between different issues within ocean governance, or to address new upcoming issues as they arise.

Weaknesses

- It might be difficult for the Task Force members to agree on themes of common interest on the spot – this might be easier if broad thematic areas are broadly pre-set.
- It might be difficult to control the Task Force and its outcome, as well as to guarantee the political relevance of the initiative.
- This might make it difficult to define the respective membership and expertise required.
- A broad thematic scope might challenge the achievement of concrete outcomes.
- It might be difficult to attract relevant experts and practitioners to a Task Force with a broad and undefined thematic scope, as this might be perceived as being another high-level event;
- The definition of the thematic scope would be heavily influenced by the vested interests of the members taking part in the Task Force, rather than by the actual policy relevance of specific themes.

Option #2: Specific thematic scope - Work streams of common interest are defined beforehand

The work streams of common interest to be addressed by the Task Force will be defined before its establishment. The number of work streams can vary, as well as their level of specificity. These can be either very specific, e.g. address the issue of access to EU markets for African small-scale fishers, or broader, e.g. blue economy development in Africa.

Implications

- The ex-ante selection of themes to be addressed needs to be duly justified and made by credible actors and based on credible assumptions.

Strengths

- A specific focus would allow the Task Force members to address each theme in a more in-depth way, and it could therefore facilitate attainment of concrete results – and this would satisfy the stakeholders, who in many cases maintain that focus is key for the Task Force.
- A specific focus could make the Task Force more efficient in terms of use of time and resources.

Weaknesses

- Some stakeholders might feel the pre-selection of work streams of common interest is too top-down, as they were not included in the definition of the scope.

- A very specific thematic scope will make it difficult for the Task Force to take into consideration the interlinkages among all possible themes of relevance under the overarching theme of ocean governance, and therefore potentially limit the impact of the initiative.
- The realities across Africa are quite different (in terms of level of engagement and capacity), so it might be difficult to define the work streams of common interest beforehand and ensure they reflect the interests of the different regions and countries.

Possible work streams of common interest for the African and European continents

As a result of the stakeholder consultation and desk research, we have identified several possible work streams of common interest for the African and European continents in the realm of international ocean governance. The most frequently referenced work streams are in the first rows of the table, followed by the less frequently referenced ones.

Table 4.3 Possible work streams of common interest as identified via stakeholder consultation and desk research

Possible work stream of common interest EU-Africa	Short description	Identified via stakeholder consultation	Identified via desk research	Justification for prioritisation
Sustainable Blue Economy	Interaction of industries working in the maritime area or with maritime products. Fisheries are a key element, but this work stream also includes, for instance, energy, aquaculture, other areas of innovation, entrepreneurship and the development of blue skills.	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the blue economy can deliver important benefits to sustainable economic development and food security; momentum has been created by blue economy strategies in the EU and Africa; coordination between different uses and resources is key for the development of the blue economy; Africa has substantial marine areas and resources; the blue economy offers a link between sustainable resource use and the fight against poverty; an important factor in migration prevention. <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> blue growth – especially for the priority areas of marine resources and energy, fisheries, ports operation and marine transport – is part of the strategic framework for socioeconomic transformation of the African continent under various initiatives including Agenda 2063 and the Policy Framework and Reform Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa (PFRS) (AU-IBAR 2019); under Thematic Areas 1 and 2 of the African Blue Economy Strategy, there are also objectives aimed at developing and strengthening transport corridors to improve value chains within the blue economy, inclusive growth for women and youth in fisheries and aquaculture, and ensuring security of investments in blue economy sectors (AU-IBAR 2019)
Maritime security	Maritime security in the context of cross-border conflicts and piracy. This includes surveillance and is considered as an important enabler for the	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> maritime security issues are jeopardising efforts in all other areas, including sustainable use of resources, economic development and fighting drivers of migration;

Possible work stream of common interest EU-Africa	Short description	Identified via stakeholder consultation	Identified via desk research	Justification for prioritisation
	development of the Blue Economy.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • there is a wide range of (organised) criminal activities taking place at sea and more efforts are needed to overcome this; • there is a high risk of piracy in certain areas in Africa, and this is a challenge for both African and EU fleets; • Africa is lacking capacity in maritime surveillance to prevent security threats and enforce rules; • a multilateral approach is necessary for improving maritime security at a wider level than single national jurisdictions. <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Piracy and criminal activities at sea represent a huge threat for African nations. These include toxic waste dumping and the discharge of oil, dealing in illicit crude oil, arms and drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, piracy and armed robbery at sea (AU 2012). • Criminal activities at sea pose threats not only to ocean governance but also to the development of the blue economy in Africa (AMCEN, AU and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 2019). • Under the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy, there are specific strategic objectives in place to improve the safety and security of transport systems, prevent criminal acts at sea and harmonise the prosecution process, protecting people and the natural environment from maritime pollution and the dumping of toxic waste, improving Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Africa, and promoting the ratification, domestication and implementation of international legal instruments (AU 2012).
Sustainable fisheries	This refers to the promotion of fishing activities that are both environmentally sustainable and economically viable. This work stream would address a broad variety of fisheries-related issues, including overfishing,	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IUU fishing is still quite diffuse, and it has a huge economic, environmental and social impact on Africa’s waters; <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the capture fisheries sector continues to experience overfishing, overcapacity and poor governance, and improved fisheries management could bring

Possible work stream of common interest EU-Africa	Short description	Identified via stakeholder consultation	Identified via desk research	Justification for prioritisation
	overexploitation and IUU fishing ²¹ .			<p>benefits to artisanal fishers and preserve the necessary natural resources for future use;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IUU fishing is considered under both ocean governance and security at sea; for the EU, it has had a steadfast outlook on deterring IUU fishing, targeted through bilateral, regional and international cooperation to promote compliance with international obligations, including on Monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS), implementation of the Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA), and other international obligations (JOIN(2016)49).
Ocean conservation	Protection of the marine environment and ecosystems from degradation through exploitation and pollution (including land-based sources)	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> needs strongly increased attention and international mechanisms; vital for future economic use of maritime resources. <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conservation is a priority area for sustainable resource management and good ocean governance. It denotes one of the nine signature thematic sessions at the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi (SBEC 2018). For the EU, addressing legal gaps in the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ), uniform enforcement of agreed rules and arrangements on the conservation of coastal and marine areas (e.g. through MPAs) are important elements of its external maritime policy positions (JOIN(2016)49).
Oceans and social issues including migration and human rights	Human rights, promotion of marginalised groups (including women and youth), migration, as well as social issues in fisheries (i.e. slavery, working conditions).	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong common interest for the EU and Africa <p>From desk research:</p>

²¹ IUU fishing, intended as fishing activities undertaken in contravention of national laws or international obligations, that have not been reported or have been misrepresented, that have been carried out in a way that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of the relevant fisheries management organisation. For an exhaustive description of IUU fishing, please see FAO (2001) International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-y1224e.pdf>

Possible work stream of common interest EU-Africa	Short description	Identified via stakeholder consultation	Identified via desk research	Justification for prioritisation
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Migration is an area of common interest, taking a constructive and multidimensional approach to migration that takes place in a safe, orderly and compliant manner. The EU has a strong political commitment to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement (AU-EU Summit 2017).
Oceans and climate change	Connection between oceans and climate change, including the role of oceans in climate mitigation and resilience	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder interest, particularly in climate change adaptation and the mitigation of ocean acidification <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> moving to a climate-resistant and circular blue economy is particularly important to African countries, as about half of the African population lives within 100 km of the coast (JRC 2017); blue carbon (i.e. carbon storage in mangroves, seagrass and saltmarshes) has also been highlighted as a new and emerging industry the African nations are interested in developing (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019); at the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi, the valuation of environmental goods and services was highlighted as a key area for science and research needed to inform policy development, implementation and evaluation (SBEC 2018).
Seafood trade and market access	Trade within Africa and towards the EU (including compliance with non-tariff measures by African exporters).	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> lacking framework to increase inter-African trade and exports; potential for African seafood products <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achieving responsible trade in fisheries products falls under Thematic Area 1 of the African Blue Economy Strategy (AU-IBAR 2019). The focus on trade is both regional and international. The African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) seeks to promote intra-African trade, which remains very low despite significant growth potential; it was recorded as 10% in 2000 and 16% in 2014 (UNCTAD, Africa Economic Outlook 2017).

Possible work stream of common interest EU-Africa	Short description	Identified via stakeholder consultation	Identified via desk research	Justification for prioritisation
Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) and ecosystem-based management	Maritime spatial planning and ICZ, MPAs in particular.	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to mediate maritime uses to enhance economic, social and environmental sustainability. • Link between conservation and the blue economy. • Build on ongoing international efforts (e.g. World Bank). <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MSP and ecosystem-based management fall under aspirations for good ocean governance for African countries (SBEC 2018); • as stated earlier, the valuation of environmental goods and services was highlighted as a key area for science and research needed to inform policy development, implementation and evaluation at the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi (SBEC 2018).
Ocean research and data	Promotion of ocean research, data and science, including by developing relevant digital infrastructure.	✓	✓	<p>From stakeholder consultation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • disseminating knowledge on oceans (e.g. ecosystem services or available resources) supports better informed political decisions; • joining forces for marine research could help find joint ways of addressing ocean challenges; <p>From desk research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • digital transformation for traditional sectors, such as fisheries and aquaculture, is a key area of interest for African nations, the need for technology uptake in shipping and maritime transport was highlighted as a key challenge for the sector, with over-reliance on paperwork and a manual application process creating very unwanted inefficiencies in the sector (SBEC 2018); • contributing to maritime security and safety, the aspirations of improving maritime shipping technologies and governance provide opportunities for adopting block chain technology and use of big data and artificial intelligence (SBEC 2018);

Possible work stream of common interest EU-Africa	Short description	Identified via stakeholder consultation	Identified via desk research	Justification for prioritisation
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moreover, an essential element needed in good ocean governance is quantitative data to inform policy-making, monitoring and evaluation on the Blue Economy.

4.4 Geographical scope

4.4.1 Definition of geographical scope

The geographical scope of the Task Force determines the geographical areas the Task Force will look into in the course of its work. The selection of the geographical scope is influenced by the mandate and the thematic scope, and has implications for the selection of the membership.

4.4.2 Lessons learned from existing Task Forces and best practices

Three types of geographical scope were defined when assessing the previous Task Forces: continental, national and regional. Most of the existing EU-Africa Task Forces adopted a hybrid approach of both continental and regional, as shown in the table below.

Table 4.4. Overview of the geographical scope of the existing Task Forces

Task Force	Geographical scope
Task Force Rural Africa	Continental/ Regional
EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments	Continental/ Regional
Digital Economy Task Force	Continental/ Regional
Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Task Force	Continental/ Regional/ National
Support Group for Ukraine*	National
Iran Task Force*	National

**Not EU-Africa specific*

In the case of the EU-Africa Task Forces, a continental approach was essential in order to meet the broader and more all-encompassing aspects of the mandate. As previously mentioned, when examining each of the specific design elements of a Task Force, it is important to consider the interlinkages between each element and the chosen mandate. For example, the setting of the mandate ultimately affects the work streams and therefore the geographical scope of the Task Force.

Since the mandate often calls for a continental scope, the thematic scope calls for a more granular level of detail of activities at regional level. For example, in the EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments, one of the work streams was to look into the challenge of clean cooking solutions. This approach called for a regional approach to fully grasp the issues on the ground. The geographical lens could therefore be used in this sense to zoom into specific regions and areas, to develop a greater understanding of the chosen work streams.


Good Practice Example – Task Force Rural Africa

A **hybrid approach of both continental and regional** was used in the Task Force Rural Africa where, under the thematic area of capacity building, it was necessary to examine the specific action programmes operating at the local level. Such an approach was imperative to be able to make recommendations for cooperation not only between the EU and Africa but between specific regions as well.

4.4.3 Options

From the analysis of the geographical scope from existing Task Forces, the following options can be envisaged for the geographical scope of the “blue” Task Force, as presented in the figure below.

Figure 4.4 Overview of options for geographical scope and their main strengths and weaknesses



Option #1: Continental Task Force

The Task Force has a solely continental geographical scope: it will look at the African continent as one whole.

Implications

- This geographical scope is well suited for a high-level political mandate.
- The Task Force membership must be continental i.e. include members that are representative of the views of the whole African continent.

Strengths

- This geographical scope would allow coastal *and* landlocked countries to be involved, therefore facilitating the consideration and discussion of land-ocean interactions.
- It can build on, and reinforce, existing pan-African processes e.g. taking place in the context of the African Union.

Weaknesses

- It might be difficult to find common ground across the whole continent.

- It might lead to overlooking significant regional or national specificities.
- It might be perceived as too high-level by stakeholders i.e. too far removed from the real problems.
- It might lead to few concrete outcomes/tangible results, as most problems are specific to certain regions and need specific solutions (the continent is very heterogeneous).

Option #2: Regional Task Force

The Task Force has a solely regional geographical scope. This can result in a Task Force that addresses all African regions, i.e. with a separate working group addressing each region, or in a Task Force that addresses a selected number of regions. This might also take place in a sort of pilot format, with a pilot Task Force established for a specific region first and the possibility of creating other subsequent regional Task Forces in case the experience proves successful.

Implications

- The Task Force membership must include relevant regional representatives.

Strengths

- It would reinforce existing regional institutions and processes that are currently gaining credibility and relevance (e.g. Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Regional Seas Conventions, as well as Regional Economic Communities within the African Union).
- The regional scope might favour the in-depth treatment of specific issues of regional relevance e.g. concerns of coastal communities.
- It might make it easier to capture relevant local specificities and this would benefit the credibility of the initiative in the eyes of local stakeholders.

Weaknesses

- The lack of coordination at continental level might promote a “silo approach” in the treatment of the themes in the context of the Task Force. This could be counter-productive, as the ocean is a shared resource and activities undertaken in each region might have an effect on other regions as well.
- Prioritising one region over the other might prove difficult and ultimately create discontent in the “de-prioritised” regions.
- Prioritising certain regions (e.g. coastal regions) might prevent the consideration of specific topics in the context of the Task Force e.g. relevant land-ocean interactions.

Option #3: Continental + Regional Task Force

The Task Force has two levels: it is established with an overall continental scope, but within each specific work stream the regional specificities are taken into account.

This would raise the profile of the Task Force at continental level, and agree on a minimum common denominator of objectives/actions at that level, while specific solutions would be found that suit each region where relevant.

Implications

- It will be important to work with relevant African Union mandated institutions, to support the pan-African processes already in place;
- It will be important to involve relevant regional organisations such as RFMOs, RSCs, RECs as entry points for the membership.

Strengths

- A hybrid approach would ensure coordination/coherence of action at continental level, but also consideration of regional specificities.

Weaknesses

- It might be more difficult to manage two levels of geographical focus, as this might require working according to different approaches e.g. to have both the continental and regional aspects considered within each work stream.

Option #4: Continental + Regional + National Task Force

The Task Force presents a cascaded focus in that it has an overarching continental mandate, but within each specific work stream the regional and national specificities are taken into account.

Implications

- The membership must include representatives of African countries.

Strengths

- The Task Force can have a high level of detail in looking into specific needs at both regional and national level.
- The inclusion of relevant national actors might increase the acceptability and relevance of the Task Force outcome.
- This geographical scope would allow both coastal and landlocked countries to be involved, therefore facilitating the consideration and discussion of land-ocean interactions.
- The inclusion of the national level might help the sharing of knowledge and best practices from countries that are currently active in ocean governance, as well as allowing advice to be given on ad hoc requests from coastal countries.
- It would raise the profile of regional and national issues.

Weaknesses

- It might be difficult to manage three levels of geographical focus and organise the gathering of views at national level if all countries need to be considered.
- It might be challenging to find an agreement if the national perspective is brought in, as these might be too heterogeneous to be reconciled.
- If the national perspective is brought in, it is possible that the Task Force becomes politicised, and this might undermine the work of the initiative.

Possible focus regions

The African Union divides the African continent into five main regions: West, Central, East, South and North. Most of the stakeholders consulted mentioned West Africa (and in particular the Gulf of Guinea) and East Africa (in particular the Indian Ocean Rim and Horn of Africa) as possible focus regions, mentioning that they are the ones currently facing substantial challenges with ocean-related questions. Other stakeholders mention that North Africa should also be made a focus, as substantial interactions with the EU are already ongoing, and relevant mechanisms are already in place that could be further capitalised on. In general, stakeholders suggest that the main focus should be on coastal states and islands.

4.5 Establishment of the Task Force

4.5.1 Definition of establishment

Establishment defines who has responsibility for setting up, hosting and coordinating the Task Force, including covering the underlying costs and following up on the delivery of the mandate. This has implications on the selection of the membership.

It is important to note that stakeholders in most cases failed to provide feedback on this element of the Task Force, presumably because they were consulted in the context of a study commissioned by the European Commission, whereby it was explained that the EU was considering setting up such a Task Force.

4.5.2 Lessons learned from existing Task Forces and best practices

The establishment of the EU-Africa Task Forces²² and the agenda-setting originated mainly from the European Commission. As mentioned in section 4.2.2, a crucial aspect that linked all of the EU-Africa Task Forces together was the statement delivered by Jean-Claude Juncker in his 2018 State of the Union address, with the new and ambitious "Africa-Europe alliance". From this top-level agenda came one main priority:

*"#3: Establishing sectoral groups of African and European public, private and financial operators and academia on a sectoral basis before the end of this year to examine and support strategic developments in critical economic areas such as **digital economy, energy, transport and agriculture.**" (European Commission, 2018, p. 2)²³.*

Close collaboration between the EU and the African stakeholders from the initial stages of developing the Task Forces was crucial. To spearhead these key priority areas, the Commission tasked the respective DGs (DG CNECT, DG ENER, DG MOVE and DG AGRI) to set up a Task Force to lead and ensure a solid evidence base for overall cooperation. As will be discussed in section 4.6.2 on the membership, while the Task Forces were not developed by the African Union per se, it was important for them to be involved in setting the mandate, work streams and proposed membership.

Cross-collaboration between the incumbent DG and other relevant Commission services was imperative for establishing common streams of interest and other bilateral relations between the EU and Africa. These services included the EEAS, DG DEVCO and the General Secretariat of the European Commission. As such, in the establishment stages, the EU-Africa Task

²² TFRA, SEI Platform, DETF and AEATTF


²³ European Commission (2018). Strengthening the EU's partnership with Africa. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-africa-europe_en.pdf

Forces were developed internally by Commission services in tandem with the African Union. This approach is also true for the non-EU Task Forces which were operationalised by the Commission and then further developed in tandem with the respective countries.

4.5.3 Options

From the analysis of the establishment of existing Task Forces, the following options can be envisaged for the establishment of the “blue” Task Force, as presented in the figure below.

Figure 4.5 Overview of options for the establishment of the Task Force and their main strengths and weaknesses



Option #1: The Task Force is established solely by the EU

The European Commission, and specific DG(s) within it, is responsible for the set-up and overall coordination of the Task Force. The involvement of the African counterpart will be ensured through their participation in the Task Force as members.

Implications

- The coordinating body should be made up of European Commission representatives, creating resources implications for the institution.

Strengths

- It would be easier to manage, coordinate and control.

Weaknesses

- It might be perceived as unilateral initiative.

Option #2: The Task Force is established jointly by the EU and Africa

In this case, two possibilities can be envisaged:

- The European Commission sets up the Task Force and is ultimately responsible for its coordination and delivery, but it collaborates closely with its African counterpart (this could be the African Union Commission or another institution mandated by the African Union, depending on the selected thematic and geographical scope), i.e. the African counterpart is involved from the early stages in the identification of the mandate and scope of the Task Force, as well as the membership and working modalities.
- Both the European Commission and the designated African counterpart equally share responsibilities for setting up and coordinating the Task Force.

Implications

- The coordinating body should be made up of a mix of European Commission representatives and African counterpart representatives.

Strengths

- This set-up would create ownership by both partners and increase the acceptability of the Task Force output.
- It is fully in line with the spirit of partnership promoted in the Comprehensive strategy with Africa and subsequent Council conclusions.

Weaknesses

- A joint initiative might be more difficult to manage, as resources from two different organisations would have to be pulled together and coordinated.

Option #3: The Task Force is established solely by the designated African counterpart

The Task Force is established solely by the African counterpart. The involvement of the European counterpart will be ensured through its participation in the Task Force.

Implications

- The coordinating body should be made up of the African counterpart's members, creating resource implications.

Strengths

- It creates substantial ownership of the Task Force work in the African counterpart.
- It could reinforce the pan-African process and underlying institutions.

Weaknesses

- It might be perceived as a unilateral initiative.
- The European Commission in particular, and the EU more broadly, would have limited influence over the initiative.

4.6 Membership

4.6.1 Definition of membership

The membership provides details on the members of the Task Force, i.e. the actors that will be in charge of carrying out the work in the context of the initiative. This includes the definition of the size, rules of engagement and types of profiles to be involved in the Task Force.

The mandate and the thematic and geographical scope influence the selection of the type of membership.

4.6.2 Lessons learned from existing Task Forces and best practices

The approach to selecting the members of the Task Forces was tailored to meet the needs and objectives of the mandate and thematic area. To ensure that the Task Force can meet its original mandate, each Task Force selected the most appropriate stakeholders that could provide useful information at both continental and regional levels. The complexity of the work streams had a large bearing on the number of members that would be included. As a general observation, the more complicated the work streams, the higher the number of stakeholders involved. The table below provides a more detailed insight into the size and thematic composition of the stakeholders included in each of the Task Forces.

Table 4.5. Overview of the different types of membership

Task Force	Size categorisation	Number of members	Thematic composition of members
Task Force Rural Africa	Small	11 experts in a personal capacity	Experts covering the areas of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agriculture • agribusiness or agroindustry • trade • development policy or migration-related issues and first-hand knowledge of the agri-food sector in Africa.
EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments	Large	40–70 members representing financing institutions, international organisations, academia and civil society from both continents (core team of 40 members)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Banks (3) • European Union Services (3) • African Union Services (1) • National Administrations (4) • Academia (4) • Businesses/ Organisations (12) • International Agencies (10) • NGOs (3)
Digital Economy Task Force	Medium	20 high-level representatives from the public and private sector from both the EU and Africa (40 in total).	The Task Force, consisting of African and EU decision makers, private sector international financial sector and civil society representatives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ministers • VPs and Presidents of major private companies • company directors • chairs of relevant companies

Task Force	Size categorisation	Number of members	Thematic composition of members
Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Task Force	Large	Total of 103 members split across 3 Main subgroups: Connectivity cluster: 43, Road safety: 22, Aviation: 38	The meetings of the Connectivity, Road Safety and Aviation Clusters under the Africa-EU Task Force for Transport and Connectivity brought together regional and professional organisations, as well as representatives of national administrations and civil society.
Support Group for Ukraine*	Medium	27 full-time members consisting of Commission staff	The operational staff of the Support Group is drawn from a wide range of European Commission services, experts seconded from national administrations and contracted staff. SGUA is made up of a number of thematic teams corresponding to the essential reform priorities set out in the Association Agenda. These teams cover areas such as governance and rule of law, justice and home affairs, economic governance, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, health, education, and communications. More specifically it included the following roles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acting Director (1) • Policy Officer (15) • Secretary (2) • Assistant (4) • Team Leader (3) • Financial cooperation (2)
Iran Task Force*	Small-Medium	Core team of eight full-time members supported by wider services from the EEAS.	From the members of the Task Force, the team of EEAS staff were divided accordingly: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Head of Task Force (1) • Deputy head of Task Force (1) • Member (2) • Policy officer (2) • Information and communication assistant (1) • Secretary (1)

**Not EU-Africa specific*

The first step taken by each of the Task Forces was establishing which stakeholders should be involved. Across each of the Task Forces, three main methods were identified for choosing the scope of membership.

The first approach was to launch an open call for experts. This was adopted by the Task Force Rural Africa, which launched a call for applications over a two-month period. Following internal discussions between DG AGRI and other relevant DGs in the Commission, a decision was made to create a group consisting of 11 members, all of whom would be experts with a high level of expertise and experience in the agriculture sector as well as having first-hand knowledge of the agri-food

sector in Africa²⁴. Around 80 applications were submitted, of which 20 were shortlisted for review. Crucial to the decision-making was a set of additional criteria²⁵ put in place by the Commission, which included:

- ensuring a balanced geographical divide between EU and African representatives;
- ensuring gender equality across all members;
- ensuring a balance of expertise and professional backgrounds

While this method did garner positive results and a fresh set of experts who were able to work collaboratively on this Task Force, it was a lengthier process compared to other approaches and also ran the risk of not finding the best possible group of members. Although this method is transferable to other Task Forces, it nevertheless comes with the caveat of requiring good publicity around the call for applications and additional resources required to review the applications.

The second and more common approach was to utilise the existing network of stakeholders who already worked with the Commission through different initiatives. This was the common approach for most of the Task Forces as it both reduced time in the design phases and further increased cooperation between existing networks. In widening the scope of possible stakeholders, the selection process moved away from specific experts towards relevant companies or organisations that could provide more detailed insights on the different thematic areas. One main observation for this approach was that there was a correlation between the number of organisations involved and the breadth of the thematic scope.

It is important to have a wide yet targeted representation of stakeholders. In the EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments, led by DG ENER, around 40–70 organisations were invited to join the platform to look into identifying and boosting energy investment and exchanges between Africa and the European private sector. By contrast, the Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Taskforce, led by DG MOVE, had a much wider thematic scope which was subdivided across three key thematic areas of connectivity, aviation and road safety. This scope therefore required an increased number of stakeholders to be involved per area, resulting in 103 members being involved.

There were challenges in defining the most knowledgeable people who could represent the whole of Africa and the respective sectors. These different sizes of membership are not without challenges, however. In the case of the EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments, despite internal networks of stakeholders, there were challenges in defining the most appropriate people to include. Utilising links through DG DEVCO was highlighted as being imperative to sourcing a number of contacts across Africa. However, unlike the open call used in Task Force Rural Africa, relying on these existing networks meant that no new members were brought forth. Similarly, in the Digital Economy Task Force, it was also acknowledged that sourcing the most representative and well-informed members was challenging. While existing contacts were used first, involvement and constant dialogue with the African Union provided an important source of networks that could be approached for membership.

Maintaining both a gender and geographical balance was challenging. Given the geographical size of the African continent and the broad thematic scope of the Task Force, it was often a challenge for Task Forces to maintain a balance between gender and geographies. Despite this, it remained a priority to ensure inclusion, diversity and overall engagement in the sector.

²⁴ European Commission (2018). Commission creates Task Force Rural Africa to focus on development role of food and farming. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/commission-creates-task-force-rural-africa-focus-development-role-food-and-farming-2018-feb-27_en

²⁵ It is important to note that these criteria were used across each of the Task Forces.

The inclusion of Sherpas to support Task Force members was crucial to ensuring inclusivity. It is important to note that across the three Task Forces which adopted this approach, the use of Sherpas²⁶ helped to facilitate cooperation between leading government officials and other members of the Task Force. This was acknowledged as being imperative to ensuring inclusion of all members of the Task Force and ensuring the time spent in meetings was used efficiently.

The third approach was considerably different, through adopting more permanent membership. This approach was adopted in cases where a strategic and specific mandate was adopted, such as in the case of the Iran Task Force and the Support Group for Ukraine. Given the increased level of cooperation required in these Task Forces, both Task Forces appointed “in-house” staff to take up a new or joint position in the Task Force. This approach was deemed appropriate given the amount and duration of the support that was required to meet the objectives of the Task Force. Crucially, these Task Forces operated with a high-level membership, for example with the inclusion of high-level politicians and national policy-makers to work closely and collaboratively together to meet the objectives of the Task Force.

Good Practice Example - *Digital Economy Task Force*


While existing contacts and networks that had been developed by both DG CNECT and DG DEVCO were useful in establishing an initial group of possible members, it was the close collaboration with the African Union at the start of the process which helped to bring additional members to the Task Force. This approach allowed the Task Force to ensure a geographical, thematic and gender balance between its members.

4.6.3 Options

From the analysis of the different types of membership adopted in the existing Task Forces, the options presented in the figure below can be envisaged for the membership of the “blue” Task Force.

²⁶ In the context of the EU, a Sherpa is officially defined as a personal representative of a head of state or government who prepares an international summit, particularly the annual G7 and G20 summits. With respect to the Task Force Membership, Sherpas were used to help facilitate discussions with leading national government officials.

Figure 4.6 Overview of options for the membership and their main strengths and weaknesses



In terms of the **size of the membership**, the following options can be envisaged, as shown in the table below.

Table 4.6. Options on the size of membership

Option number and name	Option #1: Small Task Force	Option #2: Medium Task Force	Option #3: Large Task Force
Description	• 10 to 15 members	• 20–50 members	• 50+ members
Implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is more suited for a Task Force that is made up by a single or limited number of profiles e.g. experts-only Task Force. • It is suited for a specific mandate and scope. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is suited for both specific and broad mandate and scope. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is suited for broader mandate and scope.

Option number and name	Option #1: Small Task Force	Option #2: Medium Task Force	Option #3: Large Task Force
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is easy to manage and coordinate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There would be moderate scope for inclusiveness. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There would be larger scope for inclusiveness.
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There would be limited scope for inclusiveness. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It would be more difficult to manage and coordinate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It would be more difficult to manage and coordinate.

In terms of the **type of engagement** of the Task Force members, the following options can be envisaged.

Option #1: Standing membership

The list of members of the Task Force is fixed, and only those members will take part in the work for the entire duration of the initiative.

Implications

- It will be important to ensure that the list of standing members contains all profiles needed.

Strengths

- It will be easier to manage and coordinate.
- It facilitates continuity of work as all the members will be involved in the work of the Task Force from the get-go.
- Stronger feeling of responsibility and ownership.
- Greater visibility for the standing members.

Weaknesses

- The lack of flexibility and adaptability might be limiting if additional expertise or feedback ends up being needed in light of arising issues being put on the table for discussion.

Option #2: Hybrid: standing membership + ad hoc engagements

The Task Force will consist of a set number of standing members, and then by a number of additional members that can be consulted where relevant.

This ad hoc consultation could take place via an invitation to specific stakeholders (e.g. experts) to take part in certain Task Force meetings, or to provide a specific type of contribution as milestones approach (e.g. to provide feedback on a discussion paper, submit a position paper).

The consultation could also take place in a more flexible and open way, e.g. inviting the broader stakeholder base to provide feedback via an online survey or to submit position papers on specific themes.

Implications

- Mechanisms for the ad hoc engagements need to be clearly defined and established at the get-go.
- (Financial) resources issues.

Strengths

- It would leave greater scope for inclusiveness.
- It would provide greater adaptability to unforeseen needs that might arise during the work of the Task Force.
- The Task Force would benefit from additional expertise (increase in credibility).
- See above under option #1 strengths for the standing members.

Weaknesses

- It might be more difficult to manage, as there may be different selection/appointment processes for the members, or additional engagement processes to be coordinated in the course of the initiative.

In terms of the **type of membership**, the following categories of stakeholders have been identified:

- policy experts: this can include relevant decision makers, such as representatives of the European Commission Services, European Union Agencies, EU Delegations to African States, African Union Agencies (including New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)), Regional Economic Communities, Regional Seas Conventions, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, EU and African National Governments, national authorities or agencies involved in the management of marine resources, International organisations such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), UNEP, UNDP, IMO;
- experts: this can include academics, technical advisers, experts involved in the coordination of existing EU-Africa projects and programmes;
- civil society: this can include representatives of non-governmental organisations, local communities, private sector, celebrities²⁷.

Several options can be envisaged for articulating the **type of membership**, as presented below.

Option #1: Experts only

The Task Force consists solely of a team of independent experts.

Implications

- It is more suited for a small Task Force.
- It is more suited for a Task Force that has a very specific mandate and thematic scope.
- It is well suited for a Task Force where independent guidance or advice is sought.

Strengths

- It is easy to manage and coordinate.
- It might facilitate focus and depth in the work.

²⁷ A stakeholder from academia suggested including celebrities in the Task Force: in his view, these actors might have the power to influence people in the young African population and bridge the gap between them and the Task Force.

- The independent nature of the experts might increase trust in the validity of the outcome of the Task Force.

Weaknesses

- It might be perceived as too much of a top-down or high-level initiative.
- It might not fit the political ambition behind the setting up of the Task Force.
- It leaves limited scope for inclusiveness.

Option #2: Only policy experts

The Task Force consists solely of a team of policy experts.

Implications

- It is more suited for a big/medium Task Force.
- It is more suited for a political/high-level mandate.

Strengths

- The involvement of decision makers could facilitate take-up of the Task Force outcomes and their transposal into concrete actions implemented on the ground.

Weaknesses

- There is a higher risk of politicisation of the discussions and stalling discussion.
- It might be perceived as too top-down and high-level and disconnected from the ground.
- The lack of independent members might undermine the credibility of the outcome.
- It might be difficult to reach an agreement on the outcome of the Task Force.

Option #3: Policy experts + Experts

The Task Force consists of a mixed team of both policy experts and independent experts. A set-up where experts prepare discussions and policy experts (including relevant decision makers) take decisions on the final outcome of the Task Force might be adopted in this case.

Implications

- It is more suited for big/medium Task Forces.
- It would require more work in the identification and selection of members.
- It would require the involvement of high-level decision makers.
- It would require more resources.

Strengths

- The mix of objective technical expertise and decision makers empowered to implement advice on the ground can be effective in promoting the implementation of concrete actions and strengthen the credibility of the Task Force.
- It might strengthen the science-policy interface in the field.

- Ability to produce more in-depth assessments on key thematic areas.

Weaknesses

- It might be perceived as too top-down by stakeholders.
- There would be limited scope for inclusiveness and might create discontent among members of civil society or experts that are not involved.

Option #4: Policy experts + Experts + Civil society

The Task Force consists of a mixed team of policy experts, independent experts and representatives from civil society. These members might be engaged as standing members or via other forms of ad hoc engagement, such as public consultations.

Implications

- It is more suited for big/medium Task Forces.
- It would require more work in the identification and selection of the members.
- It would require more resources.

Strengths

- This provides a broader scope for inclusiveness.
- A multi-stakeholder approach would benefit discussion on a multi-sectoral topic like ocean governance.
- The involvement of civil society could improve the credibility of the initiative and reduce mistrust towards EU/AU initiatives by civil society stakeholders.
- There would be greater scope for civil society to claim ownership of the initiative.
- The involvement of civil society would raise awareness of the initiative and its profile.

Weaknesses

- It would be more difficult to coordinate and manage as the inputs and expectations of the different types of stakeholders might vary substantially.
- It might be more difficult to reach an agreement on the outcome of the Task Force.

Type of expertise

Given the multidisciplinary nature of most of the possible work streams of common interest outlined in section 4.3, the expertise to be engaged in the Task Force membership should also be multidisciplinary. In particular, the members should bring insights from both social and natural sciences. Expertise in the following disciplines can be engaged:

- diplomacy and foreign affairs, international cooperation in ocean-related matters and relations with Africa.
- international law, including expertise on the UN Convention on the Law of the sea and other ocean-related international instruments.
- (environmental) economics.
- ocean research and innovation (e.g. ecology, oceanography, ocean data collection, analysis and visualisation).
- climate change mitigation and adaptation.

- value chain expertise for maritime products.
- social sciences.

In addition to these overarching areas of expertise, the thematic scope and the topical work streams will determine further needs for knowledge on e.g. ocean governance, blue economy sectors, fisheries policy, maritime security, marine conservation, trade, marine biodiversity, innovative financial instruments/leveraging instruments for blue economy investments, the blue circular economy and waste management, etc.

4.7 Working modalities

4.7.1 Definition of working modalities

In the context of the existing Task Forces, working modalities can be understood as the internal mechanics of the Task Force, such as the organisational set-up, meetings, working groups, division of work and reporting on recommendations.

The definition of the working modalities is closely linked with the mandate, scope and membership of the Task Force.

4.7.2 Lessons learned from existing Task Forces and best practices

An overview of the working modalities for the assessed Task Forces is presented below.

Table 4.7. Overview of the working modalities

Task Force	Number of Members	Working Modalities
Task Force Rural Africa	11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • one high-level chairperson • duration: one year • 8 Meetings (1 meeting every 1–2 months) • use of public consultation to collect stakeholder views • use of position papers from TF members • output: report with recommendations drafted by the TF members.
EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments	40–70	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • one high-level chairperson • duration: one year • split into three thematic working groups: i) sustainable energy investments with high impact on inclusive growth and job creation, including rural areas and productive uses, ii) regulatory and business climate including capacity-building needs and iii) business-to-business and networking • meetings were organised (every quarter) with selected participants to identify and prepare recommendations on the three themes • the meetings worked in a plenary and then into breakouts • output: SEI Platform’s recommendation report • a reinforced writing team made up of TF members • a number of peer reviewers have also been shortlisted to add to the SEI Platform’s participants review.
Digital Economy Task Force	40	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • two high-level chairpersons • duration: 6 months • four main meetings with all members

Task Force	Number of Members	Working Modalities
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a call for feedback was launched on the Draft Report • output: the Report that was presented at the EU Digital Assembly in 2019 • the report was written by the core members of the Task Force • use of high-level events to publicise the results from the Task Force
Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Taskforce	103	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • three high-level co-chairpersons • duration: one year • split into three working groups: Connectivity, Aviation and Road Safety • meetings will be as a plenary with all groups, and separate meetings per working group • an open call for contributions was launched alongside the Task Force • output: to provide a report with recommendations on Africa-Europe cooperation in the area of transport and will also promote high-level political support for its proposals • the report was written by the core members of each working group.
Support Group for Ukraine*	27	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led full time by one acting director • Duration: ongoing • One full-time core team • Seven sector teams, with one leader per group: Agriculture and Sanitary/Phytosanitary Matters, Economic and Fiscal Reforms, Financial Cooperation, Energy and Environment, Justice and Home Affairs, including anti-corruption, Policy Coordination, Science, Education and Social Matters • External meetings were held with Member States and a number of relevant sectors • Output: supporting Ukraine in the implementation of the policies outlined in the work programme. Reports on activities and progress made.
Iran Task Force*	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • led full time by one Head Member • duration: ongoing • one full-time core team • external meetings were held with international heads of states • output: Support the continual protection of the Iran nuclear deal.

**Not EU-Africa specific*

Given the multidimensional aspect of the working modalities as shown above, the following section will provide a summary for each key area.

Leadership and steering of the Task Force

Competent and strong leadership was pivotal to the success of all the Task Forces. Across each of the EU-Africa Task Forces, high-level chairs were appointed to manage the work programmes and facilitate meetings.

The choice and relevance of the Chair was very important, not only to ensure the timely success of the Task Force, but also to command legitimacy and respect. In the Digital Economy Task Force, for example, given the importance, complexity and size of the Task Force (40

high-level members), two chairs were appointed jointly by the European Commission and the AU – the Minister of Communications, Ghana, and the Vice-President of the African Development Bank. These two chairs also ensured gender and geographical balance.

In addition, many of the Task Forces operated with a “core team” of members who were responsible for coordinating the work, gathering all of the inputs from the members and assisting in the drafting of reports. This group was often supported by Commission staff to help with the administrative and clerical tasks (organisation of meetings, drafting of reports, etc.).

Working groups

The use of working groups was shown in almost all of the existing Task Forces to be a means of structuring and managing the Task Force. The most common approach was thematic working groups that would consist of experts and/or relevant actors in specific fields that could provide a detailed overview of the thematic area. The size and composition of these groups ultimately depended on the overall size of the Task Force and the thematic objectives set under the mandate.

The size of the Task Force is not clearly linked to the number of working groups. For example, under the Support Group for Ukraine, with around 25 members, seven working groups were established to cover the key thematic areas. In addition, while the Task Force Rural Africa did not have working groups per se, key members were able to provide detailed position papers that could be reviewed and taken into account by the Task Force as a whole.

One main benefit of the working groups was their ability to make more in-depth assessments of key thematic areas that would not have been plausible in the Task Force as a whole. Conversely, it was also noted that having this wealth of information also made the drafting of the final report challenging when striving to maintain both a geographic and thematic balance.

Additionally, it was acknowledged that the success of the working groups (and indeed the Task Force as a whole) was the participation of all members. For example, several of the Task Forces noted that due to not all of the members participating and engaging at the same level, it led to the most engaged members having to contribute more intensively to ensure a quality output.

Meetings

The size of the Task Force often determined the frequency and use of meetings. To ensure participation and the sharing of views and knowledge in the Task Force, meetings were organised at different intervals. For example, in the case of the Task Force Rural Africa (11 members), meetings were held every 1–2 months and typically lasted one day. By contrast, the Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments (40–70 members) organised four main meetings – one for each working group and one meeting with all of the Task Force members.

Where multiple working groups were involved, it was often the case that plenaries were established, followed by breakout sessions for each working group. This approach enabled each of the working groups to focus on their specific thematic area, while following the main strategic mandate of the Task Force.

Use of stakeholder consultation tools

Additional stakeholder consultation activities were often proposed to ensure that the Task Force could be as inclusive and representative as possible. This often came in the form

of public consultations or calls for feedback. This approach was highlighted as providing additional stakeholder insights that may not have been represented in the Task Force and helped to shape the recommendations produced.


Good Practice Example - EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments

With a Task Force consisting of between 40 and 70 members at any given point, the Task Force opted for one high-level chairperson (the former United Nations Undersecretary General for Sustainable Energy). This choice of chairperson ensured that the meetings were effectively managed and treated with a degree of importance. Three working groups were established to cover the three main thematic areas which were included under the mandate. Meetings were organised to accommodate these three working groups with a plenary session, accompanied by breakout sessions to explore thematic areas in more detail. The results garnered a wealth of information on the three areas, providing a solid evidence base on which to develop recommendations for the sector.

4.7.3 Options

From the analysis of the different types of working modalities adopted in the existing Task Forces, the following options can be envisaged for the working modalities of the “blue” Task Force, as presented in the figure below.

Figure 4.7 Overview of options for the working modalities and their main strengths and weaknesses



There are several options for the coordination, leadership and steering of the Task Force, and these are presented across the following tables.

Table 4.8. Options on the working modalities

Option number and name	Option #1: Secretariat	Option #2: Secretariat and Chairperson(s)	Option #3: Chairperson(s)
Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Task Force has a standing secretariat dedicated to facilitating the smooth running of day-to-day Task Force operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Task Force has a standing secretariat in charge of coordinating the day-to-day administrative work related to the Task Force, and a chairperson in charge of leading and steering the process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Task Force has one or more chairperson(s) tasked with leading and steering the work.
Implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is well suited for a medium and large Task Force that relies on working groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is well suited for a medium and large Task Force that relies on working groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is well suited in the case of a small group.
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This structure facilitates the smooth running of operations. This structure eases the work of the members. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This structure facilitates the smooth running of operations. This structure ensures direct leadership and increased support for members. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lean and agile coordination structure.
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More resources would be needed to maintain full-time Secretariat. There is a lack of direct leadership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The organisational structure is more complicated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This structure places more administrative and organisational duties on members.

There are several options for the **organisation of working groups** in the Task Force.

Table 4.9 Options for the working groups of the Task Force

Option number and name	Option #1: Only one group	Option #2: Separate working groups working independently	Option #3: Separate working groups working independently and then joining in a plenary	Option #4: Flexible structure: working groups created based on need
Description	The Task Force is made up of only one group, in charge of jointly discussing all topics.	Separate working groups are created, each in charge of discussing a specific topic. The members are divided into the working groups based on their expertise.	#3.1: Parallel structure: all the members of the working groups make up the plenary. #3.2: Vertical structure: the working groups prepare the discussion, and a top-level group above takes decisions.	The Task Force is made up of only one group, and separate working groups can be created based on need during the course of the initiative if deemed relevant by its members.
Implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a need for clear rules on how to participate, to ensure everybody can provide a meaningful contribution. • It is more suited for small or medium Task Force. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This structure would call for a Secretariat as a coordinating body. • This is well suited if the work streams can be dealt with in silos. • There are resources implications as well. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This structure would call for a Secretariat as a coordinating body. • Resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rules of flexibility will need to be clearly established beforehand. • Resources.
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It can deal with topics in integrated manner and break silos. • It is easier to coordinate, though depends on the dimensions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It allows topics to be addressed in depth. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This allows topics to be addressed in depth, but also to have exchanges and consistency of Task Force outputs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This structure would enable the Task Force to adapt to upcoming needs.
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It allows for less depth in the treatment of topics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It would be difficult to ensure consistency of outputs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More efforts would be needed to coordinate the different groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More efforts would be needed to coordinate the different groups.

- More efforts would be needed to coordinate the different groups.

4.8 Overarching considerations for the establishment of the “blue” Task Force

In light of the analysis of the possible options across each of the design elements, the following section presents overarching considerations for the establishment of the “blue” Task Force.

The process of establishing an EU-Africa “blue” Task Force may be affected by challenges and particularities characterising ocean governance as well as the collaboration between the EU and Africa. In this context, the main challenges relate to the political circumstances of the continent and the operation and design of the initiative.

Political circumstances

The relations between Africa and Europe have always been close but complex. Several contextual factors may affect the success of the initiative. The already mentioned instability in political priorities is a challenge in respect to African governments, but may also affect the focus of action from the EU and its Member States. Diverging interests among the different stakeholders on both continents and national mandates may interfere with the work of the Task Force and slow down the reaching of an agreement among parties. In this respect, it will be crucial to avoid excessive politicisation of the Task Force process.

The Task Force needs to create buy-in from relevant stakeholders to produce an impact on the ground. Local decision makers and stakeholders alike need to be convinced of the relevance and acceptance of the Task Force outcome, to ensure they take ownership of it and translate it into concrete actions at local level. They need to understand the benefits of the initiative. It is crucial to ensure they have a way of contributing to work of the Task Force, either by directly taking part as members or via alternative means for the provision of inputs (e.g. stakeholder consultation process). This will be important to ensuring that the initiative meets real needs and addresses real problems, instead of producing “one more” high-level policy document that will not result in practical change.

There is a risk that the purpose of the initiative is misunderstood. Setting up a Task Force can generate considerable expectations in participants and other relevant stakeholders, which might not correspond to the purpose of the initiative. To address this challenge, it is crucial that the selected mandate and scope of the Task Force are properly communicated, and that the initiative is transparent from the outset, to avoid misunderstandings.

Operation and design of the initiative

It is crucial that the “right” members are invited to participate in the Task Force. Members need to be able to take decisions on behalf of the organisation they represent (when this is applicable) without much delay due to internal consultations. But they also need to have the technical expertise to make informed decisions. The challenge of the limited human resource capacities of relevant organisations may lead to sending members to the Task Force that do not actually advance its objectives. In addition to this, the members need to have credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant stakeholders, to ensure that the outcome of the Task Force is credible as well. In this respect it will be important to ensure that the membership reflects a true partnership between the EU and Africa, rather than being prescriptive in relation to the African continent. To address this issue, it will be crucial to base the selection of the membership on a thorough stakeholder analysis, and to set clear requirements for the membership and working modalities. In this context, it is also crucial that the added value of the initiative is appropriately communicated, to ensure the stakeholders perceive the short-term and long-term benefits of engaging with the Task Force and are keener on committing to its work.

Communication and outreach activities are key to the success of the initiative but can also represent a challenge. For the Task Force to be successful, it is important that ownership is built around its outcomes, and that the added value of its work is adequately communicated throughout its operation. The implementation of communication and outreach activities, as well as the identification of appropriate means of communication, can be challenging, given the complex stakeholder landscape and infrastructure capacity²⁸ at hand. This will have to be considered in the definition of the membership and communications strategy, and innovative or alternative approaches might be proposed to ensure the right level of engagement e.g. the involvement of celebrities as testimonials to reach out to the youth, as suggested by one stakeholder interviewed in the course of the study.

Achieving sufficient inclusiveness with the membership will be a major challenge. A Task Force that includes stakeholders who represent all possible geographies (both EU and Africa), expertise types and views of such a complex continent might result in the creation of an overcrowded, slow and potentially ineffective initiative. The lack of continental or regional organisations representing certain industries, communities and other interests is also seen as contributing to this challenge. It will be important to strike the appropriate balance between the inclusiveness and technical feasibility of the initiative, so that the key interests are represented and the outcome of the Task Force is relevant. The selection of the membership will have to be duly justified to address this issue, and special attention will have to be paid to the transparency of the initiative.

The continuity of the work of the members may be problematic. If overly high-level members are selected, it is more likely that they will be busy throughout the initiative and potentially unavailable to provide continuous and substantial input. In addition, the political priorities of the members and the organisations they represent may change over time and obstruct the process. These issues need to be factored in when devising the rules of procedure and working modalities, as well as when setting the requirements for the membership.

Language and other capacity barriers may complicate communication. Members of the Task Force may come from different backgrounds, including in terms of the language they speak. The Task Force must therefore be designed in such a way that all members participate on an equal footing, and feel comfortable in participating. A limited number of parties leading the process should be avoided. This needs to be duly taken into consideration when developing the rules of procedure and working modalities of the Task Force, for instance by foreseeing special support and mentoring for specific stakeholders.

²⁸ For instance, it was suggested by one stakeholder that local radios or applications such as “WhatsApp” might be useful in reaching out to members of local communities.

4.9 Recommendation of two feasible options for the “blue” Task Force

As previously mentioned, the aim of the study is to present feasible options for the establishment of the “blue” Task Force. These feasible options are made up of a combination of the design elements described and assessed in the previous sections of the report.

The following parameters should guide the selection and development of feasible options for the establishment of the “blue” Task Force.


- **Inclusiveness:** The Task Force should be designed in a way that allows for the engagement of a broad variety of relevant stakeholders, and it should establish a partnership of equals between the EU and Africa.
- **Achieve tangible results:** The Task Force should be designed in a way to ensure that its outcomes are translated into tangible actions that achieve progress on the ground.
- **Added value:** The Task Force should add value to existing cooperation initiatives and mechanisms and be complementary to them rather than overlapping with them.

Other parameters might be relevant for the design of the Task Force, for instance the parameters of **Transparency**²⁹ and **Efficiency**³⁰. These will be considered when defining “how the Task Force will be set up”, which is the objective of Task 3.

The definition of the mandate determines the selection of most of the design elements of the Task Force. For this reason, our starting point for the design of feasible options for the establishment of the “blue” Task Force is the selection of the mandate. We will subsequently tailor all other Task Force elements in a way that supports the achievement of the mandate.

There is no consensus among the consulted stakeholders on the mandate for the Task Force. As indicated in the previous chapter, the main demarcation line in this context is made up of the underlying assumption that some stakeholders believe that common objectives on ocean-related matters exist between the EU and Africa, while others believe that this is not the case. While our desk research has demonstrated that there are indeed common interests in the field of ocean governance between the EU and Africa (see Appendix 2 for more details), it is possible that these have not always been defined via a joint exercise, which might explain why some stakeholders think they do not exist at all. For this reason, we propose to consider two options for the mandate of the Task Force, taking into account both assumptions listed below.

Figure 4.8. Proposed mandates for each option



We propose excluding the other possible Task Force mandates presented in section 4.2.3 for the following reasons:

²⁹ The parameter of “Transparency” requires the work of the Task Force to be accessible and visible for all relevant stakeholders. To this end, it is important that tailored working modalities and an appropriate communication strategy are devised. This will be part of Task 3.

³⁰ The parameter of “Efficiency” requires the Task Force to be designed in such a way to ensure so that the results achieved by the initiative justify the investment. To this end, it is important that tailored working modalities are defined. This will be part of Task 3.

- Option #1 - Strategic Task Force: this option might be seen as an overly high-level initiative by stakeholders (i.e. not concrete enough) and would not therefore comply with the parameter of “achieve tangible results”;
- Option #3 - Operational Task Force with follow-up: this option might be considered as a subset or possible variation of Option #2 analysed here;
- Option #4: - Operational Task Force – Coordinating existing initiatives: this option would not sufficiently add value to existing mechanisms, and it is unclear at this stage whether this mandate would sufficiently exploit the idea of EU and Africa partnership that is to be created with this Task Force.

The proposed options are explained in detail below. Where relevant, we propose additional minor variations of the options to show how these can be adapted if this is considered relevant or appropriate by the Commission. The expected outcome of the variation is also presented here.

4.9.1 Operational Task Force (Option #2)

The operational Task Force is organised as follows:

Mandate: Operational Task Force - Define a shared action plan to achieve actionable progress on existing objectives

This mandate is built on the assumption that common objectives on ocean-related issues between the EU and Africa already exist, for instance, there is an agreement that the blue economy should be developed and that maritime security should be addressed.

In this context, the Task Force will be mandated to create a shared action plan detailing concrete steps for achieving progress on the common objectives for a pre-defined set of work streams of common interest. These steps will be designed based on an assessment of existing barriers to progress and their respective proposed solutions. The shared action plan will include a timeline for its implementation, and it should be concrete enough to trigger tangible action by relevant actors on the ground.



Possible variation: In addition to defining a shared action plan for achieving actionable progress on existing objectives, the Task Force could have a “follow-up” mandate. Once the action plan is defined, the Task Force will have the task of following up, monitoring and evaluating progress in its implementation. This could encourage concrete translation of the Task Force outcome on the ground and address the concerns of some stakeholders with regards to the effectiveness of cooperation initiatives. At the same time, this could represent an additional burden for decision makers.

Work streams of common interest: Specific thematic scope

The Task Force has a specific and pre-defined thematic scope. Based on our analysis, the Task Force could focus either on the blue economy or on maritime security. In particular, the Task Force could work on either:

- defining a set of actions for achieving concrete progress on the development of the blue economy in Africa, in each of the sectors it contains;
- or defining a set of actions for achieving concrete progress on existing maritime security objectives in Africa.

Geographical scope: Continental and Regional

The Task Force will have an overarching continental mandate, i.e. targeting the African continent as a whole. As such, it will aim to create an action plan including a set of actions that will enable progress on the agreed objectives on international ocean governance for the entire African continent. Regional specificities may be considered, where relevant, within each specific work stream. If considered appropriate, the Task Force members will propose sets of actions that address regional specificities as well.

Establishment: The Task Force is established jointly by the EU and Africa

The initiative will be hosted by the European Commission, which will be responsible for setting up and coordinating the Task Force, including covering the costs and following up on the delivery of the mandate. Two chairpersons, one from the European Union and one from the designated African counterpart, will be engaged to lead the work.

To ensure the initiative is built on a true partnership, the designated African counterpart will have substantial involvement in the establishment of the Task Force. In particular, they will be involved in:

- refining the mandate;
- refining the work streams of common interest;
- defining the requirements for the membership and identifying members where relevant;
- refining the rules of procedure of the Task Force.

As the mandate is continental, we would recommend designating the Africa Union as the main counterpart. This is also in line with other EU-Africa Task Forces set up in the past.

Membership: Medium size, Standing Membership, Policy experts + Experts + Civil society

The Task Force will include no more than 50 members. The members will be selected before the Task Force begins, and the membership will be permanent for the whole duration of the initiative. For the selection of the membership, the geographical (including equal representation of the EU and Africa, and representation of different regions in both), gender and stakeholder balance will be taken into consideration.

As a minimum, the Task Force could include representatives from the following stakeholders:

- policy experts: European Commission Services, EEAS and Agencies, African Union Agencies, Regional Economic Communities, Regional Seas Conventions, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, FAO, IMO, EU and African Member States;
- experts: academics, technical advisers, experts involved in the coordination of existing EU-Africa projects and programmes;
- civil society: non-governmental organisations, representatives of local communities (at regional level), private sector.

Where the stakeholder is an organisation, this will be tasked with identifying a relevant representative. It can be envisaged that the representative may change according to the specific theme to be addressed in the Task Force.

In the case of individual experts, a call for experts can be set up.



Possible variation: The Task Force may be large (up to 100 members). This would broaden the scope for inclusiveness, but it could also slow down the work of the initiative, including decision-making processes.

Working modalities: Secretariat + Chairs, Different working groups + Plenary

A small secretariat will be set up, made up of European Commission officers from relevant Directorate-Generals and Services, e.g. DG MARE, DG INTPA and EEAS. Two chairs will be appointed, one from the European Union and one from the African Union.

The Task Force will be organised into different working groups, e.g. one for each macro-sector of the blue economy. If relevant, sub-working groups may be set up, to delve more specifically into certain aspects or sectors of relevance for each work stream of common interest.

Each working group will produce a draft of the shared action plan for the subtopic of its concern, which will subsequently be discussed at a plenary including all 50 members of the Task Force. In the context of the plenary, the shared action plan will be discussed, revised and agreed upon.

Justification for selection and compliance with the parameters

- **Inclusiveness:** the geographical scope, medium size and proposed membership modalities ensure that the Task Force has a moderate scope for inclusiveness in terms of the geographies and stakeholders represented.
- **Achieve tangible results:** the focus on the design of a concrete action plan represents a step towards the achievement of tangible progress on the ground.
- **Added value:** at present, no such joint initiative exists with a focus on the blue economy or maritime security. In addition to this, by including members of existing organisations involved in cooperation between the EU and Africa on ocean governance (e.g. regional organisations such as RFMOs and RSCs), the initiative will ensure complementarity with existing relevant cooperation mechanisms and add value to them.

4.9.2 Two-Phase Task Force (Option #5)

Mandate: Strategic and operational Task Force – Define common objectives and subsequently define a shared action plan

Building on the assumption that common objectives on ocean-related issues between the EU and Africa still need to be defined or agreed, this Task Force will first achieve a strategic alignment of positions, priorities and objectives between the EU and Africa on ocean-related matters. Secondly, it will produce a shared action plan for achieving progress on prioritised common objectives.

Work streams of common interest: Broad topical scope, not defined beforehand

The thematic scope of the Task Force will not be defined beforehand, to enable the Task Force members to define the common priorities for the EU and Africa in the broad field of ocean governance. The concrete work streams of common interest will be defined as a result of discussions taking place in the first phase of the Task Force.

Geographical scope: Continental and Regional

The Task Force will have an overarching continental mandate, and the focus will be shifted towards the regional specificities where relevant, once the concrete work streams of common interest have been defined by the Task Force members.



Possible variation: The Task Force may only be regional and focus on one specific region (as a pilot region) in the African continent (to be selected beforehand). If the experience proves successful, a similar initiative may be undertaken for other regions. This would ensure that the discussions on common objectives and a shared action plan are tailored to the needs and concerns of the selected region. At the same time, it might create discontent among the regions not prioritised in the short term.



Possible variation: The Task Force may be continental, regional and national at the same time (see option 4 in section 4.4.3). The regional and national scope would be considered in the context of each specific work stream. The inclusion of the national scope could enable the Task Force to provide advice on ad hoc requests related to specific topics from specific coastal countries.

Establishment: The Task Force is established jointly by the EU and Africa

We propose adopting the same type of establishment as in the previous option (see “Establishment” in section 4.9.1).

Membership: Medium size, Standing Membership and ad hoc engagement, Policy experts + Experts + Civil society

The Task Force will include no more than 50 members. A part of the members (core group) will be selected before the Task Force begins, while the remaining part will be engaged on an ad hoc basis once the work streams of common interest have been defined by the core group.

The members to be engaged on a permanent basis for the entire duration of the Task Force should be the Policy Experts (see “Membership” in section 4.9.1). The Experts and Civil society representatives will instead be identified (either via a call for experts or by invitation from the standing members) and engaged on an ad hoc basis throughout the duration of the initiative.



Possible variation: Civil society and experts may be engaged via a stakeholder consultation process e.g. official public consultation or multi-stakeholder platform allowing stakeholders to submit position papers throughout the duration of the initiative.

This would enable the Task Force to take into consideration the views of the broader stakeholder base and be more inclusive. At the same time, this would constitute an extra burden for the Task Force and might slow down its work.

Working modalities: Flexible structure: working groups created based on need

As for the previous option, a small secretariat consisting of European Commission services will be set up, and two chairpersons will be tasked with steering the work.

The Task Force membership will work flexibly: in the first phase, the Task Force will work mainly in plenary. Where they consider it relevant, the members of the Task Force will be able to split into working groups.

Justification for the selection and compliance with the parameters

- **Inclusiveness:** the geographical scope and the establishment and membership modalities ensure that the Task Force is geographically and thematically inclusive.

- **Achieve tangible results:** the initial identification of common objectives will ensure the buy-in of stakeholders and enhance the credibility of the initiative. This, paired with the subsequent focus on the design of a concrete action plan, will enable the achievement of tangible progress on the ground.
- **Added value:** at present no such initiative exists. By including members of existing organisations involved in the cooperation between the EU and Africa on ocean governance (e.g. regional organisations such as RFMOs and RSCs), the initiative will ensure complementarity with existing mechanisms and add value to them.

4.10 Assessment of the two options

4.10.1 SWOT analysis

In this section we present a SWOT analysis of the two options for the establishment of the Task Force outlined below. As the detailed strengths and weaknesses of options for each design element are described in the previous chapters, we will not repeat them here.

Operational Task Force

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A specific focus and working groups will ensure topics are addressed in depth. • The regional scope allows the Task Force to produce meaningful outputs that are relevant for stakeholders on the ground. • A plenary will ensure that information from working groups can be discussed within the broader group, and this could facilitate the consistency of the work. • The membership includes different types of stakeholders and this ensures complementarity of views and inputs to the Task Force. • The working groups will allow members to feel involved, empowered and committed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult to run and coordinate because of the number of members involved. • Competing interests (given number, variety of stakeholders and regional geographical perspective) might hinder the achievement on an agreement. • The specific thematic scope might make the Task Force lose sight of the bigger picture of ocean governance.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate inclusiveness will ensure buy-in of stakeholders on the Task Force outcomes. • A specific focus and membership facilitate the development of relevant and concrete recommendations/outcomes to facilitate the achievement of progress on the ground. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working groups might be too small to maintain geographic and gender balance, as well as the balance of the type of stakeholders. • A portion of Task Force members may not contribute equally to the work of the initiative • If the Member States are not directly involved as members or consulted in the context of the Task Force, this might limit the consideration of national level needs and concerns, and may limit buy-in of Task Force outcomes. • If the selected members are not considered credible or respectable enough, this may hinder the credibility of the Task Force outcome.

Two-step Task Force

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ad hoc engagement of stakeholders allows for a broader scope for inclusiveness and a re-evaluation of the needs of the Task Forces in the course of its existence. • The two-step approach ensures that the process is more rigorous from the get-go, as the members of the Task Force will decide on common priorities and then work on the shared action plan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The two-step approach could end up being a long and convoluted process, which may extend the duration of the Task Force and reduce the momentum of the initiative. • Ad hoc engagement of members might not be rigorous because of the need to engage members quickly based on emerging needs.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible to bring in additional targeted expertise based on need and to reach a broader stakeholder base with ad hoc engagement. • Since Task Force members will decide on common priorities on the spot, this will create a stronger basis for future action. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common priorities will be defined by a limited number of people, and these might not be fully representative of the whole continent or interests, which might hinder the credibility of the Task Force outcomes. • If the membership is not thematically varied enough, one theme might prevail as a priority over another – because of competing interests and politicisation. • Resources issues.

5. Elements of the “blue” Task Force

The “Two-Phase Task Force” was identified as the preferred option. This chapter further develops the constitutive elements of this Task Force, including its mandate, thematic and geographic scope, as well as its membership, working modalities, calendar of activities and communications strategy. This constitutes the Task 3 deliverable.

5.1 Mandate

SELECTED OPTION:


Strategic and operational Task Force – Select work streams of common interest and subsequently define a shared action plan

Although some common objectives regarding ocean governance between the EU and Africa exist (see Appendix 2), these have not yet been commonly agreed upon and defined in a dedicated forum. Building on this understanding, the Task Force will operate under the following mandate:

The Task Force will [1] aim to achieve strategic alignment on the key priorities and objectives on international ocean governance between the two continents and select the main work streams the Task Force will focus on. It will also [2] aim to produce a shared action plan to achieve tangible progress on the agreed set of common priorities and objectives.

To fulfil this mandate, the Task Force will be organised in two “phases”, as outlined in the figure below.

Figure 5.1 Set up of the Two-Phase Task Force



1. **Phase 1 – Strategic:** the Task Force members will have an open-ended discussion on different possible common priorities and objectives between the EU and Africa on international ocean governance. Subsequently, the members will be asked to prioritise and select the key areas of cooperation they want to work on in the subsequent phase of the Task Force (i.e. work streams of common interest).

- 2. Phase 2 – Operational:** the Task Force members will develop a concrete action plan for achieving actionable progress on the common priorities and objectives identified in Phase 1, in relation to each respective work stream selected. The output of this work will be a document outlining a set of actions and recommendations, including the definition of a timeline and the identification of relevant key actors who should implement these actions on the ground.

This mandate is in line with the statement issued by the European Commission in the context of the launch of Africa-Europe Foundation³¹, which indicates that the new Task Forces should identify areas for long-term cooperation and the respective objectives to be pursued, and then define the steps needed to take in order to get there.

5.2 Work streams of common interest for the African and European continents

SELECTED OPTION:

Broad thematic scope, not defined beforehand

The Task Force will be set up with a broad thematic scope. Its members will select and define the concrete work streams of common interest between the EU and Africa that the Task Force will focus on in Phase 1. This is to empower the members of the Task Force to influence the dialogue and outcomes of the Task Force. At the same time, this will ensure that such outcomes are the result of a joint effort between the European and African members, reflecting their current common priorities and positions.

As indicated in the outlined mandate, all ocean-related matters can potentially fall within the scope of the Task Force, and it will be up to the members to decide what to prioritise. A preliminary list of potential work streams has been drawn up based on desk research and stakeholder consultations. This includes:

- sustainable blue economy
- maritime security
- sustainable fisheries
- ocean conservation
- oceans and social issues, including migration and human rights
- oceans and climate change
- seafood trade and market access
- MSP and ecosystem-based management
- ocean research and data

The work streams that were cited most often by stakeholders or in the literature are presented first in the list. The most salient topics were the sustainable blue economy and maritime security. The work streams are further detailed in section 4.3 above.

When defining the thematic scope of the Task Force (i.e. selecting which work streams of common interest the Task Force will focus on), the Task Force members will take into consideration ongoing initiatives, to ensure the action plan mutually supports them rather than overlaps with them. Relevant initiatives include:

- The work carried out by the African Ministerial Conference on the environment (AMCEN)³² and its working group on the blue economy;

³¹ See here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2271

³² See: <https://www.unenvironment.org/regions/africa/african-ministerial-conference-environment/about-amcen>

- The work carried out by the UNEP on behalf of the African Union to develop an African Ocean Governance Strategy³³;
- The Africa Blue Economy Strategy³⁴ adopted by the African Union in 2019;
- The G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea and its working group on the blue economy;
- The new EU strategy on the sustainable blue economy, to be published in spring 2021;
- The revision and update of the EU International Ocean Governance Agenda;
- The proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument³⁵;
- The negotiations around the Post-Cotonou agenda³⁶.

5.3 Focus regions and countries

SELECTED OPTION:

Overall continental scope, with the possibility of delving into regional and national specificities where relevant

The Task Force will have an overarching continental mandate, in that the initiative will aim to identify the key priorities and objectives for increased cooperation on ocean governance for the whole of the EU and African continent. Wherever relevant, the Task Force will address regional or national specificities within each different work stream.

For instance, when defining the action plan for achieving progress on a specific work stream (e.g. “improve maritime security”), regional or national instances may be addressed, and specific actions or recommendations may be included (e.g. specific actions for the Gulf of Guinea region). As such, the Task Force members could identify tailored actions or recommendations that apply to a particular country where this is requested or considered appropriate by the Task Force, or if this is requested by the country itself.

³³ Available at:


https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10916/oceangovernance_wg1_2_developingafricanocceangovernance.pdf?sequence=1&%3BisAllowed=

³⁴ Available at: <https://www.au-ibar.org/home/171-en/media/news/au-ibar/1484-launch-of-the-africa-blue-economy-strategy#:~:text=The%20objective%20of%20the%20Africa,sustainability%2C%20the%20growth%20of%20an>

³⁵ Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-new-boost-for-jobs-growth-and-investment/file-mff-ndici>

³⁶ Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2291

Figure 5.2 Geographic scope of the Task Force



5.4 Membership

SELECTED OPTION:

Medium size Task Force, with standing members and the possibility of engaging additional stakeholders on an ad hoc basis


The standing members of the Task Force will define the work streams of common interest between the EU and Africa, as well as the respective key priorities and objectives to be pursued. As such, they will be the main actors influencing the work and output of the Task Force. In light of this, identifying them is a crucial step in ensuring that the initiative produces the expected results. Given the wide variety of stakeholders who could potentially play a role in the Task Force, and also considering the broad thematic scope of the initiative at this stage, it is important to adequately justify and elaborate on the selection of the members, as well as on the adoption of modalities for engaging additional stakeholders (non-members) that can provide input to the work of the Task Force.

5.4.1 Organisation of the Task Force

The Task Force will be of medium size, including up to 31 members (Task Force members). These will be selected before the Task Force begins, as part of a joint exercise by the EU and AU. To ensure a certain degree of flexibility and inclusivity, it will be possible to engage additional people on an ad hoc basis where relevant, i.e. when the work streams are defined and the needs of the Task Force are clarified. This ad hoc engagement will be performed either via a call for experts (expert panel) or via stakeholder consultation activities. In addition to this, the work of the Task Force will be steered by two chairpersons and supported by a Secretariat. Figure 5.3 provides an overview of the organisational set-up of the Task Force, including the different actors involved, as further explained in the section below. For a full cost breakdown per category, see Section 5.8.

Figure 5.3 Organisation of the Task Force

Organisation of the EU-Africa “blue” Task Force



Secretariat

The Task Force will have a permanent secretariat dedicated to facilitating the smooth running of day-to-day operations, e.g. organising meetings, correspondence with the Task Force members and other experts and setting up stakeholder consultation activities. The Secretariat will be set up by the EU, and it will consist of up to five EU staff from relevant Directorate-Generals and departments, working part-time on the Task Force:

- Two will be experienced staff members (grade AD 5 to 11 or equivalent). One of them will be the Project Management Officer (PMO) and he/she will work part-time on the Task Force for its entire duration. The other one may be involved in the course of the Task Force, e.g. someone with expertise in professional facilitation or other know-how, depending on the needs of each phase of the Task Force.
- The other staff will be three Secretarial/Administrative assistants (grade AST 1 to 6 or equivalent). One of these will be working part-time for the entire duration of the Task Force, while the other two will be called to support the Secretariat ahead of the meetings or important milestones, such as the finalisation of reports.

Chairpersons

The Task Force will have two chairpersons that will be tasked with steering the work throughout the duration of the initiative. The EU and the African Union will select the chairpersons with the support of the Secretariat. One chairperson should represent the EU, and one the African continent. It can be set as a requirement that gender balance should be respected. The chairpersons will be additional to the Task Force members.

Task Force members

The Task Force will have up to 31 members who will be tasked with implementing the initiative's mandate. As such, the members will select the work streams of common interest between the EU and Africa and the respective objectives to be pursued (Phase 1) and they will draw up an action plan to achieve actionable progress on these objectives (Phase 2).

The Task Force members will participate on behalf of the organisations they belong to. They will be selected and invited to participate by the EU and the AU. As the work streams to be selected for discussion in Phase 2 are still unknown and may vary greatly, we propose allocating a fixed number of seats to each selected organisation, so as to allow the organisations themselves to choose their representatives, based on the subject matter at hand in the meeting. Each Task Force member will have voting rights (i.e. one vote for one seat).

The membership should be geographically- and gender-balanced. To comply with this, there will be a 50–50 split of EU and Africa representatives to the extent possible, and the selected organisations will be asked to make arrangements to ensure gender balance when they select the relevant representative that will take part in each specific meeting.

Expert panel

The Task Force members will be supported by an expert panel, composed of up to 20 members. They will be invited to support the discussion or provide specific input and insights on different issues at hand in the form of dedicated hearings, participation in the Task Force meetings, short papers or other background material in preparation for the meetings. The experts may come from different institutions, and from academic/scientific or technical/advisory backgrounds. The spectrum of world views derived from these experts will cover multidisciplinary aspects of the topics under discussion in the Task Force. The experts will not have voting rights.

Experts will be selected via a call for applications, to be launched by the Secretariat as soon as Phase 1 of the Task Force comes to an end and the work streams of common interest have been agreed upon. Following the call for applications, a list of experts will be drawn up. The EU and AU will select the most suitable experts, based on a set of selection criteria to be agreed upon by the EU and AU before the launch of the call. This will ensure transparency and avoid bias.

Stakeholder consultation

Given that one of the priorities of the Task Force is to be inclusive, to ensure that its output is credible and a product of a shared effort between the parties, **the Task Force members will have the possibility of gathering input from additional stakeholders by setting up one or more consultation activities.** The activities envisaged could be the following:

- **Targeted survey from the Task Force website:** online questionnaire surveys can be an effective tool for reaching a broad audience, interest groups or citizens but require well-formulated questions and a survey length that is not too long or complicated. This can work as an opinion poll, where respondents are automatically categorised according to nationalities,

stakeholder group, gender, age, etc. The responses are directly made visible online by frequently updated visualised presentation of the results. Such visualisation may motivate more respondents to take part in the survey.

- **Public Consultation via the European Commission website:** similar to a targeted survey, a public consultation via the Commission website can enable a wide and diverse group of stakeholders to present their views on matters concerning the Task Force.
- **Online interviews/ meetings/ webinars:** online meetings/conferences could be arranged to connect with additional stakeholders on an ad hoc basis. This can take the form of interviews, interactive meetings to exchange different concerns, or presentations by Task Force members, expert groups, stakeholder groups, and/or citizens representatives. Moreover, where disputes arise on a topic area, these meetings can serve to address conflicts and carry out conflict management strategies to reach agreement when issues are disputed.
- **Citizens' juries/citizens' conferences:** to ensure inclusivity and the representativeness of broader society, citizen juries/conferences could be undertaken. These are people who are not lobbying for specific interests, do not gain personal benefits from participating but are willing to independently think about what good decisions are in the long term and how best to balance the different societal views of businesses, environmental issues, climate concerns, etc. Such conferences can consist of everything from ten to hundreds of participants, examples of which can be found in the USA and Denmark.
- **Local workshops:** when the Task Force advises on issues with implications at regional, national or local levels, workshops could be organised between the members of the Task Force representatives of interest groups.

One or more of these activities can be selected and implemented in the course of the Task Force. The Secretariat will be in charge of setting up these activities, based on the agreement of the Task Force members and available resources.

The selection of the most suitable consultation activity or mix of activities will be based on the needs of the Task Forces Phase. For instance, when a specific work stream is selected (e.g. the sustainable blue economy) the Task Force members might be interested to hear the views of industry and civil society about the needs, challenges and possible actions points to be proposed.

The Task Force members will take into account the feedback from the consultation when drawing up the action plan and the recommendations. For this reason, the timing of consultation activity or mix of activities will have to be carefully considered, as their results would need to be available at the right moment.

Observers

The Task Force members may also allow "**observers**" to attend some of the meetings of the Task Force³⁷. The observers will submit their application to obtain observer status via the Task Force website, and they may belong to different stakeholder categories such as international organisations, civil society and public authorities. However, they will not have voting rights and will not participate in the formulation of recommendations or advice by the Task Force.


5.4.2 Proposed selection process for the Task Force members

The selection of the members is crucial to ensuring the Task Force accomplishes its mandate. Given that, at this stage, there are still many uncertainties regarding the thematic scope of the Task Force,

³⁷ The inclusion of observer status was included under the rules of procedure for the Rural Africa Task Force, which adopted a similar approach. Other existing Task Forces did not adopt official observer status, primarily due to the absence of official rules of procedure being drafted.

the proposed organisational set-up is flexible. Rather than proposing a concrete list of members, what we define here is a process for their selection. The figure below presents an overview of such a process.

Figure 5.4 Overview of the proposed selection process for the Task Force membership



1. **The EU and AU agree on the size and organisation of the Task Force:** EU and AU representatives will agree on the format of the Task Force, and they might discuss the option proposed in the previous section 5.4.1 and decide whether to take them up or adopt some modifications.
2. **The EU sets up the Task Force Secretariat** that will consist of EU staff from relevant Directorate-Generals and Services.
3. **The EU and AU propose and select the Chairpersons:** the EU and AU will draw up a list of possible chairpersons with the help of the Secretariat. The EU and AU will identify the two chairpersons, one for Europe and one for Africa, and invite them to participate and steer the work of the Task Force.
4. **The EU and AU propose and select the Task Force members:** the EU and AU will draw up a list of possible members with the help of the Secretariat and the Chairpersons. In section 7.4.4 below we present some examples of possible Task Force members. The EU and AU will jointly identify the members from the list. The members will be invited to participate and execute the work of the Task Force.
5. **The Chairpersons and Secretariat grant observer status to applicant individuals or organisations:** individuals and organisations will apply to obtain observer status via the Task Force website. The Chairpersons, with the support of the secretariat, will grant observer status to the applicants.

6. **The Secretariat launches a call for experts:** once Phase 1 of the Task Force has run its course and the work streams of common interest are agreed upon, the Secretariat will launch the call to identify the experts who will make up the expert panel. The Secretariat will gather all the applications and draw up a list of expert applicants.
7. **The EU and AU select the experts for the expert panel:** the EU and AU, organised in a dedicated selection committee, will review the applications and select the 20 experts who will make up the panel. Selection criteria will be agreed beforehand.
8. **The Task Force members can decide to organise stakeholder consultation activities:** the Secretariat will be in charge of organising these activities (see section 5.4.1).

5.4.3 Possible stakeholders

Given the wide variety of potential work streams of common interest between the EU and Africa on international ocean governance that could become the object of the Task Force, a large number of stakeholders may have a stake in the work of this initiative. Table 5.1 presents an overview of all the possible stakeholders that might have an interest in, or may be affected by, the work of the Task Force. This table also provides an indication of the different ways in which these stakeholders could be engaged, i.e. whether they are more suited to be Task Force members, experts in the panel, observers, or engaged via stakeholder consultations. Appendix 4 provides additional details on each different stakeholder category and the input that each of these stakeholders might provide.

Table 5.1 Overview of key stakeholders in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance and how they could be engaged in the Task Force

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder subcategory	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
Policy-makers	EU (including EU Member States)	✓			
	African Union (AU) (including AU Member States)	✓			
	African Regional Communities	✓			
	Regional organisations (e.g. RFMOS, RSCs)			✓	✓
	UN Bodies (e.g. FAO, UNEP)			✓	✓
	UN Action Platform			✓	✓
	Other international organisations (e.g. IMO)			✓	✓
Experts	Academics (e.g. research institutes, universities)		✓	✓	✓
	International research organisations		✓	✓	✓
	Technical advisers and other experts		✓	✓	✓
	Professional facilitators (e.g. conflict management experts, dialogue facilitation experts)		*To be included in the Secretariat		
Civil society	Local communities and their organisations, associations	✓		✓	✓
	Industry or private sector representatives	✓		✓	✓
	Citizens' representatives			✓	✓

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder subcategory	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
	Specific target groups ³⁸			✓	✓
	NGOs			✓	✓

The selection of work streams of common interest has an influence on the selection and prioritisation of certain stakeholders' engagement, i.e. for certain work streams it will be more relevant to involve certain stakeholders than it will be for others. The prioritisation of the involvement of certain stakeholder subcategories reflects the importance of the target groups they represent when discussing a specific topic.

For instance, in discussing the blue economy and facilitating potential investments in that economy, the impacted groups include the people benefiting from the potential investments (e.g. countries, industries) and the people who are dependent on any resource that will be affected after the investment is completed. If the interests of these target groups are to be represented in the Task Force, then members of civil society and policy-makers should be involved as a matter of high priority. It would also be important to invite experts, as they may be able to provide relevant insights on how to approach the topic.

The main risks in an international Task Force include miscommunication and misunderstanding. It is therefore recommended that communication or dialogue facilitation experts are involved from the very beginning of the Task Force to facilitate the interactions of the Task Force members. These professional facilitator(s) will form part of the Secretariat, and they will be engaged on a needs basis.

In addition to this, it is particularly important when working in Africa to engage local communities. This may be a challenge because they often operate informally. Still, they are a critical cornerstone in African thinking and organisation and must not be excluded.

5.4.4 Proposed composition of the Task Force

This section presents our proposal for the composition of each of the groups identified above in Figure 5.3, based on the information presented in 5.4.3 and Appendix 4. The proposal for the composition is left open and flexible, to respond to a series of complexities in the Task Force:

- the need for the Task Force to be inclusive yet manageable;
- the need for the Task Force membership to be representative of the relevant interests yet manageable;
- the need for the membership to be flexible, since the work streams of common interest that the Task Force will focus on are to be decided in Phase 1 and different types of expertise might be needed once the decision is taken;
- the need for the Task Force to include members who have the legitimacy to take decisions and have an impact on the matters at hand, but at the same time avoid politicisation of the initiative;
- the need for the Task Force to include members who will be available throughout the entire initiative.

³⁸ People operating in formal or informal arrangements impacted by the initiative. These would change depending on the work streams selected in Phase 1 of the Task Force.

Task Force members

EU and African policy-makers and civil society representatives should be members of the Task Force. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the proposed members (31), including examples of organisations that could be included in each stakeholder category. The final selection will be the responsibility of the EU and AU, as indicated in section 6.6. If some of these organisations are not selected as members, they could be engaged via other modalities, e.g. they could be observers or they could be engaged via stakeholder consultation activities.

Table 5.2 Proposed Task Force members, including examples of possible organisations to be included

Stakeholder category	Geographical scope	Description of expertise/profiles	Number of seats allocated
Policy-makers	EU	<p>The EU policy-makers could be represented by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the European Commission: the expertise of this group relates to the DG's specific expertise (MARE, INTPA, ENV, GROW, TRADE, MOVE, CONNECT, RTD) and JRC's specific expertise, particularly on AU-Africa relations, ocean governance, as well as institutions and international relations. the European Parliament: this group supplements the first group with expertise on fisheries, and represents, for instance, the Intergroup Seas, Rivers, Islands and Coastal Areas (SEARICA) or other Members of the Parliament. the European External Action Service: this group provides country-specific expertise and expertise in EU-Africa relations. European Union Agencies: this group provides expertise on foreign policy instruments, fishery control, capacity building, maritime safety and security, natural capital, ecosystems, etc. the EU Member States (MS): the EU Member States could be represented by representatives of the national authorities of a selected number of Member States³⁹ e.g. representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Sea. Alternatively, national authorities could be represented by the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. 	10
	Africa	<p>The AU policy-makers could be represented by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the AU Commission: this group provides expertise in the African and rural economy. the AU Agencies: these provide, among others, expertise in animal resources (IBAR) and development (NEPAD). the Regional Economic Communities: these can provide economic and trade expertise across regions (COMESA, ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD, SADC) and the whole continent (AfcFTA). the Regional Intergovernmental Fisheries Bodies: these can provide expertise on fisheries (SRFC, COMHAFAT). 	10

³⁹ The Member States themselves would be in charge of identifying their representatives, i.e. the selected Member States could be those who express most interest in the initiative because they have a particular stake in it, such as major coastal states, or those states that have established well-functioning partnerships with Africa on international ocean governance.

Stakeholder category	Geographical scope	Description of expertise/profiles	Number of seats allocated
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Intergovernmental Organisations: these can provide insights of maritime issues (e.g. MOWCA⁴⁰). the AU Member States (MS). The AU Member States could be represented by representatives of the national authorities of a selected number of Member States⁴¹, e.g. representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of fisheries or the blue economy. Alternatively, national authorities could be represented by a group of representatives from the African Union Assembly⁴², the AU Permanent Representatives Committee⁴³ or the Executive Council⁴⁴. 	
Civil society	EU and Africa	<p>The civil society representatives could include organisations such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> local communities, e.g. community-based organisations⁴⁵, such as the Mida Creek Conservation and Awareness Group⁴⁶, Civil Society Organisations⁴⁷ such as the West African Civil Society Institute⁴⁸ or the Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe.⁴⁹ Industry or private sector representatives, e.g. the African Confederation of Artisanal Fisheries Organisations (CAOPA), the EU-Africa Business Forum etc. Citizens’ representatives. Target groups. 	11
TOT.			31

Expert panel

A panel of 20 experts will be selected via a call for applications, to be launched before the start of Phase 2 of the Task Force. We present below a definition of potential expert profiles that could be relevant for Phase 2 of the Task Force. Depending on the work streams selected in Phase 1, the list of sectors and disciplines presented below could be shorted or supplemented, to ensure the expert panel composition adequately supports the work of the Task Force. The detailed call for applications is presented in Appendix 4 to this report.

⁴⁰ Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA).

⁴¹ The Member States themselves would be in charge of identifying their representatives, i.e. the selected Member States could be those who express most interest in the initiative because they have a particular stake in it, such as major coastal states, or those states that have established well-functioning partnerships with Europe on international ocean governance.

⁴² See: <https://au.int/en/assembly>

⁴³ See: <https://au.int/en/prc>

⁴⁴ See: <https://au.int/en/executivecouncil>

⁴⁵ Community-based organisations are “grassroots organisations” made up of groups of individuals who are collaborating for a common interest. For more information on examples of community-based organisations and their role in the Effective Management of Coastal and Marine Resources in Kenya and Tanzania please see: https://www.wiomsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/cbo_publication_final.pdf

⁴⁶ See: <http://www.watamu.biz/member-list.php?cid=9>

⁴⁷ Civil Society Organisations are often set up in cooperation with third parties to encourage grassroots level interests. For more information on possible Civil Society Organisations based in Africa, please see: http://www.ldgl.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/global-statement_endorsements.pdf

⁴⁸ See: <https://www.linkedin.com/company/wacsi/?originalSubdomain=gh>

⁴⁹ See: <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/womens-coalition-of-zimbabwe-wcoz/?location=zimbabwe&theme>

Table 5.3 Definition of expert profiles

Type of profile
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A high level of expertise (at least 5 years' experience) in the following sectors and disciplines (one or more):<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ ocean governance▪ blue economy sectors▪ fisheries policy▪ maritime security▪ marine conservation and marine biodiversity▪ trade▪ innovative financial instruments/leveraging instruments for Blue Economy investments▪ blue circular economy▪ waste management▪ (Environmental) economics▪ ocean research and innovation (e.g. ecology, oceanography, ocean data collection, analysis and visualisation)▪ climate change mitigation and adaptation▪ value chain expertise for maritime products▪ social sciences▪ international law, including expertise on the UN Convention on the Law of the sea and other ocean-related international instruments▪ diplomacy and foreign affairs▪ international cooperation in ocean-related matters and relations with Africa▪ conflict management and resolution, facilitation techniques• Experience working on these sectors and disciplines in an African context• Availability to travel to either Europe or Africa for 6 meetings• Absence of circumstances that could give rise to a conflict of interest

Observers

International policy-makers, regional organisations, as civil society representatives and public authorities can be observers in the context of the Task Force.

Stakeholder consultations

Stakeholder consultations will be primarily aimed at civil society, but could also focus on experts or EU and AU policy-makers if this is deemed relevant by the Task Force members.

5.5 Working modalities

SELECTED OPTION:

Flexible structure

This section will serve as an introduction to the rules of procedure for the Task Force, which are presented in Appendix 6. In particular, it will highlight where the key parameters (to be inclusive, achieve tangible results and add value) have been taken into account across all points.

The working modalities have been designed based on the analysis and lessons learned from previous EU-Africa Task Forces (see section 4.7.2), in conjunction with the data gathered throughout the stakeholder consultations.

The rules of procedure are divided into 19 points that cover the establishment of the Task Force, the coordination of the members, the organisation of working groups, and the internal decision-making mechanisms⁵⁰.

5.5.1 Key considerations

As discussed in section 4.7.2, the analysis of the existing EU-Africa Task Forces uncovered best practices that were taken on board during the design of the Task Force, particularly in the design of the working modalities. The following section presents the main considerations that were taken into account when drafting the rules of procedure as shown in Appendix 6.

Inclusiveness and cooperation at the foundation of the Task Force

Evidence from the existing Task Forces revealed that the most common approach was for the European Commission to instigate the establishment of the Task Forces. In a similar vein, the “blue” Task Force will be established by the European Commission. Crucially, however, close cooperation with the African counterparts will be imperative to the inclusiveness, tangibility of results and added value of the Task Force. This is shown in Point 1 of Appendix 6, which highlights the need for the designated African counterpart to be fully involved in the establishment of the Task Force.

A streamlined organisational set-up

At the core of the Task Force will be a small but dedicated group consisting of two high-level chairpersons and a small secretariat. The secretariat will consist of European Commission officers from relevant Directorate-Generals. This will also allow for existing relations and contacts between the Commission and the African counterparts to be continued and for cooperation to be developed further.

The secretariat will support the Task Force throughout by preparing agendas, meetings and attendance lists, while also being in charge of the written procedures from each meeting. The secretariat will consist of two experienced EU staff members who will act as Project Management Officers and supervise the creation and establishment of the Task Force. They might also act as facilitators if required. Assistants will conduct the majority of the administrative and logistical work (see section 5.8 for more details). In addition, should working groups be employed in phase two of

⁵⁰ This is in line with Annex 3 of the Commission Decision of 30.5.2016 on setting up an expert group.

the Task Force, the secretariat may further support the writing and preparation of the shared action plans. These areas are set out in points 3, 4, 8 and 10–12 in Appendix 6.

With respect to the Chairpersons (Point 9 in Appendix 6), given the number of Task Force members and the broad scope of the Task Force, **two chairpersons will be appointed**. In order to maintain inclusivity and legitimacy between the Task Force members and wider political sphere, one chairperson will be from the EU and one from the AU. The appointment of two chairpersons will be instrumental, particularly in phase one of the Task Force.

Table 5.4. Overview of main roles, tasks and responsibilities

Role	Main Tasks and Responsibilities	Voting Rights
Chairpersons (2 persons)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To provide leadership and diplomacy in the discussions and work of the Task Force. Steering the work throughout the duration of the initiative. Ensuring that meetings are planned and conducted effectively and efficiently. Keep the Task Force on track and in alignment with its original mandate and calendar of activities. Represent the Task Force as spokespersons. 	✓
Task Force members (31 members)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collective responsibility in implementing the mandate of the initiative. Committing to attending all scheduled meetings to the extent possible and participating in discussions and activities. Representing their organisation's and/or community's interests and sharing this information with the Task Force so that they can gain a greater understanding of the main issues at hand. 	✓
Expert panel (20 persons)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the discussion and/or provide specific input and insights on different issues at hand in the form of dedicated hearings. Participation in the Task Force meetings in Phase 2. Provide short papers or other background material in preparation of the meetings to support the work of the Task Force. 	–
Secretariat 2 (AD or equivalent) and 3 (AST or equivalent) positions – See Cost Assessment 7.8)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One experienced administrator from the EU will act as a PMO and will supervise the creation and establishment of the Task Force, as well as the work of the Secretariat. Another administrative will act as a professional facilitator if required by the Task Force. Three secretary-level positions will provide administrative and logistic support in both the creation and implementation of the Task Force (over a 15-month period). This support includes organising and booking travel for Task Force Members, taking minutes at meetings, providing support for the deliverables of Task Force and monitoring social media platforms. 	–
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The website will be created through the Europa Web Publishing Platform, with the option of DG DIGIT hosting the service. 	–


Role	Main Tasks and Responsibilities	Voting Rights
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpreters from DG SCIC will be involved in each meeting to translate from French to English and vice versa. • Internal or external translators⁵¹ will be used to translate meeting reports and documents in both French and English. • Staff from the Commission’s financial units will be responsible for financial proceedings, checking the invoices and making reimbursements. 	

A flexible approach to the organisation of the Task Force

As discussed in section 5.1, the implementation of the Task Force will be split into two phases. Given the differences between the phases in terms of the nature of the discussions held, **a flexible approach has been proposed for the organisation of the Task Force**. In phase one, to ensure that all main stakeholder groups are represented, the Task Force will operate in a plenary. Once the main priorities have been agreed upon, the Task Force members and Chairpersons will decide how best to organisationally proceed under phase two.

Should more specific thematic areas be identified and require more in-depth analysis and scrutiny, the Chairpersons will decide upon the creation of working groups (Point 6 in Appendix 6). Each working group will produce a draft of the shared action plan for the subtopic of its concern, to be subsequently discussed in a plenary with the entire Task Force. In the context of the plenary, the shared action plan will be discussed, revised and agreed upon. To ensure that the work of the working groups is conducted promptly, each working group will assign one leader who will ensure coordination of the work. The working group leaders will be appointed through agreement between the Task Force members and chairpersons. The chairpersons will be responsible for ensuring that each of the working groups retains geographic and gender balance, and a mix of stakeholder perspectives. Figure 5.5 below provides an example of how the working groups could be organised.

Figure 5.5. Example organisational set up of the working groups



⁵¹ Internal refers to DG Translation, while external translators could include official EU translations by companies such as ETC Europe.

5.6 Calendar of activities

Based on the design elements that have been proposed in the previous sections, the following table presents an indicative calendar of activities for the Task Force. Crucially, the calendar of activities has been developed by working back from the date of the 7th African Union-EU Summit (expected in the second half of 2022), where the results of the Task Force would be presented. In addition, it also takes into account the following considerations:

- **a minimum of three months** have been allocated for the Task Force’s preparation work, with the goal of establishing the Task Force in second half of 2021.
- the Task Force will last for a duration of **12 months**.
- to facilitate the work of the Task Force, **6 meetings** have been envisaged.
- given the importance of phase 1 and the implications it has on Phase 2 of the Task Force, **2 months** have been allocated for discussions and agreement on the areas of common interest.
- analysis of existing Task Forces highlighted that the drafting of reports commonly took longer than anticipated, and therefore **4 months** have been allocated for drafting the final report, taking into account the need for proofreading, final editing, graphic design and translation.
- stocktaking of the work done at ministerial events, possibly organised and hosted by Portugal (mid-2022).
- the aim is for the results of the Task Force to be presented as part of the 7th **African Union-EU Summit** which is expected to take place at the end of the second half of 2022.
- a flexible approach has been adopted regarding dialogue between the Task Force members (i.e. in the organisation of meetings of the work streams).

Table 5.5 Preliminary calendar of activities

Deadline	Action/deliverables
TO – 3 Months (min) <i>Pre-kick off of the Task Force</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement and establishment of the Secretariat consisting of Commission staff. • Selection and appointment of the standing members of the Task Force. • Selection and agreement of the two chairpersons.
TO – 1.5 Month <i>Pre-kick off of the Task Force</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretariat to assist in the establishment and development of the website for the Task Force and social media platforms. • Secretariat to invite members to the first official meeting. • Secretariat to prepare the meeting agenda for the first official meeting of the platform. • <i>Optional: Develop and publish a public consultation on the work streams of the Task Force (to feed into the discussions under phase 1).</i>
TO - reference date (second half of 2021) <i>Phase 1</i>	Meeting 1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First official meeting of the task force. • Presentation of the Task Force by the chairpersons focusing on its format (i.e. the two-phase approach) and working modalities. • Preparatory work for the call for applications for the expert panel (i.e. topical experts). • Opening discussions on the different possible workstreams of common interest on ocean-related matters between the EU and Africa, as well as potential common priorities and objectives.

Deadline	Action/deliverables
TO + 1 month <i>Phase 1</i>	Meeting 2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Each of the members will present their consolidated priorities, objectives and possible areas of common interest. <i>Optional: Analysis and reporting on the public consultation to the Task Force members.</i>
TO + 2 months <i>Phase 1</i>	Meeting 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Task Force will identify areas of common interest between the Task Force Members. The chairpersons will hold a vote on which common priorities and objectives should be taken forward into phase two of the Task Force. Discussion on the working modalities to be adopted under Phase 2 (i.e. establishment of working groups per topic area). <i>Optional: The Task Force reviews and takes into account the results of the public consultation.</i>
TO + 4 months <i>Phase 2</i>	Meeting 4 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Task Force will meet to review progress to date. If working groups are established, the group members may wish to meet on an ad hoc basis outside of the Task Force. It is suggested that working group leaders organise at least one meeting a month during the period from month four to month eight. <i>Optional: The Task Force may agree to carry out additional stakeholder consultation activities.</i>
TO + 8 months <i>Phase 2</i>	Meeting 5 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Task Force members will present their proposed action plans and possible recommendations. There will be an open discussion on the collective actions across thematic areas and the main recommendations to be put forward. The Task Force, with support from the Secretariat, will begin to draft the final report.
TO + 10 months <i>Phase 2</i>	Meeting 6 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A final meeting will be held to review the final reports and allow for any comments or iterations to be made. Final agreement of the final report.
TO + 12 months <i>Phase 2</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The secretariat will provide the final editing of the final report ahead of publishing.
TO + 12 months (end of second half of 2022) EU-AU Summit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The chairpersons will present the final results at the EU-African Union summit.

In addition to the indicative calendar of activities, the following external events should also be taken into account:

- The European Development Days:** this event, organised by the European Commission, aims to bring the development community together to share ideas and experiences in ways that inspire new partnerships and innovative solutions to the world's most pressing challenges. The

agenda for EDD 2021's event title is "The Green Deal for a Sustainable Future" and will take place (virtually) on 15th-16th June 2021⁵².

- **The Halieutis fair**⁵³: under the High Patronage of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, the 7th edition of the Halieutis fair is scheduled for February 2022. This fair aims to provide a larger international presence – with a strong African presence – for players who operate at the heart of the fishing ecosystem.
- **UN Ocean conference in 2022**⁵⁴: the United Nations Ocean Conference primarily seeks to mobilise action for the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources. Building on the momentum of the 2021 conference hosted by both Portugal and Kenya, the 2nd UN Ocean Conference is scheduled to take place in the spring of 2022 in Lisbon.


5.7 Communications strategy

This section introduces the communications strategy for the Task Force, which is presented in Appendix 7. It also sets out the key considerations made in its development. In particular, it highlights the targets, principles, methods and target audiences that have been developed, with the **overarching aim of ensuring the timely and appropriate visibility of the Task Force**. The Task Force's communications have taken into account the analysis conducted of previous EU-Africa Task Forces, as well as the data gathered throughout the stakeholder consultations.

5.7.1 Goals, principles and key message

To guide the Task Force's communications strategy, two main goals have been set and are presented in the figure below.

Figure 5.6. Goals of the communications strategy



The communications strategy will operate on the basis of four guiding principles. This includes the need to be [1] inclusive by making information widely accessible; to be [2] objective and transparent on information that is communicated; to be [3] timely and audience-appropriate, to ensure effective engagement with all audiences, and lastly [4] to have consistent messages.

In relation to the fourth principle, a lesson learned from existing Task Forces is the need for simple and consistent communication on the work and rationale of the Task Force. As such, the communications strategy (presented in Appendix 7), outlines a proposed message to be disseminated across all communications activities.

5.7.2 Methods, tools and target audiences

A series of methods and tools have been developed for implementing the communications strategy, as presented in the figure below.

⁵² Available at: <https://eudevdays.eu/about-edd>

⁵³ Available at: <http://www.salonhalieutis.com/>

⁵⁴ Available at: <https://www.oceanactionhub.org/thematic-area/ocean-conference>

Figure 5.7. Overview of key communication tools.



Central to the Task Force’s communications approach is establishing an accessible and wide-reaching online presence. For this, the development of a website on either the European Commission and/or African Union websites is proposed, thus helping to ensure geographical coverage. To complement the website, the strategy also includes a presence on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn. To ensure that online content is up to date and appropriate, the Task Force secretariat will hold develop and monitor the online and social media platforms.

To fulfil the first target of the communications strategy, we suggest that the results from the Task Force are reported. This was also highlighted by existing Task Forces as a central element not only for raising awareness of the Task Force’s topic area, but also for ensuring that developed actions can be recognised and enacted. In addition, it is also suggested that the work of the Task Force is communicated, with the potential of launching stakeholder consultation activities with local communities that will be affected by action plans on ocean governance. This approach also takes into account principle No. 1 on the need for inclusivity in the Task Force’s communication. Any content that is produced by the Task Force will be translated by either the European Commission or external services in both English and French.

Target audiences

On the basis of the desk research (see Appendix 4) and in correlation with the methods presented above, two main target audience groups were identified:

- 1. primary target audiences:** national governments and policy-makers at all levels (i.e. local, national and international)
- 2. broader audiences:** civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the business sector, business associations, local representatives and the wider public in Europe and in Africa, including islands and coastal communities and their associations.

In its communications and outreach activities, the Task Force may choose to take the specific context of different countries or regions into account, and this may require tailor-made outreach activities.

5.8 Cost assessment

This section aims to provide an estimation of the main costs that would be involved in the development and implementation of the Task Force under the selected option (see Table 5.6). In the course of our analysis, we have recognised that the definition of costs is closely linked to the working modalities and calendar of activities, e.g. duration of the Task Force, number of meetings, number of members involved, communications strategy, etc.

In order to delineate the cost structure, a number of assumptions were made, in line with the design elements for the selected option proposed in Chapter 5. These assumptions are listed below.

- The duration of the Task Force will be 12 months, with 3 months for preparation before the first meeting of the Task Force.
- The membership includes 2 chairpersons, 31 standing members and a 20-person expert panel. These positions will not be paid, but their travel and per diem allowances will be covered.
- Six meetings will be held over the course of a 12-month period and there will be one conference to present the results of the Task Force⁵⁵.
- Meetings will be held equally between the EU and the AU premises.
- There will be a secretariat consisting of five people. The secretariat will support the work of the Task Force, including one part-time and two additional assistants who would provide support on an ad hoc basis. In addition, one experienced member of staff from the EU will act as a PMO (Project Management Officer) to oversee the work of the secretariat and one experienced member of staff will act as a professional facilitator.

On the basis of these assumptions, the following section presents a breakdown per cost category of the main elements that have been taken into account, as well as the sources of the cost estimate. It should be noted that these costs have also been assessed on the basis of the indicative information provided by the previous EU-Africa Task Forces on the main cost categories and estimates.

In addition, it should be caveated that many of the costs listed in the section below may or may not be required, depending on the organisational set-up of the Task Force. For example, if meetings were to be held virtually, it would drastically reduce the travel expenses and per diem allowances of the Task Force participants (this being the most significant cost category). Thus, the total cost for the Task Force should only be seen as being indicative.

Human Resources

In the context of this cost assessment, human resources can be understood as staff from the EU institutions who would assist in the work of the Task Force as part of their full-time employment. The unit rates have been derived from the basic monthly salaries for each pay grade and step in function groups, as referred to in Article 66 of the Staff Regulations of the European Commission⁵⁶.

One experienced staff member (cost category 1.1.1) from the EU will act as a PMO and will supervise the creation and establishment of the Task Force, as well as the work of the Secretariat. In addition, we have foreseen the involvement of one experienced staff member who would act as a professional facilitator, depending on the needs of each phase of the Task Force. These two roles would amount to 0.5 FTE over the 15-month period. An average unit rate has been derived by calculating the

⁵⁵ Due to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, it remains uncertain whether it will be possible to organise in-person meetings during 2021–2022. For this reason, in-person meetings have been included in the cost assessment with the caveat that the meetings may be hosted virtually instead.

⁵⁶ European Commission (2018). Annex I, 2018 Annual update of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto. COM(2018) 781 final. Available [here](#).

average monthly salary for a full-time employee (staff categories AD 5–11), then divided to calculate the cost per day.

The secretariat (cost category 1.1.2) will require one part-time position for the creation and establishment of the Task Force (15 months in total), along with two additional positions that will operate on an ad hoc basis to further support the work of the secretariat during times of increased workload (i.e. creating the Task Force and organising meetings). The part-time position would last for approximately 157 days (part-time over 15 months⁵⁷), while the two additional positions would collectively operate for 44 days. Thus, the secretariat as a whole would involve 201 days of work. An average unit rate has been derived by calculating the average monthly salary for a full-time secretary position (staff categories AST 1–6), then divided to calculate the cost per day.

Travel expenses and per diem allowances

As mentioned above, the Task Force members, chairpersons and expert panel will not be paid. However their travel and per diem allowances will be covered instead. This approach was confirmed by existing Task Forces as being normal practice.

Per diem allowances

Per diem allowances can be understood as expenses to cover accommodation, meals, local travel within the place of the mission and sundry expenses. The unit rates have been derived from the “current per diem rates” per country listed by the European Commission (updated on 01/02/2020).⁵⁸

Given the differences in the number of persons involved between each phase of the Task Force, they were subsequently divided. Similarly, it should be noted that the six meetings of the Task Force will take place equally between the premises of the EU (Brussels) and the AU (Addis Ababa), and the per diem allowances therefore reflect this distinction. In phase one, all members and chairpersons will be covered (33 people) for per diem allowances for two meetings in Brussels and one meeting in Addis Ababa. In phase two, all members, chairpersons and the expert panel (53 people) will be covered for per diem allowances for two meetings in Addis Ababa and one meeting in Brussels.

International travel

Similar to the per diem allowances, the costs for international travel are split across each phase of the Task force. The unit rates have been derived from the “reimbursement of travel expenses” document provided by the European Commission’s European Research Executive Agency⁵⁹. The cost of international flights has been calculated by finding the average economy return ticket from Brussels to Addis Ababa over the months that the Task Force would be in operation (from the second half of 2021 to the second half of 2022). In addition, the standard rail cost has been calculated at the rate of EUR 0.12 per kilometre between 1 and 1 000 kilometres of travel. An average unit cost has therefore been derived from the average cost per return flight and rail journey⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ This is based on the total number of working days in Belgium in 2021 being 251 days. Thus, we have approximated that part-time would equate to the total working days over 15 months (314 days) divided by two.

⁵⁸ European Commission (2020). Current per diem rates, International partnerships. Available [here](#).

⁵⁹ European Commission (2020). Policy on the reimbursement of travel expenses for applicants. Available [here](#).

⁶⁰ The estimated return flight from Brussels to Addis Ababa was estimated at EUR 1 100, while a return rail fare was averaged at EUR 0.12 per km (assuming an average of 500 km, it would equal a maximum return rail fare of EUR 120). Thus, the cost between flights and rail for all members was averaged at EUR 610.

In phase 1, it is assumed that all of the Task Force members and chairpersons will require some form of travel (33 people). In phase 2 it is assumed that all of the Task Force members, expert panel and chairpersons will require travel (53 people) of some form. It should be caveated that this assumption does not take into account the possibility that some members will live locally to the place of meetings, meaning this cost will vary significantly depending on the different personal requirements of each person in the Task Force.

Translation and proofreading

This cost category can be understood across three main areas: interpretation, translation and proofreading. Firstly, for interpretation, the unit rate has been derived from the "Agreement on working conditions and the pecuniary regime for auxiliary conference interpreters" that forms part of the EU Staff Regulations⁶¹. Two interpreters have been envisaged to be required to translate from English to French and vice versa at each meeting of the Task Force (6 meetings).

For translation and proofreading, the unit rate has been derived from quotes provided by a recognised company that is actively involved in the translation and proofreading of documents for the European Commission⁶². For translation, the unit price is based on the average cost per word being EUR 0.12, which has then been scaled up for an average meeting note length of 1 000 words. From assessment of similar reports from existing Task Forces, the final report is estimated to be approximately 50 000 words in length. For proofreading, the average unit price is EUR 1 300 per 100 pages, and it is envisaged that the final report from the Task Force would be around 100 pages in length.

Other costs and services

This final cost category takes into account additional activities that the Task Force will have the option of adopting throughout its duration. This primarily relates to the communication costs involved in implementing the Task Force's communications strategy (i.e. creating websites and using social media platforms). For the creation of the website on the European Commission's webpage, the unit rates have been derived from the European Commission's "Europa Web Publishing Platform"⁶³. The basic webpage template model has been envisaged (table on p. 47), and this would not require any development or technical profiles on the part of the website owner and is considered the most cost-efficient option by DG DIGIT. This would therefore entail a one-off cost of EUR 10 000 under this model that would cover the development and monitoring of the website.

Regarding the use of social media platforms, the unit rate has been derived from quotes from the contractor's internal communications officers on the average time (in days) that would be required to develop and maintain social media coverage. For this, it is envisaged that two days per month would be required (over 15 months), conducted by a member of the secretariat.

In addition to the costs set out above, the Task Force may also choose to conduct additional stakeholder consultations. This would therefore be an additional cost that is not reflected in the cost assessment table below.

⁶¹ European Commission (2008). Agreement on working conditions and the pecuniary regime for auxiliary conference interpreters. Available [here](#).

⁶² Provided by ETC Europe for 2020/2021. More information can be found [here](#).

⁶³ European Commission (2016). Next Europa IT platform: Technical maintenance model & SLA. See the Service Level Agreement available [here](#).

Table 5.6. Cost assessment table

Expenses	Cost type	Unit	# of persons	# of units	Unit Rate (in EUR)	Costs (in EUR)
1. Human Resources						
1.1 Salaries						
1.1.1 Senior staff (PMO)	Operational cost	Per day	2	157	€256	€40 192
1.1.2 Administrative/ Support staff (Secretariat)	Operational cost	Per day	3	201	€145	€29 145
Subtotal Human Resources						€69 337
2. Travel expenses and Per diems						
2.1 Per diems (Phase 1, TF members and chairs)						
2.1.1 Brussels (EU Headquarters)	Operational cost	Per diem	33	2	€232	€15 312
2.1.1 Addis Ababa (AU Headquarters)	Operational cost	Per diem	33	1	€200	€6 600
2.2 Per diems (Phase 2, TF members, chairs and expert panel)						
2.2.1 Brussels (EU Headquarters)	Operational cost	Per diem	53	1	€232	€12 296
2.2.1 Addis Ababa (AU Headquarters)	Operational cost	Per diem	53	2	€200	€21 200
2.3 International travel						
2.3.1 Phase 1 (Chairs, TF members, 1 Secretariat)	Operational cost	Per Trip	33	3	€610	€60 390
2.3.1 Phase 2 (Chairs, TF members, 1 Secretariat, Expert panel)	Operational cost	Per Trip	53	3	€610	€96 990
Subtotal Travel expenses and Per diems						€212 788
3. Translation and proof reading						
3.1 Interpretation in meetings	Operational cost	Per day	2	6	€600	€7 200
3.2 Translation of meeting documents	Operational cost	Per report	/	6	€120*	€720
3.3 Translation of Final Report (Approx. 50,000 words)	One-off cost	Per report	/	1	€120*	€6 000
3.4 Proof reading of Final Report	One-off cost	Per report	/	1	€1 300	€1 300
Subtotal Translation and proof reading						€15 220
4. Other costs, services						
4.1 Communication costs						
4.1.1 Website (creation and monitoring)	One-off cost	One-off	/	1	€10 000	€10 000
4.1.2 Social Media	Operational cost	Per day	1	30	€145	€4 350
Subtotal Translation and proof reading						€14 350
Estimation of Total Costs						€311 695
					*Per 1000 words	

6. Conclusions

This final chapter provides the overall conclusions and key considerations for this feasibility study on establishing an EU-Africa Task Force for Policy Cooperation and Dialogue on International Ocean Governance.

6.1 Overall conclusions

- 1. There is a clear need for a dedicated Task Force on international ocean governance between the EU and Africa.** Analysis of literature and stakeholder consultations highlighted the need for a Task Force on international ocean governance between the EU and Africa. This has been reiterated across several topic areas such as the blue economy and maritime security. More specifically, policy initiatives such as the 2020 EU Comprehensive Strategy with Africa placed a focus on the blue economy as an essential area of partnership between the EU and Africa. This strategy, along with the AU "Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want", also emphasises the need for increased cooperation and partnership between the EU and Africa in these topical areas.
- 2. Consulted stakeholders welcomed the establishment of an EU-Africa Task Force on international ocean governance⁶⁴.** There is general agreement among stakeholders that an EU-Africa Task Force could increase the level of cooperation between the two continents and expand the sharing of knowledge and capacity building in the context of ocean governance. Crucially, it was also seen as a potential vehicle for increasing momentum around ocean governance and offering an opportunity to achieve progress on existing objectives or to agree on common principles in the area of ocean governance.
- 3. Analysis of the different design options highlighted the need for careful design and implementation of the Task Force.** The analysis revealed that all the design elements of the Task Force (e.g. mandate, working modalities, thematic and geographic scope) are highly interconnected and influence each other. A careful design of the Task Force is therefore required for the Task Force to work efficiently. This is particularly relevant in the context of a Task Force on ocean governance, a topic that is by nature multidimensional and complex to tackle, with several competing interests to be reconciled.
- 4. Existing EU-Africa Task Forces highlight the potential for increased cooperation and dialogue between the EU and Africa on areas of common interest.** All existing Task Forces analysed have led to the reaching of an agreement on recommendations or actions for increased cooperation between Europe and Africa in specific topical areas. More specifically, examples such as the Digital Economy Task Force also showed the potential for a Task Force to serve as a platform for increased dialogue between stakeholder groups and to provide a shared understanding of the future of international cooperation between the EU and Africa.
- 5. The Task Force should be seen as both a pioneering action and an important first step in increasing cooperation and dialogue on international ocean governance between the EU and Africa.** It is important that the output of the Task Force is not viewed as one event in time, but rather as a catalyst for change that will encourage further cooperation and dialogue in the future. This aspect is particularly important for ensuring the credibility and sustainability of the Task Force's output.


⁶⁴ 25 out of the 36 interviewed stakeholders explicitly expressed a need for a blue Task Force. This covered all types of stakeholders.

6.2 Selected task force design

The design option selected on the basis of this study is the “Two-Phase Task Force”. The Two-Phase Task Force, as the name suggests, will operate across two distinct phases, in correlation with the overall mandate (as shown in Figure 5.1). Across each of the design elements, the principles of being inclusive, efficient and transparent have been taken into account, to enable a representative and balanced platform for dialogue between the EU and Africa.

Figure 6.1 below provides an overview of the selected Task Force across each of its design elements and its overall intended outputs.

Figure 6.1. Overview of the design elements of the “Two-Phase” Task Force



To intertwine each of the design elements shown above, the Task Force will operate under the following key principles.

- **Inclusiveness:** the Task Force should be designed in a way to allow for the engagement of a broad variety of relevant stakeholders, and it should establish a partnership of equals between the EU and Africa.
- **Achieve tangible results:** the Task Force should be designed in a way that ensures that its outcomes are translated into tangible actions that achieve progress on the ground.
- **Added value:** the Task Force should add value to existing cooperation initiatives and mechanisms, and be complementary to them rather than overlapping with them.

As part of this study, estimates of the costs were able to be derived (see Table 5.6). This is a challenging exercise, as the costs are highly variable depending on the design choices implemented during the establishment of the Task Force.

6.3 Key considerations for the future

Given the overall conclusions of the study, and taking into account the proposed Task Force design, the following paragraphs present the main considerations that should be taken into account during finalisation of the Task Force design and its implementation.

1. **The work on the establishment of the Task Force should start promptly if the results are to be presented as part of the EU-Africa Summit in 2022.** As presented in the calendar of activities (see Section 5.6), the Task Force will operate over a 12-month period. It should also be noted that a minimum of three months has been allocated before establishment (TO – 3 Months) for the development of the Task Force. This includes the selection of the Task Force secretariat, chairpersons, members and launching the call for experts.
2. **Establishing the secretariat at an early stage will be crucial for the timely start of the Task Force.** The secretariat will play a vital role in the organisation and logistics of the Task Force, primarily through the preparation of agendas, meetings and attendance lists. Crucially, the secretariat will play an important role in assisting in the selection and appointment of members of the Task Force. In addition, they will also help to launch the call for experts and assist the EU and AU with selecting the 20 people that will form part of the expert panel. Given the short time period in which to select and appoint the members (estimated as three months), there should be a sense of urgency among the EU and AU to work together to ensure that the Task Force can start promptly.
3. **The selection of the Chairpersons is vital for ensuring the success of the Task Force, as well as for supporting the legitimacy of the initiative internationally.** Analysis of previous Task Forces shows that competent and strong leadership is pivotal to the success of the Task Force. It is therefore important for high-level and well-recognised Chairs to be appointed to steer the work of the Task Force and to facilitate its meetings. It is important that the expertise and authority of the Chairs is respected at international level.
4. **Membership of the Task Force should strive to be as geographically- and gender-balanced as possible.** While it is anticipated that achieving sufficient inclusiveness in its membership will be a major challenge, the aim of having a geographically- and gender-balanced Task Force should not be diminished. It will therefore be important for the EU and AU to strike an appropriate balance between inclusiveness and the technical feasibility of the initiative, so that the key interests are represented. Furthermore, to aid the transparency of the selection process, the selection of the membership must be duly justified and agreed between the EU and AU.
5. **Communicating the work of the Task Force will be key to raising awareness and ensuring the success of the action plans that will be developed by the Task Force.** For the Task Force to be successful, it is important that ownership is built around its outcomes, and that the added value of its work is adequately communicated. Publicity through conferences or large events can

provide a good platform not only for conveying the legitimacy of the Task Force's work, but can also help to increase awareness around the importance of international ocean governance to economies, society and the environment. Developing an engaging online presence is also important to raising awareness and boosting the profile of the Task Force more generally. This could be achieved by developing a website on the Europa web service, as well as other social media platforms.

**Appendix 1– OVERVIEW TABLE OF THE MAIN
CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS EACH TASK FORCE**

Table 6.1 Overview table of the main characteristics across each Task Force assessed in the course of the study

Task Force	Mandate	Creation / duration	Membership	Thematic scope	Geographical scope (local, regional, national, continental)
EU-Africa Task Forces					
Task Force Rural Africa	To advise the European Commission on how best to contribute to sustainable development and job creation in Africa's agri-food sector and rural economy	2018 – One year	11 experts in personal capacity 7 representatives from the EU, 4 from Africa	Boosting public and private investments in African sustainable agriculture, agribusiness and agro-industrial development. Share knowledge on employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in African rural areas.	Continental/ Regional
EU-Africa High-Level Platform on Sustainable Energy Investments	To identify the enablers for public and private investments in Africa that will improve access to sustainable energy, boost industrialisation and job creation and fight climate change.	2018 – One year	50-70 members representing financing institutions, international organisations, academia and civil society from both continents	Business and finance models to boost policy and regulatory frameworks and initiatives to develop Africa-Europe partnerships on sustainable energy, including energy efficiency and the challenge of clean cooking solutions.	Continental/ Regional
Digital Economy Task Force	To provide a platform of partnership based on a shared understanding of how an already fast-evolving African digital transformation can achieve cross-border integration and bring benefits to all citizens.	2018 – One year	20 high-level representatives from public and private sector from both the EU and Africa. Included African and EU decision	Developing a set of values-based principles for supporting the digital transformation, including issues such as inclusiveness, (taking into account physical access, affordability and digital literacy), market integration, fair market competition, involvement of all relevant stakeholders and the	Continental/ Regional

Task Force	Mandate	Creation / duration	Membership	Thematic scope	Geographical scope (local, regional, national, continental)
			makers, private sector international financial sector and Civil Society representatives	empowerment of women and girls, as well as digital security.	
Africa-Europe Alliance Transport Taskforce	To exchange views and deliver recommendations to enhance transport cooperation. The Taskforce, consisting of three clusters (Connectivity and Infrastructure, Road Safety and Aviation), to deliver tailor-made recommendations.	2018 – One year	Total of 103 members split across 3 Main subgroups: Connectivity cluster: 43 Road safety: 22 Aviation: 38	Strengthening transport connectivity between Africa and the EU and within Africa through the provision of sustainable, credible and viable investment in efficient and sustainable transport infrastructure, providing safe and intermodal mobility.	Continental/ Regional/ National
Non-EU-Africa Task Forces					
Support Group for Ukraine	To provide a focal point, structure, overview and guidance for the Commission's work to support Ukraine, through the initial and crucial early phases of its transition. The Support Group would also help mobilise Member State expertise and further enhance coordination with other donors and the International Financing Institutions (IFIs)	2014 – ongoing	27 full-time members consisting of Commission staff	Support Ukraine in the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU (including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area), and of the Association Agenda which stems from it. To ensure that support provided by the European Commission – advice, expertise and financial cooperation drawn from across the services of the Commission – is	National

Task Force	Mandate	Creation / duration	Membership	Thematic scope	Geographical scope (local, regional, national, continental)
				focused and concentrated according to the Association Agenda.	
Iran Task Force	To support the EU High Representative Josep Borrell in his role as coordinator of the Joint Commission responsible for overseeing the implementation of the JCPOA. To develop a coherent framework for bilateral engagement with Iran in close cooperation with the European Commission services.	2015 - ongoing	Core team of 8 full-time members, supported by wider services from the EEAS.	Support the implementation and protection of the JCPOA between the EU and Iran.	National

**Appendix 2 – CONCEPT NOTE SUMMARISING FINDINGS OF
TASK 1 DESK RESEARCH**

CONCEPT NOTE SUMMARISING FINDINGS OF TASK 1 DESK RESEARCH


Introduction

Africa's expansive coastline stretches over 30,000 kilometres, imparting jurisdiction over maritime zones of 13 million square kilometres. The natural aquatic endowments arising from the blue economy represent significant opportunities for social and economic development, much of which remains underutilised and under serious threats (AU-EU 2019). Sources of threats include, among others, overfishing, pollution from land-based sources, mangrove deforestation, climate change and ocean acidification. With 38 out of the 54 countries on the African continent being littoral states, and 90% of Africa's trade conducted by sea, the maritime economy is of significant importance to both coastal and landlocked states (Figure 1, UNECA 2016). However, "the increased disturbance of the marine ecosystem and safety has cumulative impacts on African coastal communities and their subsistence – a role that cannot be overemphasised" (Adewumi 2020).

Nevertheless, there lies much opportunity in the maritime economy for the continent that is home to the youngest and fastest-growing middle-class in the world. The youth of Africa have the potential to transform the continent's political, economic and social prospects (JOIN 2020). However, in order to do so, access to education, infrastructure, energy and social services are critical. Many areas in which improved governance and international cooperation can assist, and in turn, pave the path for inclusive economic development.


Africa is Europe's closest neighbour, with deep ties shared as a result of past history, proximity and common interests (JOIN 2020). The EU is Africa's largest trading partner, accounting for 37% of total exports from Africa and 35% of imports in 2017 and the EU remains the most open market and the main destination of African manufactured goods (COM 2018). In terms of investments, the EU is also Africa's biggest investor with Member States holding approximately 40% of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock in Africa in 2016, to the value of €291 billion (COM 2018). Hence, there are many prospects in progressing the EU-Africa relationship further, especially in the maritime economy that hold vast potential in supporting the much-needed economic development for the growing continent.

Figure 6.2 Map of African states, coastal and landlocked countries (Adewumi 2020)



At the centre of sustainable blue growth is good ocean governance, and this is intricately linked with many areas of shared interest between the EU and Africa (Figure 6.3). The purpose of the desk study in Task 1 is to identify areas of common interest on ocean governance between the EU and Africa – how they are linked with broader development goals such as investing in youth and digitalisation, existing challenges to cooperation, and opportunities that can overcome challenges and/or provide the most benefits. For readability, the findings from literature, meeting documents and technical reports are presented in the table form in sections below, according to the breakdown of research question and sub-questions discussed.

Figure 6.3 Common interest areas between the EU and Africa that can be linked to ocean governance



Which are the areas of common interest on ocean governance between the EU and Africa?

European Union	African Union
<p>Growth, investment, infrastructure and skills</p> <p>Common interest is shared in boosting economic development, investment and improving business climate (AU-EU Summit 2017). The blue economy is one of the key sectors highlighted in Action item #2 under communication on the Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs, in boosting private investment in Africa (COM 2018).</p> <p>In addition, the EU’s commitment to SDGs other than SDG 14 (e.g. SDG 1, 8, 13, 16 etc.) is reflected in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement with 79</p>	<p>Economic transformation and sustainable development</p> <p>Given that for 3/4 of the African continent, the blue or ocean economy is its principal economy and, this represents a potent engine for sustainable economic growth and development (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019). The supporting regulatory framework, i.e. ocean governance, is at the forefront in building a safe and sustainable blue economy.</p> <p>Governing blue growth – especially for the priority areas of marine resources and energy, fisheries,</p>

European Union

countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). The areas of focus include eradicating poverty, moving to inclusive sustainable economic development, developing climate resilient economies, supporting private sector development and so forth (European Commission 2020a).

Improved ocean governance not only supports the financial environment in doing business and attracting investment for growth (e.g. sustainable use of marine resources), but also enhancing trade and efficiency down the value chains through the maritime transport sector. The EU Commission is also preparing a new approach to sustainable blue economy (adoption due in 2021)

Blue energy

An area of interest for Blue Growth for the EU is in the area of offshore wind and ocean energy (SWD 2017 128). The EU Directives that guide use of marine space for the development of blue energy sector within the Union are the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive (Directive 2014/89/EU) and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Directive 2008/56/EC). An estimated 80% of the EU's wind resource are in waters too deep for tradition fixed turbines, so there is also interest in deploying floating turbines, for instance off the Iberian Atlantic coast and the Mediterranean (SWD 2017 128).

In November 2020, the EU Commission published a dedicated EU strategy on offshore renewable energy that prescribed actions needed to scale up the deployment of offshore renewable energy in Europe (COM/2020/741). To maximise its impact, the EU strategy also looks at broader issues including access to marine space, international and regional cooperation, technological transfers and industrial and employment dimensions.

Ocean energy, largely derived from the power of currents, tides and waves, is still an emerging sector for the EU. While there are still technological and commercial challenges, the EU is leader in this renewable energy market, with considerable funds invested in the developments of certain renewable energy technologies to increase their competitiveness (SWD 2017 128). This is an area in which knowledge transfer, in terms of both

African Union

ports operation and marine transport – is part of the strategic framework for socioeconomic transformation of the African continent under various initiatives including Agenda 2063 and the Policy Framework and Reform Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa PFRS (AU-IBAR 2019). Under Thematic Area 1 and 2 of the African Blue Economy Strategy, there are also objectives aimed at developing and strengthening of transport corridors to improve value chains within the blue economy, inclusive growth for women and youth in fisheries and aquaculture, and ensuring security of investments in blue economy sectors (AU-IBAR 2019).

Furthermore, promotion of intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) and creating regional infrastructure necessary for continental interconnection via the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) – (AU-EU Summit 2017).

AMCEN in its meeting in December 2020 will discuss the African Green Stimulus package that includes a work stream on the blue economy.

Low-cost renewable energy

The focus on innovative sustainable energy solutions in support of farming, circular and blue economies that can underpin Africa's economic growth is backed by the African Initiative on Renewable Energy (JOIN 2020).

Renewable blue energy (i.e. wind, wave and tidal) has been highlighted of interest as a new and developing industry for Africa's blue economy (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019).

Blue energy initiatives have already begun in many African countries, including Ghana (Wave Energy), Mauritius (FPV) and Offshore wind projects, and there are a number of goals set under African Blue Economy Strategy, Thematic Area 4 specifically aimed at increasing blue energy in energy mix, creating supportive financial environment to support blue energy growth and developing policy framework to accelerate the transfer and application of blue energy technologies, and increasing reliability and affordability of modern energy solutions (AU-IBAR 2019).

This is an area in which improved ocean governance can provide further support on.

European Union	African Union
<p>governance and technology, can assist African states. Renewable energy solutions is also featured in the common interest of deepening the strategic alliance that is the AU-EU Energy Partnership (Africa-EU Energy Partnership, AEEP).</p>	
<p>Aquaculture</p> <p>Aquaculture is one of the 5 focus areas for the Blue Growth Strategy for the EU, with increasing competitiveness and sustainable practices included as some of the main action items (SWD 2017 128). Ensuring EU standards are understood and implemented efficiently without hindering development of the sector with unnecessary complexities is also an area of interest (SWD 2017 128).</p> <p>Modernisation of the sector, including equipment for higher productivity, staff training and improving environmental footprints of activities have been targeted by the EMFF. In addition, H2020 has also invested in research on aquaculture management, spatial planning, disease control with funding in commercial feasibility for offshore and biorefinery projects included in the next cycle (SWD 2017 128). Finally the EU is also closely involved in aquaculture guidance work done at the international level, including those by the FAO.</p>	<p>Aquaculture</p> <p>Fresh water and marine fish contribute to the food security of over 200 million people in Africa and provide an income for over 10 million people. Therefore, the interest in developing the aquaculture sector is two-fold for African nations – food security and also blue growth supporting local employment (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019).</p> <p>In particular, under Thematic Area 1 of the African Blue Economy Strategy, there are objectives aimed at promoting inclusive blue value chain in sustainable aquaculture, as well as developing processing and storage capacity for aquaculture fish, and achieving responsible trade in fisheries products (AU-IBAR 2019).</p> <p>Cross-cutting objectives also include empowering women and youth in aquaculture, and strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change (AU-IBAR 2019).</p> <p>Ocean governance in areas of environmental sustainability and strengthening resilience to climate change are therefore key to this sector.</p>
<p>Blue biotechnology</p> <p>Blue biotechnology, in particular pharmaceuticals but also cosmetics and food supplements, is another one of the five focus areas for Blue Growth Strategy for the EU (SWD 2017 128). Moreover, a circular bio-based economy is a key focus area for the EU Farm to Fork Strategy, for example, bio-fertilisers, bio-energy, bio-chemicals and bio-gas – particularly those derived from waste products of agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture production processes such as fish waste (European Commission 2020b). Complementary to circularity objectives, there is also interest in using biotechnology and bio-based products in improving plant and animal health/welfare (e.g. animal feed and plant pesticide alternatives from algae). Finally, the EU Commission is actively engaged in international forums on the progressing the bioeconomy (World Bioeconomy Forum 2020)</p>	<p>Blue bioproducts</p> <p>Bioproducts such as pharmaceutical and agrichemical, have been highlighted as a new and emerging industry Africa is interested in developing (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019).</p> <p>The sector supports growth in the blue economy and relies on sustainable extraction of marine resources. Therefore ocean governance is integral to the sector in the same way as fishing and aquaculture.</p>
<p>Climate change and ecosystem services</p> <p>The EU is committed to the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and Marrakech Action Plan adopted in COP22, and supporting developing</p>	<p>Move towards low-carbon, blue and circular economy</p> <p>Africa is one of the continents that is most vulnerable to weather and climate variability, with</p>

European Union

countries responding to climate change – mitigation and adaptation, disaster risk management and reduction, as well as in the sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems (AU-EU Summit 2017).

From the ocean governance perspective, the EU is monitoring emissions from key sectors like maritime shipping and transport, as well as fisheries and aquaculture. In addition, the ocean plays an important role in climate regulation and carbon sequestration, namely through absorption and redistribution of heat, photosynthesis by phytoplankton, and downward transfer of particulate carbon through a variety of processes (Blue Economy Report 2020). As such, implementing mitigation measures to capture carbon and reduce global warming through the use of oceans is a key research area for the EU (e.g. CERES project).

Restoring marine and coastal ecosystems in different regions around the world, including ACP countries is one of the 3 core pillars under the “*International Ocean Governance: agenda for the future of our oceans*”.

African Union

several millions of people regularly suffering the impacts of extreme weather events. Future climate change and low adaptive capacity may lead to even more severe impacts on many vital sectors, such as agriculture, water management and health (JRC 2017).

Ocean governance, in terms of monitoring the climate system and improving climate forecasts and capacity to adapt to climate change (incl. ecosystem-based management) will be key in disaster management.

Moving to a climate-resistant and circular blue economy is particularly important to African countries as about half of the African population lives within 100 km of the coast. This has put pressure on water quality, biodiversity and marine productivity (JRC 2017). The central role marine and coastal resources play in African livelihoods and development was recognised at the African Union’s Extraordinary Summit on Maritime Security and Safety and Development (Lomé, Togo, 2016). Of the 54 countries that make up the African continent, 38 are coastal states whose populations are directly dependent on the services provided by coastal and marine ecosystems (JRC 2017).

Blue carbon (i.e. carbon storage in mangroves, seagrass and saltmarsh) has also been highlighted as a new and emerging industry the African nations are interested in developing (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019). At the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi, the valuation of environmental goods and services was highlighted as a key area for science and research needed to inform policy development, implementation and evaluation (SBEC 2018).

The EU’s commitment to sustainability and the UN SDGs (e.g. SDG 14 life below water)

The most relevant UN SDG for ocean governance is SDG 14: Life below water. The EU has a number of initiatives that target this SDG including, the IOG agenda, CFP, the Clean Oceans Initiative that focuses on prevention, collection, treatment, recycling and disposal of plastics from the marine environment (Blue Economy Report 2020). The European Investment Bank has also launched the Blue Sustainable Ocean Strategy, which expands the focus more broadly to include sectors such as sustainable seafood production (i.e. fisheries, aquaculture, processing and preservation of seafood) and green shipping which aims at reducing emissions from the shipping industry through improving efficiency of fuel use and technological innovations (Blue Economy Report 2020).

Sustainable management of water resources (incl. fisheries)

Given the importance of the marine resources to the livelihoods of many African countries, the sustainable management of fishing and governance of marine resources are key areas of importance to the African Union.

As stated at the African Ministerial Conference on Ocean Economies and Climate Change, held in September 2016, the ocean-related economies of many African countries contribute to 1/4 of all revenues and 1/3 of export revenues. However, the continuously growing coastal populations, overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), pollution and unsustainable tourism degrade marine and coastal biodiversity and increase poverty (Saghir, 2016, JRC 2017).

European Union

Marine pollution (e.g. plastics, chemicals and toxic substances, excess nutrients and noise) threatens the health of oceans and biodiversity. As such, in addition to the Clean Oceans Initiative, the EU also has a number of directives to monitor and regulate marine pollution, including the MSFD, the EU Water Framework and SUP Directives, and EU activities on microplastics (Blue Economy Report 2020).

Moreover, the commitment to fighting marine litter and the 'sea of plastic' is made under action 9 of the "International Ocean Governance: agenda for the future of our oceans" (JOIN(2016)49). Given the transboundary nature of marine pollution, it is also a key focus area for international cooperation for the EU.

In the area of sustainable marine resource management, there is work underway with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the PESCAO programme (SWD(2019)104). The aim of the programme looks at addressing fisheries policy at the regional level, building the capacities of competent national and regional MCS authorities to deter IUU fishing, and demonstrating the added value of coordinated approaches for shared fisheries management. At the regional level, the EU is also active in RFMOs and uses bilateral agreements and SFPAs to encourage better ocean governance from cooperating partner countries.

African Union

Like the EU, SDG14 is an important objective for the Africa Blue Economy Strategy, and a series of targets are set for 2030 from which most relate to better exploitation of the sea, preservation of the environment and prevention of pollution and other harmful changes from human activities (AU-IBAR 2019). In particular, under Thematic Area 1 of the African Blue Economy Strategy, there are objectives aimed at developing small-scale fisheries while minimising impacts on other activities in the blue economy, as well as promotion of conservation and sustainable management of aquatic resources and achieving responsible trade in fisheries products (AU-IBAR 2019).

Litter reaching the ocean from land-based sources has also been identified as a major threat to the marine environment and the development of the blue economy in Africa (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019).

Resilience, peace and security

Common security threats to international and regional peace have impacts on both continents, particularly growing terrorist threats and trans-boundary criminal activities (AU-EU Summit 2017).

From the blue economy perspective, the EU has a steadfast outlook on good ocean governance, in particular safety and security at sea targeted through regional and international cooperation on MCS, and Agreement on Port State Measures (APSM) (EUMSS 2014, JOIN(2016)49).

The promotion for the ratification and implementation of international legal instruments by countries external to the Union, including international security measures, is outlined as a leadership priority for the EU in various official documents. For example, the Common Fisheries Policy (EU 1380/2013), the Integrated Maritime Policy (COM(2009)536 final), recommendations for the EU's Maritime Transport Policy (COM(2009)8 final), and the International Ocean Governance agenda (JOIN(2016) 49 final).

Peace and security

Africa's maritime domain has increasingly been dominated by discussions on piracy, armed robbery and other illegal activities at sea. These include toxic waste dumping and discharge of oil, dealing in illicit crude oil, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), arms and drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling (AU 2012). These security issues pose a threat to not only ocean governance but also development of the blue economy in Africa (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019).

The African Blue Economy Strategy includes peace and security at sea as part of the total approach to the blue economy, highlighting initiatives such as the 2016 African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) in aiming to prevent and curb national and transnational crime, especially terrorism, piracy and armed robbery against ships, as well as all forms of trafficking at sea (AU-IBAR 2019).

Under the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy, there are strategic objectives in place to improve safety and security of transport systems, prevent criminal acts at sea and harmonise the prosecution process, protecting people and natural environment from maritime pollution and dumping of

European Union

African Union

toxic waste, improve the Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Africa, and promote the ratification, domestication and implementation of international legal instruments (AU 2012).

International ocean governance

The EU has committed to good international ocean governance under the “*International Ocean Governance: agenda for the future of our oceans*”.

As already alluded to in the EU’s commitment to sustainability and SDG 14, part of the ocean governance relates to addressing capacity in terms of ocean governance. This includes programmes like PESCAO that aim to build capacity in MCS and deterring IUU fishing.

The need for better general governance and more coordinated and homogeneous framework in applying UNCLOS also identifies other areas of concern beside those related to fisheries management. These include addressing legal gaps in the conservation and sustainable use of marine BBNJ, uniform enforcement of agreed rules and arrangements conservation of coastal and marine areas (e.g. through MPAs), coordination between international organisations for oceans, and improving security and mitigating illegal and criminal activities in the maritime sector (JOIN(2016)49).

Promoting rules-based good governance at sea and tackling safety and security issues will also help to achieve other priorities of the EU, including enhance human rights, freedom and democracy, create a level playing field for business and improve working conditions worldwide (JOIN(2016)49).

Integrated ocean governance

Governance of water resources is a key area of focus for African nations, managed through various transboundary agreements in support of an integrated water management in the seven basins of Africa (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019).

Inadequacies in fisheries management mechanisms, marine protection measures and policies are key challenge areas for ocean governance among African countries (SBEC 2018). These factors have contributed to unsustainable fishing practices, depletion of marine species (e.g. over half of 50 shark species are considered threatened) and climate change which endangers coral reefs and the coastal communities that rely on the ecosystem services provided by them (e.g. coastal defence and food security).

As such, improving ocean governance to sustain marine life, conservation and sustainable economic activities was one of the 9 signature thematic sessions at the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi (SBEC 2018). Building mutually supportive systems through collaborative framework across policy, science and market, and utilising governance tools such as Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) and Ecosystem-Based Approaches (EBA) are seen as key ways forward in improving ocean governance.

An essential element needed in good ocean governance is quantitative data to inform policy-making, monitoring and evaluation on the Blue Economy (SBEC 2018). The lack of or weak law enforcement capacities of countries not only undermines good ocean governance but also safety and security at sea, and this is a key area for capacity building for many African countries.

Investing in Youth for Accelerated Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development

Broader common interest, indirectly related to ocean governance, exists in providing young people with the skills and opportunities they need through the mobilisation of smart and targeted investments, empowering young people, both girls and boys on equal terms to participate in political, economic and social life (AU-EU Summit 2017). There is a strong emphasis on empowering girls and women and tackling discriminatory regulations and practices (JOIN 2020). The commitment to capacity building,

Investing in youth

Africa has the youngest population of any region of the world and continues to experience strong demographic growth, but its workforce is the least skilled in the world (Africa Pulse 2017).

African Union skills initiative – targeting improving access to higher/technical education, e-infrastructure, private sector involvement and developing an African continental qualification framework. The latter looks at harmonising recognition of qualifications within Africa and the EU, and making the contents of higher education

European Union

including the investment in training and qualifications for fishing vessel personnel is mentioned in "*International Ocean Governance: agenda for the future of our oceans*" (JOIN(2016)49).

Specific interest from the EU in addressing skill gap and promoting career development within the blue economy is reflected in the four actions points in place to support blue growth. The action points include EMFF projects targeting blue careers a new (sectoral) skills agenda for Europe with the maritime technology sector as one of the key sectors identified expert group on skills and development in the blue economy and ocean literacy (EC Maritime Affairs 2020).

Investing in youth fits within the framework of ocean governance also in the sense that quality work, access to education, infrastructure and renewable energy which are critical to youth development can be supported by improved governance of the marine environment and sustainable use of ocean resources.

Strengthening ocean research and data

Promoting ocean research, data, and science is one of 3 core pillars under the EU's "*International Ocean Governance: agenda for the future of our oceans*" (SWD(2019)104). To this end, the EU is committed to supporting national database efforts to help the creation of an international marine data network. In 2017, the EU signed the Belém Statement on Atlantic Research and Innovation Cooperation with Brazil and South Africa ([Belém Statement 2017](#)) and the [Galway Statement on Atlantic Ocean Cooperation](#), aimed at aligning ocean observation efforts across the Atlantic, was signed in 2013.

This also matches well within the proposed EU-Africa partnership in Digital Transformation (JOIN 2020). The improvement in data and research is essential in ocean monitoring, and supporting ocean governance that is based on science and information. Finally, the mission area of healthy oceans, seas, coastal and inland waters will continue to be an important area of research targeted under the next EU framework programme for research and innovation, Horizon Europe.

Digital infrastructures and support for digital entrepreneurship and innovation have the potential to provide much-needed jobs for the 15-20 million young people (in Africa) who are entering the workforce every year (JOIN 2020).

Mobility and migration

Common interest taking a constructive and multidimensional approach to migration that takes

African Union

programmes more relevant to the labour market needs (COM 2018).

Specifically for the blue economy, there are objectives set under the African Blue Economy Strategy which focuses on empowering youth in sectors such as fisheries and aquaculture (AU-IBAR 2019). Improving maritime education and skills training policies based on skills and career gap analysis, and addressing wage and opportunity disparities for youth are outlined as the key ways forward to facilitate the inclusion of youth in the blue economy (SBEC 2018). Lastly, addressing safety and security at sea is necessary to attract youth into maritime sectors.

Digital transformation

Digital transformation can also modernise traditional sectors such as fisheries and aquaculture, and access to digital financial services. The need for technology uptake in shipping and maritime transport was highlighted as a key challenge for the sector, with over-reliance on paperwork and manual application process creating much unwanted inefficiencies in the sector (SBEC 2018). Contributing to maritime security and safety, the aspirations of improving maritime shipping technologies and governance provide opportunities for adopting block chain technology, and use of big data and artificial intelligence (SBEC 2018).

Mobility and migration

Worldwide, about one third of refugees are African nationals, and within Africa it is estimated that

European Union	African Union
<p>place in a safe, orderly and regular manner. The EU has a strong political commitment to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement (AU-EU Summit 2017).</p> <p>Given the underlying causes of migration relate to access to education and economic opportunities, supporting the blue economy through governance provides a potential pathway to address at least some elements of this. More directly, illegal migration over sea poses threats to safety and human rights. Since 2015, the EU and African countries have developed a joint approach to managing migration and mobility targeting migrant smuggling, and in developing more sustainable approaches for refugees in hosting countries in Africa (JOIN 2020).</p>	<p>internally displaced persons are 2-3 mores. Some of the key underlying causes is the lack of economic opportunities or skills development at home, institutional fragility, violent conflicts and environmental deterioration (JRC 2017). Investing in education is a powerful means to stimulate economic and human development for the benefit of Africans and Europeans.</p> <p>Closely linked with investing in youth, security at sea and sustainable blue growth, increase in the availability of decent work within the maritime sector can help alleviate the need for migration and/or reduce the number of internally displaced persons, as well as contributing to eradicating poverty.</p>

What are the current challenges to EU-Africa cooperation on ocean governance?

Challenges and risks	Description
<p>Fragile and poor states</p>	<p>36 of the world’s most fragile countries are located in Africa, often weakened by conflicts (JOIN 2020). The continent also has 390 million people living below the poverty line, highlighting that growth is not always inclusive.</p> <p>Unstable and fragile political regimes exacerbate weaknesses in ensuring maritime security and good ocean governance (Adewumi 2020). This poses a challenge in meaningful cooperation between the EU and Africa on ocean governance.</p>
<p>Business environment and corruption</p>	<p>Since 2009, Foreign Direct Investment inflows to Africa have continually accounted for less than 5% of total FDI flows worldwide. Important factors for investors tend to include an independent judiciary, predictability of taxation, peace and stability. The cost of setting up business is thought to be ~3x higher in fragile states (COM 2018).</p> <p>The abundance of raw materials and pressures from key interest groups has also led to risks of mismanagement of financial resources accruing, with pollution, waste, corruption and rising inequality among its most severe symptoms (CESEM-HEM 2015). This poses challenges not only to the business environment and fair competition, but also weaken transparency in governance.</p> <p>Illegal activities in the maritime domain can fuel violence and insecurity, putting pressure on the fragile states, and also aid corruption. In particular transnational organised crime, including money laundering, illegal arms and drug traffic, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering/crude oil theft along African coasts, maritime terrorism, human trafficking, human smuggling and asylum seekers travelling by sea (AU 2012).</p> <p>Related to the challenge of multiplicity of players within the African continent is the fluctuating and uneven level investments, which reflects global uncertainty and business environment in each country – for example, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt and Morocco attract collectively 58% of total FDI in 2016 while more fragile countries face systemic challenges in attracting private investment</p>

Challenges and risks	Description
<p>Weak governance (e.g. policy and administrative) capacity</p>	<p>(COM 2018). Therefore cooperation in ocean governance will need to be tailored to the political and business environment to foster fruitful outcomes.</p> <p>Capacity constraints on Member States of the AU to effectively formulate and implement policies relating to new growth areas of the blue economy, and those that favour environmental protection and improving the health of ecosystem services are a key factor undermining progress potential (AU-IBAR 2019). The lack of effective policy and regulatory fragment also impacts capacity to attract investment needed for innovation and technological transfers.</p> <p>The limitations in terms of resources, including soft power, vulnerable legal framework, capacity and capabilities also extend to maritime security and safety (AU 2012). For example, the lack of and/or poorly maintained aids to navigation and modern hydrographic surveys, up-to-date nautical charts, maritime safety information, and strategic communication systems all impact the monitoring and surveillance capacity of a country to detect and deter illegal activities in the maritime domain.</p> <p>Similar areas of weaknesses and threats are echoed by the International Oceans Governance report (European Commission, MRAG 2018). These include: varying levels of political will, lack of national training plans, poor retention of skilled staff, enforcement and administrative capacity, focus on the end products (e.g. food) rather than resource, regional pressure on smaller states, strong industry lobby.</p>
<p>Multiplicity of actors and unequal distribution of investment</p>	<p>Multiplicity of actors and stakeholders is often identified as a bottleneck in maritime management (Adewumi 2020). Africa is not only diverse in states, local communities, tribes, stakeholders in various sectors, but also in pressure groups with corrupt or unethical interests (e.g. interests in tax evasion, illegal logging, fishing and other activities that impact directly or indirectly on ocean governance). Therefore, innovative approaches are needed to overcome this challenge of balancing interests, and to design incentives or other policy instruments that can guide various sectors through a common policy building on trade-offs and synergies (UNECA 2016).</p> <p>Stakeholder representation is another challenge to meaningful cooperation between the EU and Africa. Most coastal and lake communities in Africa are poor, lack education and capacity, have few rights of tenure over resources, and often excluded from the decision-making process (AU-IBAR 2019). Therefore, it is important to balance the interests from larger corporations with means to exercise pressure and the local communities that are impacted the most.</p> <p>Furthermore, strategic governance plans such as the AIM strategy, have not always included a kind of contingency plan that could accelerate buy-in by all African states (Adewumi 2020). Issues related to low political buy-in, and competent institutions to coordinate and secure implementation of maritime strategies, as well as inadequate mechanism for cooperation are challenges that have been identified in the past (Adewumi 2020).</p>
<p>Insufficient cooperation among countries, regional and subregional institutions (incl. intra-African trade)</p>	<p>Insufficient cooperation among countries, regional and subregional institutions is another issue that can jeopardise effective and meaningful cooperation with the EU. For the blue economy, lack of coordination between AU MS extends across areas of governance, monitoring and enforcement. Maritime security and safety is a key issue on the agenda as alluded to previously. Piracy and</p>

Challenges and risks	Description
	<p>armed robbery at sea is a major problem for many African states (AMCEN, AU and UNEP 2019).</p> <p>Another area where better coordination and synergy is needed is in Maritime Spatial Planning. A number of African nations have started the MSP process as part of their national development programmes in recent years, but there is still a lack of synergy in balancing conservation priorities and mitigate conflicts in success from spatial allocation strategies (AU-IBAR 2019).</p> <p>Related to MSP coordination is better cooperation over governance of marine ecosystems. Regional coordination among relevant government bodies, sectors and stakeholders is needed for a management of fisheries, pollution and ecosystem health (AU-IBAR 2019).</p>
<p>Lack of understanding and scientific knowledge</p>	<p>There is a lack of understanding on the overall contribution of the blue economy, and a unified accounting process of activities for all sectors and components is needed to record and monitor changes in the blue economy and related ecological components (AU-IBAR 2019). Without improved understanding and technical expertise, efforts towards ocean governance may be hampered.</p>

Specifically on fisheries and aquaculture, the Virtual Meeting on “Fish(ing) for Future: Sustainable Fish for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa” held by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation on 9 September 2020 identified various challenges through an interactive session with key experts on the region. The results are formulated in a word cloud displayed in Figure 3. The more times a challenge is named by the respondents, the larger the word appears within the word cloud. Based on the responses, the key challenge areas for fisheries and aquaculture can be identified as the following: governance and management, training and knowledge capacity, IUU and overfishing, climate change, sustainability, access to investment, food safety and security, poverty, corruption, transparency, market access and so forth.

Figure 6.4 Word cloud of biggest challenge facing Africa for fisheries and aquaculture (FAO 2020)



What are the opportunities for EU-Africa cooperation on ocean governance?

Opportunities arising from challenges

Opportunities arising from challenges	Description
<p>Weak governance (e.g. policy and administrative) capacity</p>	<p>Strengthening institutional and regulatory capacities of key national and regional agencies and organisation will be critical to the effective implementation of blue economy related functions (AU-IBAR 2019). Among others, this should also include capacity building and incentivisation of those entities and structure that play a key role in the sectoral aspects of the blue economy.</p> <p>Closely linked with increasing the transfer of scientific knowledge and understanding, the International Oceans Governance report identifies a number of areas for capacity building related to governance (European Commission and MRAG 2018). Potential areas for scientific support include but are not limited to regulating harvesting and end overfishing, MPAs, implementing law as reflected in UNCLOS, understanding ecosystem impacts and tackling marine pollution.</p>
<p>Business environment and corruption</p>	<p>EU instruments of Twinning and Technical Assistance and Information Exchange can support efficient, transparent and accountable public administrations (COM 2018).</p>
<p>Multiplicity of actors and unequal distribution of investment</p>	<p>EU can support Africa to crowd in investments via blending and guarantees to leverage resources in capital markets with international, European and national financial institutions (COM 2018). The EU External Investment Plan and European Fund for Sustainable Investment Plan already leveraged €15 billion through blending and €16 billion under Guarantee between 2017 and 2020. The effectiveness of the exercise can be reviewed and extended.</p> <p>Boosting private sector investment and stimulating entrepreneurship through improved business environment and investment climate was also highlighted as a key avenue to economic diversification and sustainable growth (JOIN 2020). Moreover, stepping up the EU's engagement with its Member States and institutions, including European development finance institutions, to mobilise private finance is in with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (JOIN 2020).</p> <p>Directing poverty eradication efforts towards the integration of poor and outlying coastal and lake communities is essential in progressing blue economy development process (AU-IBAR 2019). This will empower coastal and waterways communities and make them gain more access and control over the basic conditions that determine their well-being.</p>
<p>Insufficient cooperation among countries, regional and subregional institutions (incl. intra-African trade)</p>	<p>Intra-African trade remains very low despite significant growth potential it was recorded as 10% in 2000 and 16% in 2014 (UNCTAD, Africa Economic Outlook 2017). Facilitating improvements in supply and value chains (incl. modernisation in ports and shipping, the development of transport corridors and reduced the freight rates for cargo transport) as well as promoting economic integration can assist in increased trade, boosting economic growth and cooperation among countries.</p> <p>On the maritime strategy front, the resistance to collaborate or lack of political will to adopt joint aims/visions between African countries has</p>

Opportunities arising from challenges **Description**

been identified as “train-wrecks” in marine management (Adewumi 2020). Meanwhile, poor coordination among national agencies and sociocultural conflict also play a role. First steps can be taken to activate the Special Task Force (S2TF) proposed under the AIMS with the responsibility of overseeing the realisation of the Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA), which is also yet to be put in place. Another low hanging fruit identified by Adewumi (2020) is increasing coherence and coordination of targets listed under the 2050 AIMS, a role appointed to the Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Coordination opportunities also lie in ecosystem-based approach, taking a nexus outlook on the inter-connectivity of maritime issues across sectors and countries.

Opportunity for a longer-term solution to tackling coordination in implementing the 2050 AIMS could be the establishment (and with adequate capacity) of a dedicated organisation saddled with the responsibilities to coordinate and implement the 2050 AIMS, the efficiency of designing a functional plan or strategy and updating on the progress of achieving targets set (Adewumi 2020).

Lack of understanding and scientific knowledge

The International Oceans Governance report commissioned by the European Commission to MRAG (2018) identified a number of strengths from African partners participating in the study. These include a strong national focus on training and academic infrastructure, especially within national colleges. External opportunities can build upon the strengths identified, for example, new skill training/transfer from outside agencies, presence of regional knowledge, and the possibility of public-private partnerships. Developing human resources on ocean governance within the 13 third countries with SFPAs with the EU was also recommended as one of the areas for capacity building, along with organisational development, and institutional and legal framework development (European Commission and MRAG 2018). All of which can be aided by the transfer of scientific knowledge and understanding of governance policies strategies.

Similarly, the 7 implementation factors (i.e. strategy, structure, system, style, staff, skills and subordinate goal) are key in achieving good maritime governance (Adewumi 2020). The transfer of the EU’s knowledge and expertise can improve many of the 7 factors, and help address a number of challenges faced by African countries in the maritime sector.

Opportunities on which enhanced cooperation could bring the most benefits

Opportunities on which enhanced cooperation could bring the most benefits	Description
Investment and jobs for youth	<p>The Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs focuses on private investment opportunities and jobs for youths (COM 2018) – “addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, effectively borders, preventing and fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings, rescuing and protecting lives, offering paths for legal migration, and ensuring improved cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants in line with the established principles and international law obligations, as well as agreed arrangements.”</p> <p>Cooperation on ocean governance can pave way to improve safety at sea, business environment and job opportunities within the blue economy sectors, as well as sustainable long-term growth. All of which can target root causes of migration but also improve job prospects for youth.</p>
Sustainable growth, value chains and value addition	<p>Improved governance and modernisation in ports and shipping can be expected to bring about increased traffic, development of transport corridors and reduce the freight rates for cargo transport via sea (AU-IBAR 2019). The expansion in the ports and shipping sector is essential to improving value chains in support of economic growth.</p> <p>Smart shipping, ports and transportation was one of the 9 signature thematic sessions at the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference. The objectives focused on devising ways to attract sustainable and climate-proof investment, incentives to balance fossil fuel and renewable energy use in the maritime transport sector, promoting measure that help integrate women and youth in the sector, and enhancing connectivity to remote areas (SBEC 2018). Cooperation between the EU and Africa can support development in this sector and enhance sustainable and inclusive blue growth.</p>
Boosting education, research and innovation	<p>The main sectors for research and education is fisheries and aquaculture at the current time, leaving huge gap in expertise for renewable energy, oil and gas, blue carbon and other sectors (AU-IBAR 2019). There is great potential in boosting innovation and growth in other blue economy sectors from boosted education and research. Moreover, research and innovation in data management on the blue economy will contribute to better governance.</p>
Access to sustainable energy	<p>Blue energy initiatives have already began in many African countries, including Ghana (Wave Energy), Mauritius (FPV) and Offshore wind projects. However, currently, Ghana’s electricity contribution to GDP sits at ~1.5% (AU-IBAR 2019). This indicates large potential for growth in the sector.</p> <p>Better governance, especially through MSP can contribute to supporting growth in the sector.</p>
Combating climate change	<p>Africa has extensive areas of mangrove, salt marsh and sea grass coastlines, estimated at a value of US\$40 billion annually in 2018 using the average monetary value of carbon sequestration of ~US\$130,000 per km² (AU-IBAR 2019). Effective protection and restoration of coastal, marine and freshwater ecosystems, can be increased significantly, providing opportunities to mitigate climate change.</p>

Opportunities on which enhanced cooperation could bring the most benefits	Description
<p>Protecting biodiversity and natural resources</p>	<p>The capture fisheries sector continues to experience overfishing, overcapacity and poor governance (AU-IBAR 2019). Given that marine artisanal fisheries contribute the most to the sector, improved fisheries management can bring benefits to artisanal fishers and preserve the necessary natural resources for future use.</p>

List of references

Type of documentary source	Title of documentary source
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Communication and strategy documents from	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ AU-IBAR (2019) - Africa Blue Economy Strategy http://www.au-ibar.org/strategy-documents ○ AU (2012) - 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy https://au.int/en/documents-38 ○ AMCEN, AU, UNEP (2019) - Advancing the sustainable blue (ocean-based) economy in Africa https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30676/AMCEN_176.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Type of documentary source	Title of documentary source
the African Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ AU-EU (2019) - Stakeholder's Consultative Workshop - Formulation of Africa's Blue Economy Strategy http://www.aubiar.org/component/rseventspro/event/116-stakeholder-s-consultative-workshop-formulation-of-africa-s-blue-economy-strategy ○ NEPAD, Policy framework and reform strategy for fisheries and aquaculture in Africa, May 2014
Reports and studies on ocean governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, MRAG (2018) - International Oceans Governance - Scientific Support https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a52a5f65-832b-11e8-ac6a-01aa75ed71a1/language-en • Wright, G. et al. (2017) - Partnering for a Sustainable Ocean. The Role of Regional Ocean Governance in Implementing Sustainable Development Goal 14. PROG, https://doi.org/10.2312/iass.2017.011 • CESEM-HEM (2015) The Relations between the European Union and Africa https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/atlantic_future_papers/policy_papers/the_relations_between_the_european_union_and_africa
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**Appendix 3 – CONCEPT NOTE SUMMARISING FINDINGS OF
TASK 1 STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS**

CONCEPT NOTE SUMMARISING FINDINGS OF TASK 1 STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

Introduction

This concept note summarises the results of the stakeholder consultation elements. The data collection activities are presented in Section 2, which describes the methodologies applied.

The present concept note is divided in two parts:

1. Summary of the results from interviews
2. Summary of the results from the targeted survey.

Targeted interviews

A total of 36 targeted interviews were conducted in the course of this study. A long list of stakeholders was presented as part of the inception report. This list was further refined based on the feedback received from the European Commission (EC), and a final list of stakeholders for the interviews was agreed upon with the EC in August 2020. Due to the lack of response of certain stakeholders, replacement stakeholders were contacted, in agreement with the EC.

The table below presents an overview of the stakeholders consulted.

Table 6.2 Overview of planned and conducted interviews

Stakeholder type	Institution Name (planned interviews)	Interview conducted
European Union Agencies	European Fishery Control Agency EFCA	✓
	European Maritime Safety Agency EMSA	✓
EU-Africa projects/programmes	PESCAO	✓
	EUCAP Somalia	✓
	EU Crimson	✓
African Union Agencies	AU-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR)	✓
African Regional Economic Communities	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	✓
	East African Community (EAC)	✓
AU Member States	South Africa, the Department of Science and Innovation	✓
	Tanzania (Zanzibar) Ministry of Finance – Blue Economy Task Force	✓
	Madagascar, Direction of Sea and Blue Economy at the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries	✓
	Kenya, JKP Secretariat – the Coastal Economic Bloc	✓
	Seychelles, Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture	✓
	Senegal, High Authority for Maritime Security and the Protection of the Marine Environment (HASSMAR)	✓
	Morocco, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries	✓

Stakeholder type	Institution Name (planned interviews)	Interview conducted
	Gabon, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries	✓
	Mozambique, PROAZUL (Fund for Blue Economy Development ⁶⁵ – Government’s Financial Mechanism)	✓
	Cabo Verde, Ministry of Marine Economy	✓
UN bodies	UNEP	✓
	UN IMO	✓
	UN FAO	✓
Regional Seas Conventions	Nairobi Convention Secretariat	✓
	Jeddah Convention Secretariat	✓
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation	General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM)	✓
NGOs	Women’s International Shipping & Trading Association	✓
	International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN)	✓
	International Maritime Rescue Federation (IMRF)	✓
	United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG)	✓
Industry associations	Pan-African Chamber of Commerce and Industry	✓
	African Confederation of Artisanal Fisheries Organisations (CAOPA)	✓
Academia	University of Cardiff	✓
	One Ocean Hub	✓
	University of Cape Coast Ghana	✓
	International Ocean Institute (IOI) and The Nature Conservation*	✓
	African Marine Environment and sustainability initiative and World Ocean Council*	✓
	Institut National des Sciences et technologies de la Mer, Tunisia	✓
Total conducted		36

**Where multiple affiliations have been indicated, the stakeholder belongs to both.*

⁶⁵ PROAZUL is a governmental financial mechanism instituted by the Government of Mozambique.

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS

Diagnosis

Current topics of cooperation on ocean governance

The current topics of cooperation and examples of the mechanisms used that were mentioned by the stakeholders are summarised in Table 6.3.

Projects in the area of fisheries are most mentioned, followed by maritime security collaboration. Joint development of the blue economy is a third topic with multiple mentions. Only individual or few mentions were made to ocean sustainability more broadly, maritime spatial planning and migration.

Table 6.3: Stakeholder mentions on topics of current cooperation.

Topic	Number of mentions	Stakeholder types	Examples of mechanisms mentioned
Main mentions			
Fisheries (including IUU fishing)	21	All	Projects (e.g. PESCAO, ECOFISH) bilateral agreements (SFPAs)
Maritime security	9	Mainly academia and African states	Security summits, projects (e.g. EU MASE)
Blue economy development	5	All	Financing of FISH4ACP project, projects from national financing organisations
Also mentioned			
Ocean health and sustainability	3	Academia, African states	
Maritime spatial planning	3	Academia, African states	
Migration	1	Academia	
Marine research	1	African state	Cooperation between universities

Room for improvement

Eight stakeholders (out of the 36 interviewed) across all types consider the existing mechanisms as valuable in advancing collaboration in the specific area of work. However, some stakeholders also indicate that there is room for improvement.

Three stakeholders from academia stress the need for more transparency and evaluation of the financial support to African states as part of e.g. SFPAs.

A broad array of stakeholders (academia, African states, NGOs, industry, AU stakeholders) see room for improvement in the inclusivity and the involvement of practitioners and subnational stakeholders (e.g. county level, local communities) which have to implement decisions.

African states and academia stakeholders (a total of five stakeholders) also mention the need to offer African partners a stronger say in the collaboration projects to avoid prejudice and negative attitudes.

EU stakeholders and international organisations (four stakeholders in total) point to the difficult internal communication within the EU/international organisations and lacking coordination of initiatives that reduce the efficiency and result in overcomplexity for African partners.

Other areas for improvement with a smaller number of mentions are:

- A need to create more awareness in the national governments (mentioned by an international organisation and NGO)
- A need for consistency in the actions following a long-term strategy rather than a limited project duration (NGO and international organisation)
- A need to broaden the scope beyond the current focus on fisheries management (academia)
- A need to go beyond agenda-setting and turn towards achieving actionable results (international organisation)
- A need to enhance regional cooperation between African countries
- A need to better communicate and “market” what is being done in terms of cooperation
- A better balance between engagement with the AU institutions, which are described as too high-level to drive effective actions, and cooperation with states, which cannot capture the variety of interests in the ocean space.

Topics for further cooperation

The topics mentioned for further cooperation are similar to the ones mentioned under existing cooperation. Table 6.4 illustrates all topics, while the most salient ones are the following four.

Fisheries are the most often mentioned and across all types of stakeholders. This is explained by the central role it plays to the African economy and in food security. Moreover, fisheries are described as an area of strong interaction between the EU and Africa which requires continued coordination.

Maritime security is mentioned seven times as a topic strongly impacting other areas of ocean governance and important benefits for sharing of knowledge between the EU and Africa.

Similar comments are raised in respect to maritime spatial planning and ecosystem-based management, which is also mentioned by seven stakeholders.

The blue economy specifically is mentioned by six stakeholders, but explanations for fisheries, security and spatial planning, all include additional implicit references to blue economy topics further adding to the importance of the topic for stakeholders.

Table 6.4 Stakeholder views on topics for further cooperation.

	EU stakeholder	African Union or Regional Economic stakeholder	AU Member States stakeholder	International organisation or convention	Academia	NGO	Industry	Total (36)
Blue Economy	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	7
Fisheries	2	2	3	1	1	2	1	12
Deep sea exploitation	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Ecosystem-based management and MSP	0	0	4	0	2	1	0	7
Global targets	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	3
IUU fishing	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	4
Land-ocean link	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
Maritime safety	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Maritime security	3	0	2	0	1	1	0	7
Ocean conservation	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3
Ocean pollution	1	1	3	0	1	1	0	7
Oceans and climate change	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Oceans and social issues	0	1	0	0	3	1	0	5
Ocean research	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total (unique)	3	3	6	2	5	4	1	25

How to improve cooperation

According to stakeholders, future cooperation could be improved through different mechanisms:

- Create joint programmes and platforms for exchanging knowledge (mentioned by 7 stakeholders, mainly from academia and African states plus NGO);
- Base decisions on high quality data that is currently lacking (mentioned by 6 stakeholders, mainly from international organisations plus academia and EU stakeholder)

- Improve the consistency across the existing activities and ensure long-term continuity of actions (mentioned by 5 stakeholders from EU stakeholders, international organisations and industry);
- Strengthen the involvement of actors on the ground such as practitioners, local governments and communities (mentioned by 3 stakeholders from NGOs and industry).

Need for a Task Force

25 interviewed stakeholders explicitly express a need for a blue Task Force. These cover all types of stakeholders.

The main needs identified by the stakeholders are:

- Increasing capacity and share knowledge (mentioned by 9 stakeholders across all types)
- Achieving progress on existing objectives (mentioned by 8 stakeholders from international organisations, NGOs, academia, industry and African states)
- Increasing cooperation in general (mentioned by 6 stakeholders from African states, international organisations and NGOs)
- Achieving an integrated approach to ocean governance (5 stakeholders from EU stakeholders, African states, industry and international organisations)
- Helping ocean topics receiving more priority (5 stakeholders)
- Understanding needs and opportunities of the different stakeholders involved (5 stakeholders)

Only one EU stakeholder (representative from EFCA) expressed that no need for a Task Force exists because of the many existing initiatives and the added bureaucracy an additional Task Force would create.

What will the Task Force do?

Mandate

As potential mandates, stakeholders present the following options. Several stakeholders see a potential for multiple mandates to be implemented. There is no clear mandate that is favoured by the stakeholders.

The most frequently mentioned mandate is to design pathways to get from strategy to practice. This approach is mentioned by 16 stakeholders from all types and is based on the reasoning that much effort has been spent on setting international and continental objectives in Europe and Africa that need to be implemented and worked towards. The Task Force is described as an instrument to identify barriers to implementation, develop the necessary actions to overcome them and suggest a prioritisation to policy-makers. Multiple stakeholders from academia and African states favour this option while it is also mentioned by NGOs, industry, international organisation and EU stakeholders.

Other stakeholders suggest mandating the Task Force to advocate for ocean governance topics at the highest political levels by bringing technical and political experts together. This option is mentioned by ten stakeholders with high representation of international organisations and NGOs. This option for a mandate is described as “like a think tank” (international organisation) that would have the competence to initiate research projects and support evidence-based decision support to the policy-makers.

A third mandate suggested by stakeholders is to align strategies and set common objectives for the cooperation on ocean governance. Eleven stakeholders, of which six are African states (also: EU stakeholders, academia and international organisation), suggested this option as a possible one for the mandate of the Task Force. The explanation given by stakeholders is that the Task Force would help build mutual understanding between the EU and Africa to act as a stronger voice on the

international level. The objectives would be more aligned and backed by high-level political personnel from the two continents, which according to the stakeholders would raise awareness for ocean governance topics and open opportunities for development.

As a fourth potential mandate, stakeholders suggest coordinating existing initiatives. Again, eleven stakeholders – across all categories – see this mandate as a possibility. They say that the multitude of existing initiatives of the EU and its Member States on ocean governance in Africa would benefit from increased coordination to promote the results beyond their original scope and increase the efficiency in coordination. Some stakeholders (academia) extend this to also aligning other ongoing projects between the EU and Africa with the ocean agenda developed in both continents. A Task Force under this mandate could also identify gaps and then design projects to fill these (AU stakeholder).

Thematic scope – Work streams of common interest

As thematic scope, two stakeholders (EU stakeholder and African state) consider a broad option as best suited. According to them, this would ensure that all topics relevant for ocean governance can be discussed.

Seven stakeholders (four EU stakeholders, NGOs and international organisation) on the other hand explicitly call for a specific scope to allow efficient and focused work on selected topics and reduce the complexity that represents ocean governance.

Stakeholders then identified topics which they considered of common interest to the EU and Africa, which could be of focus for the Task Force. These are to a large extent in line with the results on the need for further collaboration presented above. The connection between the most important topics, which were mentioned as being part of current mechanisms, having a need for further cooperation and potentially forming a work stream of common interest for the Task Force is illustrated in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5 Mentions of topics for potential work streams, further cooperation and existing initiatives

Topic	Number of mentions as...		
	Proposed work streams	Topics identified for further cooperation	Identified existing initiatives
Blue economy	18	6	5
Maritime security	13	7	7
Marine conservation	12	3	3
Social aspects of ocean governance	7	5	1
Sustainable fisheries and fight against IUU fishing	8	11	20
Land-ocean link	3	3	0
Maritime spatial planning	3	7	0

The possible topics mentioned for the thematic work streams are the following. The reasoning is explained already above under “topics for further cooperation”. The topics mentioned most often are:

- Blue economy development (18 mentions from all stakeholder types);
- Maritime security (13 mentions from all stakeholder types);
- Marine ecosystems, conservation and environmental sustainability (12 mentions from all types of stakeholders);

- Social topics related to ocean governance such as migration, working conditions, safety (seven mentions by academia, international organisations, AU stakeholders and NGO)
- IUU fishing was brought up separately by seven stakeholders (international organisations, EU stakeholders and NGOs).

Other topics mentioned by multiple stakeholders are:

- Trade of maritime products and through maritime routes (four mentions from industry, AU states and AU stakeholders);
- The land-ocean link (three mentions from academia and international organisation);
- Maritime spatial planning (three mentions from academia, AU stakeholder and African state).

Actions needed in these areas are building capacity in African communities (28 stakeholders across all types), strengthening the institutions and legal frameworks (21 stakeholders from all types), providing the lacking funding to actions (13 stakeholders, mainly academia, AU stakeholders and African states plus industry and international organisation) and supporting the engagement of stakeholders for an inclusive development of future actions (12 stakeholders from mainly academia, AU stakeholders and African states plus NGO and international organisation).

Geographical scope

19 stakeholders call for a combination of continental and regional approach. These stem from stakeholders of all types with a high number of African stakeholders (AU bodies and states) expressing their preference for a pan-African Task Force that covers the entire continent but is organised in sub-groups per region to allow a focus on specific topics of relevance.

Justifications are:

- National level is too diverse and complicated to bring together in a Task Force (academia, international organisation);
- Many problems exist all across the continent (Regional Economic Community);
- Regional level is useful to promote cross-border cooperation, and it facilitates communication with specific stakeholders that act at local level (Regional Economic Community, NGO);
- Combine African diversity with the need for a broad scope to reflect ocean governance. Combine coherence and specificity (African states, NGO);
- Regional areas can be testing sites for solutions discussed at continental level (industry, EU stakeholder).

Five stakeholders also consider targeting national level as relevant, in addition to the continental and regional levels. These stakeholders, of which two were already among the previous group of 19, argue that many relevant decisions are taken at national level, which makes it important to reflect this in the Task Force.

Ten stakeholders present regional approaches as the most appropriate geographical scope. This is justified with the heterogeneity of the continent and the differences in challenges faced by different regions (African state) and the difficulty of communication between parts of the continent (international organisation, NGO).

Four stakeholders (EU stakeholders, academia, international organisation and NGO) call for a mere focus on the continental level with the justification that ocean governance requires the largest possible scope to reflect the nature of the oceans.

Table 6.6 below compares the preferences for a geographical scope among the stakeholder types.

Table 6.6 Stakeholder views on the geographical scope of the Task Force

	EU stakeholder	African Union or regional organisation	African national authorities	International organisation or convention	Academia	NGO	Business	Total (36)
Continental + Regional	3	3	5	4	2	0	2	19
Continental + Regional + National	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	6
Continental scope	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	4
Regional scope	2	0	2	2	0	3	0	9
Total (unique)	6	3	7	6	5	3	2	33

How will the Task Force be set up?

On the selection of members and their expertise, the general comment from stakeholders is that this strongly depends on the mandate set for the Task Force. 12 stakeholders from all types expressed this view saying that an operational, action-oriented mandate would require more technical expertise and on-the-ground knowledge, whereas a strategic mandate would require high-level political decision makers to take the leading role. On the different subsets, varying views were expressed.

On mechanisms of selecting the overall composition:

- Detailed mapping of stakeholders and their interests (academia)
- Avoid a top down approach in the decision-making from too high-level decision-makers (academia)
- Avoid political representatives but rather focus fully on what actions are necessary (academia)
- Mix different backgrounds from political and civil society, research (academia, international organisation)
- Full balance between the EU and Africa (2 mentions: African state, international organisation)
- Political leaders and decision-makers need to be involved (3 mentions: African state, international organisation, NGO)
- Avoid being completely distanced from practitioners (African state)
- Include marginalised groups like women and youth (NGO)

Table 6.7 illustrates the preferences for the composition of the Task Force.

Table 6.7 Stakeholder views on the composition and expertise of a Task Force.

	EU stakeholder	African Union or regional organisation	African national authorities	International organisation or convention	Academia	NGO	Business	Total (36)
Only experts	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Only policy	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Policy + Experts	4	1	0	1	1	1	0	8
Policy + experts + civil society	3	3	10	5	6	3	1	31
Total (unique)	5	3	7	5	6	4	1	32

Identification of members

- Start with some States that have capacities and awareness, then expand (academia)
- Call for expert applications to ensure motivation to work in the Task Force with evaluation panel including EU, AU and international representatives (international organisation)
- Representatives with continental mandate make inclusion easier (international organisation)

On size:

- Not too small, because the multitude of perspectives will make a difference (
- The smaller the better, with clear accountability (3 mentions: academia, NGO, EU stakeholder)

Organisational set-up

14 stakeholders see the most adequate set-up as one core strategic group with multiple specific technical groups on an ad hoc basis (notably: African states, academia, international organisation). Table 6.8 illustrates the preferences expressed by the different stakeholder types:

Table 6.8 Stakeholder views on the organisational set-up of the Task Force.

	EU stakeholder	African Union or regional organisation	African national authorities	International organisation or convention	Academia	NGO	Business	Total (36)
1 group	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	5
Different working groups	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	6
Working groups + Plenary	1	0	6	2	4	1	0	14
Total (unique)	2	2	7	4	5	2	0	22

Working modalities:

- Take inspirations for the rules of procedure used in regional and international organisations (international organisation)
- Co-chairs from the two continents (international organisation)
- Target-driven to increase accountability (academia, AU stakeholders)
- Formal EU Task Force can take months to set up (EU stakeholders)
- Many stakeholders underline the importance of clearly defined terms and objective for the Task Force to avoid misunderstanding and ensure transparency (9 mentions: academia, AU stakeholders, African states, EU stakeholder, NGO)
- Clear communication on objectives, progress and results (3 mentions: academia, AU stakeholder)
- Evaluate progress based on indicators (African state)

Challenges

The interviewees mention a broad array of challenges that the Task Force could face. These relate to the members, the political circumstances, operational challenges and the design of the initiative itself.

The most mentioned concern is the ability of reaching an agreement between participants. This is brought forward by 13 stakeholders across all types of stakeholders, except for academia. It is explained with the differing interests and political priorities, mainly on a national level. Such notions are expressed by EU and AU stakeholders, industry and international organisations.

Many other challenges mentioned relate to this difficult and delicate political process. In terms of challenges related to members, seven stakeholders (EU stakeholders and international organisations) note that ensuring continuity of members represents a likely challenge. This challenge is also reflected in the mentions of sudden changes in political priorities that can highly depend on single persons in governments. Such points are expressed by two stakeholders from NGOs and international organisations. Another member-related challenge is the selection of the right representatives (mentioned by six stakeholders: AU stakeholders, EU stakeholders, NGO, industry). Members need to be able to take decisions without much delay due to internal consultations but also need to have the technical expertise to make informed decisions. The challenge of limited human resource capacities (mentioned by industry and EU stakeholders) can lead to members sent to the Task Force that do not actually advance its objectives. An additional challenge identified in this respect is to achieve inclusivity and transparency, as has been mentioned by eight stakeholders, notably African states and NGOs but also international organisations. Ensuring that no country and no stakeholder group is left out and might work against the Task Force is given as concrete example repeatedly. The lack of continental organisations representing industries, communities and other interests is also seen as contributing to this challenge. A possible result mentioned is an overcrowded Task Force.

Related to political circumstances, the already mentioned instability of political priorities is mentioned as a challenge in respect to African states but also concerning the actions of focus from the EU and its Member States (mentioned by EU stakeholders and international organisations). Diverging interests on both continents and national mandates can impede the Task Force from taking decisions according to these stakeholders. The other important challenge raised in relation to the political environment is the challenge to create buy-in from the decision makers that is necessary to drive the work of the Task Force and implement actions. Five stakeholders from international organisations and NGOs mentioned this challenge.

Operational challenges relate to possible language barriers between participants impeding communication (four mentions: international organisations, African state, EU stakeholder) or the

costs for members to participate in meetings (two stakeholders: international organisation, African state).

The final block of challenges – related to the design of the initiative – comprises challenges such as

- Achieve added value through the Task Force instead of creating additional burden because of overlap with other initiatives: mentioned by seven stakeholders from academia, international organisations, African states and NGOs;
- Create consistent and credible outputs that reflect the partnership between the continents rather than making prescriptions to the African continent: mentioned by three stakeholders from academia and AU stakeholders;
- Lack of impact on the ground and meeting real needs by only creating more policy documents that do not result in practical change: mentioned by seven stakeholders from academia, international organisations, NGO and EU stakeholders;
- Risk of misunderstanding of the purpose between participants on the support of financial means and the objective of the leading organisation(s): mentioned by six stakeholders from academia, NGOs, industry and EU stakeholders.


ONLINE SURVEY ANALYSIS

Introduction

This report is the survey analysis for the project “Feasibility study on establishing an EU-Africa Task Force for policy Cooperation and Dialogue on International Ocean Governance”. This survey aimed to gather feedback from two specific stakeholder types: EU delegations and Fisheries Attachés, and national authorities within EU Member States. The survey was distributed on 15th September 2020 and was subsequently closed on the 23rd of October. In total, the survey gathered 27 responses, of which 22 were fully completed and 5 were partially completed (i.e. started completing the survey but did not answer all questions). Each graph therefore presents the total response rate and, in some instances, provides the number of responses per answer category.

In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox⁶⁶, the survey data was assessed for any entries that may be incomplete, contain duplicates, or contain errors. From cleaning the data, one main data quality issue was uncovered. Out of the 5 partially completed responses, it was found that 4 respondents only completed the profiling questions (Q1-2). Following data cleaning, the main pool of respondents contains 22 completed and 1 partially completed responses, thus bringing the total to 23 responses.

Figure 6.5. Overall status of responses



The survey is structured and presented across five key areas:

1. The need for an EU-Africa Task Force on ocean governance
2. Topical scope of the Task Force
3. Geographical scope of the Task Force
4. Proposed membership
5. Main challenges to strengthening the collaboration on ocean governance between the EU and Africa

Background/ profiling questions

To start, the respondents were asked a series of profiling questions, specifically which stakeholder category they belong to. This information is useful in that it helps to identify any correlations or


⁶⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/better-regulation-toolbox-54_en

differences between responses and stakeholder categories, which will aid the triangulation of data sources in the design stage of the Task Force in this study.

The figure below first displays that out of the 24 responses, 15 were Delegations of the European Union to the African Union or an African country while 9 responses were from EU Member States.


Figure 6.6. Stakeholder type (n=23)

WHICH TYPE OF STAKEHOLDER DO YOU REPRESENT?




The figure below provides a geographic representation of the participants that responded from Delegations of the EU to the African Union or an African country.

Figure 6.7. Geographic representation in Africa (n=15)



The figure below provides a geographic representation of the participants that responded from EU Member States. It should be noted that out of the 7 Member States which took part, all of the answers were provided by representatives from their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In addition, two responses were provided from Portugal.

Figure 6.8. Geographic representation from EU Member States (n=8)




Questions to the survey

This section presents the answers to the main questions in the survey covering five main areas: the need for a Task Force, thematic scope, geographical scope, possible membership and the main challenges in strengthening ocean cooperation between the EU and Africa.

Assessing the need for an EU-Africa Task Force on ocean governance

The respondents were first asked to rate on a five-point scale (zero being that they do not agree at all and five being completely agree) if there is a need for an EU-African Task Force on ocean governance. From the 23 responses, the majority (14/23) answered that there is a need. Interestingly, out of the 14 people who answered that there is a need, 11 originated from EU Delegations in Africa. Member States by contrast highlighted that there is less of a need for a Task Force in this area.


Figure 6.9. Question 1 on the need for an EU-Africa Task Force on ocean governance (n=23)



Following this opening question, the respondents were invited to provide additional answers on why they either see or do not see a need for a Task Force in this area, of which 20 written responses were provided. The figure below displays the main themes which emerged from the written responses, with the answers in light blue being the top 4 most salient. The most salient answer provided was for the Task Force to agree upon common principles in the area of ocean governance between the EU and Africa (7 out of 20). Similarly, the second most salient theme goes further by stating the need to identify and promote the implementation of an international framework on the management of ocean resources between the EU and Africa. Both of the answers were more commonly answered by the EU Delegations in Africa.

Only one EU Delegation in Africa answered that they did not see a need for a Task Force by stating that due to a very limited coastline (for the DR Congo), the issue of ocean governance has never been presented by the Congolese authorities as a priority. Thus, the priority is more to strengthen political/economical governance, of which a Task Force would not be beneficial.


Figure 6.10. Most salient themes from written contributions (n=20)



Possible thematic scope of the Task Force

The next question focused more on the possible thematic scope of the Task Force. Here the respondents were asked to rank nine thematic areas from one to nine (one being the most important and nine being the least important). The results are presented in the figure below.

Figure 6.11. Topical scope of the Task Force (n=23)



The top four thematic areas that were identified (shown in light blue) were sustainable fisheries (18/23), maritime security (15/23), environmental issues (14/23) and maritime spatial planning (12/23). In a follow-up question, the respondents were asked to provide additional information on which issues represent the main opportunities. Similar to the findings in Figure 6.10, the area of sustainable fisheries was raised the most by stakeholders, specifically making reference to the following opportunities: combining sustainable fisheries with the fight against IUU (Illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing, linking investments in the coastal areas and adopting an ecosystem approach to fisheries.

It is important to note that several of the respondents answered that all of the thematic areas listed in the previous question are very relevant and all represent good opportunities for a possible Task Force. Table 6.9 below provides examples of the main issues that represent opportunities per thematic area.

Table 6.9. Examples of additional answers provided to the question: within the highly ranked topics in the previous question, which issues represent the main opportunities for an EU-Africa Task Force on ocean governance? (n=21)

Thematic area	Answer
Sustainable fisheries	"Linking investments in the coastal areas (at all levels) to sustainable fishery practices and overall conservation efforts." [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]


Thematic area	Answer
	"Ecosystem approach to fisheries - co management of marine resources - satellite technologies - nature based solutions" [<i>Member State of the European Union</i>]
Maritime security and surveillance	"Lack of adequate coastal and sea governance, lack of cross sectoral ocean strategy, lack of harmonisation and alignment of sectoral policies, lack of positive incentive for the private sector, lack of skills and mean in implementing/ enforcing regulation, lack of national skills and resource on research (no incentive for young people)" [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]
Environmental issues like marine biodiversity, the fight against pollution and marine protected areas	"...The need for transparency in fisheries governance, traffic security and environmental preservation..." [<i>Member State of the European Union</i>]
Maritime spatial planning	"It's important to have maritime spatial planning to organise better which areas to be exploited, protected. The passage areas need to be agreed, etc..." [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]
Blue Economy sectors like tourism, shipbuilding and ports, energy, biotechnology, shipping	"The fight against pollution, sustainable blue economy in sectors as tourism, energy, and fisheries." [<i>Member State of the European Union</i>]
Oceans and climate change	"Broad issues ensuring the legal and strategic approach to implement. Ocean and climate change associated to marine knowledge are for me, the basement of the framework to build on..." [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]
The fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing	"The need to address illegal migration, illegal fishing and marine pollution." [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]
Marine knowledge, ocean observation, research and innovation	"It would be an opportunity to make populations in Africa realise that preserving oceans is an emergency (problems of marine and coastal pollution). It could also be an opportunity to join forces to improve marine research and to find transnational ways to face ocean challenges." [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]
Additional thematic areas	"Supporting an integrated approach to marine planning and management across sectors, reflecting the connectivity and diversity of marine socio-ecological systems in times of a changing climate and growing economic interests to exploit the oceans as the world's "last frontiers". The aim of such holistic approach is to govern human demands in the ocean in ways and through governance arrangements that fit the problems so that sustainable "blue" development can be achieved. These sustainable ocean development pathways focus on sustained ecosystem services provision through a healthy ocean that serves socioeconomic interests, enables the safeguarding of environmental opportunities for future generations, stimulates ocean-based climate protection and provides options for adaptation for nature and people" [<i>Member State of the European Union</i>]

Possible geographical scope of the Task Force

The next question asked the respondents to answer which geographic level they believe the EU-Africa Task Force should operate at. Figure 6.12 below presents the findings across three main geographic levels: continental, regional and local.

Figure 6.12. Results on the geographical scope (n=22)

AT WHICH LEVEL THE EU-AFRICA TASK FORCE COULD BEST OPERATE?




From the results, the answer of “Regional” was the highest (20/23), followed by both local and continental. To provide more detail to their answers, the respondents were asked in a follow-up question whether the geographical scope be the same for all potential topics mentioned. Interestingly, most of the respondents answered that the geographical scope should *not* be the same for all of the topics that were presented in Figure 6.11.

For the respondents who answered “no”, it was noted that the geographical scope should be based on the regional contexts, which can vary considerably among the regions and between different regional political agendas. In addition, some respondents noted that different topics should be treated at different geographic levels, and conversely, in some instances the same topics can be discussed at different levels. As an example, oceans and climate change can be treated at the continental and the regional level. While other specific thematic areas such as sustainable tourism would work more appropriately at the local level.

Figure 6.13. Follow-up question on the link between the geographic and thematic scope (n=20)

SHOULD THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE BE THE SAME FOR ALL POTENTIAL TOPICS MENTIONED ABOVE?




Which specific areas should be considered?

The following question “zoomed-in” further by asking the respondents to answer which geographical areas should be considered at the most important for the Task Force to look at. As shown in Figure 6.14, both the answers of “Gulf of Guinea” and the “Mediterranean Sea” received the highest responses with 16 out of 22, respectively. When looking at stakeholder differences for the top two answers, ten represented Delegations of the European Union to the African Union or an African country, and six were EU Member States.

Figure 6.14. The specific areas the Task Force should operate in (n=22)

WHICH GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS DO YOU CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE EU-AFRICA TASK FORCE ON OCEAN GOVERNANCE?




For the one respondent who answered “other”, they answered that Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) should also have special consideration by the Task Force.

Which stakeholders should be represented in the Task Force?

Following on from the geographical scope, the respondents were asked in an open question which stakeholders they would like to see represented in the Task Force. As shown in Figure 6.15, out of the 21 responses, the top five stakeholders that were identified to be included were civil society, research institutions, private sector operators (EU and Africa) and EU/AU Member State representatives. From this set of answers, the majority originated from Delegations of the European Union to the African Union or an African country.

Figure 6.15. Stakeholders to be included in the Task Force (n=21)



Interestingly, a considerable number of respondents noted that there should be a balance between stakeholders, geographies and gender in the Task Force, thus the selection of stakeholders should also take this into account. In addition, it was also noted that in order to enable the Task Force members to feel involved, empowered and committed, working groups could be established, which could be split by stakeholder type or thematic area.


Key challenges in strengthening collaboration on ocean governance between the EU and Africa

In the final question, the respondents were asked on the topic area more generally and not specifically on the design of the Task Force. Instead it asked what they considered the main challenges were to strengthen collaboration on ocean governance between the EU and Africa. Three main challenges were highlighted: Lack of prioritisation, institutional issues at local, regional and national levels due to a lack of dialogue with local communities and/or stakeholders and lack of cooperation between ministries and regions (15 out of 22, respectively). These responses were mostly provided by Delegations of the European Union to the African Union or an African country with only four out of 15 being from EU Member States.

For the one respondent who answered “other”, they noted that due to the existing complexities, it was not possible to prioritise the above-mentioned challenges as they are all equally challenging.

Figure 6.16. Key challenges in strengthening ocean governance (n=22)

WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER MAIN CHALLENGES TO STRENGTHENING THE COLLABORATION ON OCEAN GOVERNANCE BETWEEN THE EU AND AFRICA?



Additional comments

As a closing question, the respondents were asked if they would like to share any additional comments, suggestions or ideas, of which 12 responses were gathered.

Figure 6.17. Key examples from additional answers (n=12)

Comment category	Answer/ suggestion examples
Important to establish a good knowledge base (n=4)	<p>"Starting point: a compendium on existing documents related to IOG to the attention to all involved in the platform. Lessons learned from elsewhere, international law, UN current fora, etc. Before any discussion, ensuring that all members have a good level of knowledge and comprehension of the issues at stake to avoid one party (AU or EU) to lead the process. It must be carried out according to strict equity and cooperation all along the process." [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]</p> <p>"Before establishing any Task Force, there should be an assessment of existing institutions already in this field. And the possibility of creating this TF with existing institutions (e.g. African Union or Regional African Institutions)" [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]</p>
There is a need to have political initiatives (n=2)	<p>"Political initiatives, especially when they are at this level, can have a substantial leverage effect to put actors around the table and make people take decisions and act. Africa needs that kind of effort." [<i>Delegation of the European Union to the African Union or an African country</i>]</p>
Support pre-existing areas of cooperation,	<p>"Strengthen knowledge production Support pre-existing spaces for cooperation, consideration and decision-making To encourage the stability and continuity of</p>

Comment category	Answer/ suggestion examples
consideration and decision-making (n=2)	the state outside of political alternations Promote the inclusion of Civil Society representatives in dialogue processes" [<i>Member State of the European Union</i>]
Important to ensure that African stakeholders are included (n=2)	"The success of such Task Force would be subject to acceptance by African partners. The level of acceptance depends on the ownership and understanding of the benefits." [<i>Member State of the European Union</i>]
Other (n=3)	

Appendix 4– OVERVIEW OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Table 6.10 Overview of key stakeholders in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
Policy-makers	EU	European Commission European Parliament European External Action Service European Agencies EU Member States	<i>European Union and Schengen area</i>	<i>All e.g. Blue Economy, Maritime Security etc.</i>	<i>E.g. The European Commission provides the policy framework for investment opportunities in the blue economy in a specific ocean area out of the coast of an African region.</i>	✓			
	African Union (AU)	AU Commission AU National Authorities AU Member States AU Agencies (e.g. IBAR, NEPAD) African Continent Free Trade Secretariat (AfCFTA)	<i>African Union</i>	<i>All e.g. Blue Economy, Maritime Security etc.</i>	<i>E.g. The AU provides the policy conditions for investment opportunities in the blue economy across and within specific ocean area out of the coast of an African region.</i>	✓			
	African Regional Communities	Regional Economic Communities (ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD, SADC) Regional Intergovernmental Fisheries Bodies (SRFC, FCWC) Regional Intergovernmental Organisations (COMHFAT, MOWCA)	<i>Specific African Regions</i>	<i>Specific topics – depending on what is most relevant for each specific community (e.g. fishing rights, blue growth policy,</i>	<i>E.g. The African Regional Communities inform of specific needs or impacts to their regions</i>	✓			

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
				<i>trade agreements, etc.)</i>					
	Regional organisations	Regional Fisheries Management Organisations Regional Seas Conventions	<i>Specific European and African Regions</i>	<i>Specific regional point of view on fisheries and conservation issues</i>	<i>E.g. The RFMOs and RSCs inform on specific needs or impacts to the region of their competence</i>			✓	✓
	UN Bodies	Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) UN Environment Programme (UNEP) UN Development Programme (UNDP) UN International Maritime Organisation (IMO) UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)	<i>Africa and Europe (the world)</i>	<i>Specific topics for specific organisations (e.g. fisheries, blue growth, trade, ocean nature resources, maritime issues etc.)</i>	<i>E.g. The UN bodies give feedback on the policy framework for investment opportunities on the specific topic they defend.</i>			✓	✓
	UN Action Platform	UN Global Compact	<i>Africa and Europe (the world)</i>	<i>Specific Sustainable Ocean Principles</i>	<i>E.g. The UN platform gives feedback on the policy framework for the Sustainable Ocean Principles, based on engagements of a broad audience on the platform</i>			✓	✓

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
Experts	Academics	Universities, research institutes, Scientists specialised on quantitative analyses, experts on EU-Africa policies etc.	<i>Specific areas within Africa and Europe (the world)</i>	<i>All e.g. Blue Economy, Maritime Security etc.</i>	<i>E.g. The scientists can provide specific and up-to-date data and information on the context of cooperation, needs and challenges, as well as potential implications of decisions taken in the context of the Task Force.</i>		✓	✓	✓
	International research organisation	IOI WorldFish Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR)	<i>Africa (international)</i>	<i>Ocean Governance</i>	<i>E.g. The research organisations can provide specific and up-to-date data and information on the context of cooperation, needs and challenges, as well as potential implications of decisions taken in the context of the Task Force.</i>		✓	✓	✓
	Technical advisers and other experts	Representatives of institutes who hold specific expertise	<i>Specific areas within Africa and Europe (the world)</i>	<i>Specific up-to-date data provision on specific topics</i>	<i>E.g. The technical advisers can provide specific and up-to-date data and information on the context of cooperation, needs and challenges, as well as potential implications of</i>		✓	✓	✓

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
					<i>decisions taken in the context of the Task Force.</i>				
			Professional facilitators		Institutes who hold specific expertise e.g. conflict management experts, dialogue facilitating experts		<i>General scope, not related with area</i>	<i>Insights of how to improve communication and conflict management in activities of the Task Force</i>	<i>E.g. The communication experts assist to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts throughout the processes of the Task Force.</i>

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
Civil society	Local communities	Local coastal community representatives (informal/ formal)	Specific African locations	Representing the local community challenges, barriers and opportunities.	E.g. The local communities inform of their specific traditional rights and cultural traditions in local areas, to ensure consequences, barriers and opportunities for the community are represented in the Task Force. Local coastal communities represent the real institutional reality of Africa, and it will be crucial to involve them in the Task Force.	✓		✓	✓
	Industry or private sector representatives	This group consists of a range of businesses: multinationals, regional, national and local companies.	Very topic and context dependent (intercontinental, regional, national local)	Representing the interest of industries including small-scale informal businesses	E.g. Representatives may range from multinationals, regional, national and locally operating business entities, which may hold very different insights about consequences and opportunities for the economy of the work of the Task Force. Note that the expertise held by this	✓		✓	✓

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
	Citizens' representatives	Sometimes organised, sometimes informal (e.g. take part by means of organised Citizens juries, citizens conferences)	Very topic and context dependent (intercontinental, regional, national local)	All	<p><i>groups is limited to their specific business interests.</i></p> <p><i>E.g. The category that most clearly represent civil society broadly speaking are the citizens themselves. Note that any person can take this role, if the starting point is a large geographical scale and looking at the issue considering 'us' and not only own not in my backyard (NIMBY) or profit interests. The citizens representatives inform of societal conditions, barriers and opportunities, to ensure representation in the advice provided by the Task Force. They represent the broader societal view by thinking from a large geographical scale and from a 'we' perspective.</i></p>			✓	✓

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
					<i>Real involvement of citizens requires a citizen jury or citizen conference alike format for inclusion and facilitators trained in conducting dialogues to replace a negotiating context.</i>				
	Specific target groups	People operating in formal or informal arrangements impacted by the initiative	<i>Specified African Locations</i>	<i>Insights on real consequences, barriers and opportunities</i>	<i>E.g. This group can contribute with knowledge about actual needs, barriers, opportunities regarding different ocean-related issues and questions at the local level. The target groups will be impacted by the Task Force's output in at least three ways 1) they will benefit from the new initiative, 2) they will be harmed by the new initiative (especially, informal groups are vulnerable), and 3) the natural resource and</i>			✓	✓

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder sub-category	Specific organisations or types of organisations	Geographical scope	Thematic scope	Main role or stake in EU-Africa relations on ocean governance	Member	Expert panel	Observers	Stakeholder consultation
					<i>ecosystem they depend on might be affected by the initiative.</i>				
	NGOs	E.g.: The Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) European Bureau for Conservation and Development (EBCD) Development Indian Ocean Network (DION) (Mauritius) Coalition for fair fisheries arrangements (CFFFA) Fair Fishing	<i>International or specified Africa locations</i>	<i>Representing environmental interests, small-scale fisheries, inclusiveness, etc.</i>	<i>E.g. Depending on the specific societal concern that is the focus of the specific NGOs, they may represent vulnerable groups, ecosystems, or other local interests.</i>			✓	✓

Appendix 5– CALL FOR APPLICATIONS

CALL FOR APPLICATIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF EXPERTS FOR THE EU-AFRICA TASK FORCE FOR POLICY COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE

1. Background

[To be adapted based on finalised approach decided upon in the establishment of the Task Force]

2. Features of the Task Force

2.1 Composition

The EU-Africa Task Force for Policy Cooperation and Dialogue on International Ocean Governance shall consist of up to 31 members appointed in a personal capacity, who shall act independently and in the public interest. In addition to these members, there will be an expert panel, composed by 20 experts from different backgrounds.

The selection of the members of this expert panel is the object of this call. The experts will be invited to participate to the Task Force meetings or to provide specific input and insights on different issues at hand in the form of hearings, short papers or other background material in preparation of the meetings.

The experts to be selected by means of this call will have high-level expertise and experience in the field of ocean governance and other ocean-related sectors and disciplines, as well as first-hand knowledge of the cooperation between the EU and Africa on these matters.

2.2 Appointment

The experts invited to participate in the Task Force shall be appointed by the European Commission from applicants complying with the requirements referred to in chapter 4 of this call.

The members shall be appointed for the whole duration of the Task Force. They shall remain in office until replaced or until the end of their term of office. Their term of office may be renewed.

Experts who are no longer capable of contributing effectively to the group's deliberations, who in the opinion of the responsible Commission services do not comply with the conditions set out in Article 339 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union or who resign, shall no longer be invited to participate in any meetings of the group.

2.3 Rules of engagement and operation of the Task Force

Organisation of the Task Force

The Task Force shall be chaired by two chairpersons designated by the responsible European Union and African Union services. The chairpersons will be additional to the 31 Task Force members.

The Task Force shall act at the request of its chairs, in compliance with the European Commission's horizontal rules on expert groups ('the horizontal rules').

Responsible Commission services may invite experts with specific expertise with respect to a subject matter on the agenda to take part in the work of the group on an ad hoc basis. The selection of these experts is the object of this call.

Experts should be prepared to attend meetings systematically, to contribute actively to discussions in the Task Force and to be involved in preparatory work ahead of meetings. As a general rule, working documents will be drafted in English and French and meetings will be also conducted in English and French.

The members of the Task Force and the invited experts are subject to the obligation of professional secrecy, which by virtue of the Treaties and the rules implementing them applies to all members of the institutions and their staff, as well as to the Commission's rules on security regarding the protection of Union classified information, laid down in Commission Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 and 2015/444 . Should they fail to respect these obligations, the Commission may take all appropriate measures.

The responsible European Commission or African Union services may grant individuals an observer status by direct invitation, in compliance with the horizontal rules. Observers may be permitted by the Chair to take part in the discussions of the group and provide expertise. However, they shall not have voting rights and shall not participate in the formulation of recommendations or advice of the group.

The European Commission shall provide secretarial services.

Remuneration and other costs

Participants in the activities of the Task Force shall not be remunerated for the services they offer. Travel and subsistence expenses incurred by participants in the activities of the Task Force shall be reimbursed by the European Commission. Reimbursement shall be made in accordance with the provisions in force within the Commission and within the limits of the available appropriations allocated to the European Commission departments under the annual procedure for the allocation of resources.

Output and voting rights

On a proposal by and in agreement with the responsible European Commission and African Union services the Task Force shall adopt its rules of procedure on the basis of the standard rules of procedure for expert groups.

The Task Force is to present a final report with the action plan and recommendations by [TBC].

The Task Force shall adopt its opinions, recommendations or reports by consensus or by majority. The voting modalities will be agreed upon in the context of the first meeting of the Task Force.

In agreement with the responsible European Commission or African Union services, the Task Force may, by simple majority of its members, decide that deliberations shall be public.

Timeline

The work of the Task Force will be organised in the form of 6 dedicated meetings to take place within 12 months of activity.

2.4 Transparency

The Task Force shall be registered in the Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities ('the Register of expert groups').

The names of members of the Task Force, the names of experts and observers will be published in the Register of expert groups and on DG MARE's website.

The Secretariat shall make available all relevant documents, including the agendas, the minutes and the participants' submissions, either on the Register of expert groups or via a link from the Register to a dedicated website where this information can be found. Access to dedicated websites shall not be submitted to user registration or any other restriction. In particular, the responsible Commission services shall ensure publication of the agenda and other relevant background documents in due time ahead of the meeting, followed by timely publication of minutes. Exceptions to publication shall only be foreseen where it is deemed that disclosure of a document would undermine the protection of a public or private interest as defined in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) N° 1049/2001.

Personal data shall be collected, processed and published in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

3. Application procedure

Interested individuals referred to in point 2.1 are invited to submit their application to the Secretariat of the Task Force as explained below.

Applications must be completed in English or in French.

An application will be deemed admissible only if it is sent by the deadline and includes the documents referred to below. All documents submitted by applicants should be duly filled in, legible, signed and numbered sequentially.

Supporting documents

Each application shall include the following documents:

- a cover letter explaining the applicant's motivation for answering this call and stating what contribution the applicant could make to the Task Force
- a selection criteria form duly filled in documenting how the applicant fulfils the selection criteria listed in chapter 4 of this call (Annex I)
- a *curriculum vitae* (CV), preferably not exceeding three pages. All CVs shall be submitted in the Europass format.

Applicants must disclose any circumstances that could give rise to a conflict of interest by submitting a declaration of interests ('DOI') form on the basis of the standard DOI form for expert groups attached to this call. Submission of a duly completed DOI form is necessary in order to be eligible to be appointed in a personal capacity. The Secretariat of the Task Force shall perform the conflict-of-interest assessment in compliance with the horizontal rules⁶⁷.

Additional supporting documents may be requested at a later stage.

Deadline for application

The duly signed applications must be sent by [TBC] at the latest by email to the following email address: [TBC]

The date of sending will be the date of the email.

⁶⁷ Article 11 of the horizontal rules.

4. Selection criteria

The responsible European Union and African Union services will take the following criteria into account when assessing applications⁶⁸:

- High level of expertise in the following sectors and disciplines (one or more):
 - Ocean governance
 - Blue economy sectors
 - Fisheries policy
 - Maritime security
 - Marine conservation and marine biodiversity
 - Trade
 - Innovative financial instruments/leveraging instruments for Blue Economy investments
 - Blue circular economy
 - Waste management
 - (Environmental) economics
 - Ocean research and innovation (e.g. ecology, oceanography, ocean data collection, analysis and visualisation)
 - Climate change mitigation and adaptation
 - Value chain expertise for maritime products
 - Social sciences
 - International law, including expertise on the UN Convention on the Law of the sea and other ocean-related international instruments;
 - Diplomacy and foreign affairs;
 - International cooperation in ocean-related matters and relations with Africa;
 - Conflict management and resolution, facilitation techniques.
- Experience working on these sectors and disciplines in the African context
- Availability to travel to [TBC] for [TBC] meetings
- Absence of circumstances that could give rise to a conflict of interest

5. Selection procedure

The selection procedure shall consist of an assessment of the applications performed by the responsible European Union and African Union services against the selection criteria listed in this call, followed by the establishment of a list of the most suitable applicants, and concluded by the invitation of the 20 selected experts to participate in the expert panel of the Task Force.

When selecting the most suitable experts, the responsible European Union and African Union services shall aim at ensuring, as far as possible, a high level of expertise, as well as a balanced representation of relevant know-how and areas of interest and, as far as possible, gender and geographical balance, while taking into account the specific tasks of the Task Force, the type of expertise required, as well as the relevance of the applications received.

For any further information please contact: [Functional email address]

⁶⁸ Based on the work streams that will be selected in Phase 1, it can be considered to shorten or add to the list of sectors and disciplines presented in the selection criteria, to ensure the expert panel composition adequately supports the work of the Task Force.

Annexes

- Annex I - Selection criteria form
- Annex II - Standard declaration of interests⁶⁹
- Annex III - Guidance for filling in the declaration of interests⁷⁰
- Annex IV - Privacy statement⁷¹

⁶⁹ These are standard documents to be provided by the European Commission.

⁷⁰ These are standard documents to be provided by the European Commission.

⁷¹ These are standard documents to be provided by the European Commission.

ANNEX I: Selection criteria form⁷²

Applicants are requested to describe how they fulfil the selection criteria listed in chapter 4.

<p>High level of expertise in the following sectors and disciplines (one or more):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ocean governance • Blue economy sectors • Fisheries policy • Maritime security • Marine conservation and marine biodiversity • Trade • Innovative financial instruments/leveraging instruments for Blue Economy investments • Blue circular economy • Waste management • (Environmental) economics • Ocean research and innovation (e.g. ecology, oceanography, ocean data collection, analysis and visualization) • Climate change mitigation and adaptation • Value chain expertise for maritime products • Social sciences • International law, including expertise on the UN Convention on the Law of the sea and other ocean-related international instruments; • Diplomacy and foreign affairs; • International cooperation in ocean-related matters and relations with Africa; • Conflict management and resolution, facilitation techniques. 	<p><i>[Insert:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Academic background in the relevant sector/discipline</i> • <i>Years of professional experience in the relevant sector/discipline</i> • <i>Any other information that proves high level expertise in the sector/discipline]</i>
<p>Experience working on the sectors above and disciplines in the African context</p>	<p><i>[Insert evidence of relevant publications/projects carried out in the sector/discipline mentioned]</i></p>
<p>Availability to travel to [TBC] for [TBC] meetings⁷³</p>	<p><i>[Yes/No]</i></p>
<p>Absence of circumstances that could give rise to a conflict of interest</p>	<p><i>[Yes/No]</i></p>

⁷² This form must be filled in, signed and returned with the application.

⁷³ To be deleted in case travelling is not allowed due to the COVID-19 crisis.

Appendix 6 - RULES OF PROCEDURE

RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE EU-AFRICA TASK FORCE FOR POLICY COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE

THE EU-Africa Task Force for Policy Cooperation and Dialogue on International Ocean Governance,

Having regard to the creation of the group,

Having regard to the standard rules of procedure of expert groups⁷⁴,

HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RULES OF PROCEDURE:

Background to the Task Force

[To be adapted based on finalised approach decided upon in the establishment of the Task Force]

Point 1

Operation of the Task Force

1. The Task Force will be hosted by the EU, which will also hold the responsibility of setting up and coordinating the Task Force. The Task Force shall act at the request of its chairpersons with the agreement of the EU and the African Union. More specifically, the African counterpart will be substantially involved in the establishment of the Task Force through refining the mandate, work streams of common interest, requirements for the membership and identifying members where relevant and refinement the rules of procedure of the Task Force.
2. The Task Force will operate according to two phases. The first phase will be to reach a joint consensus and strategic alignment on the positions, priorities and objectives between the EU and Africa on ocean-related matters. This phase will involve all Task Force members to ensure a diverse and inclusive approach to encapsulate the main views.
3. The second phase will utilise the expertise from each Task Force member to produce a shared action plan to achieve progress on a set of prioritised common objectives that were outlined in phase one. Given the specificities of the second phase, the Task Force will call upon a pre-selected expert panel which will partake in discussions and provide evidence to support the work of the Task Force. These experts will be selected from a call for experts prior to the establishment of the Task Force. The expert panel shall not have voting rights in the Task Force.

Point 2

Convening a meeting

1. Meetings of the Task Force are convened by the Chairpersons (see Point 10), with the agreement of the EU and the designated African counterpart either on their own initiative, or at the request of a simple majority of members after the Commission and the designated African counterpart have given their agreement.

⁷⁴ C(2016) 3301 (Annex 3).

2. Joint meetings of the Task Force with other groups may be convened to discuss matters falling within their respective areas of responsibility.
3. Meetings of the Task Force shall be held on both EU and its African counterparts' premises following agreement during the establishment of the Task Force⁷⁵.

Point 3

Agenda

1. The secretariat (described in Point 11) shall draw up the agenda under the responsibility of the Chairpersons and send it to the members of the Task Force under Phase 1. The agenda shall be adopted by the Task Force at the start of the meeting.
2. Under Phase 2 the secretariat shall again draw up the agenda under the responsibility of the Chairpersons and send it to the members of the Task Force and the expert panel.

Point 4

Documentation to be sent to Task Force members

1. The secretariat shall send the invitation to the meeting and the draft agenda to the Task Force members no later than thirty calendar days before the date of the meeting.
2. The secretariat shall send documents on which the Task Force is consulted to the Task Force members no later than fourteen calendar days before the date of the meeting.
3. In urgent or exceptional cases, the time limits for sending the documentation mentioned above may be reduced to five calendar days before the date of the meeting⁷⁶.
4. As a general rule, working documents will be drafted in English and translated into French.

Point 5

Opinions of the Task Force

1. As far as possible, the Task Force shall adopt its opinions, recommendations or reports by consensus. This will be particularly pertinent during step one of the Task Force operation, as outlined in Point 1.
2. In the first meeting of the Task Force members, an agreement will be made on the procedure of voting. This will include whether to conduct voting by consensus or by majority.
3. In the event of a vote, and on the basis of the decision in the point above, the outcome of the vote shall be decided by simple majority⁷⁷ of the members. The members that have voted against or abstained shall have the right to have a document summarising the reasons for their position annexed to the opinions, recommendations or reports.

⁷⁵ These meetings may also take place virtually.

⁷⁶ To be adapted based on the outcomes of the discussions during the establishment of the Task Force between the Commission and the designated African counterpart

⁷⁷ To be decided in the first sitting of the Task Force

Point 6

Working groups

1. To support the work carried out in part two of the Task Force (see Point 1), the chairpersons and Task Force Members may set up working groups for the purpose of examining specific thematic questions. Sub-groups shall operate in compliance with the Commission's horizontal rules on expert groups ('the horizontal rules') and shall report to the Task Force. They shall be dissolved as soon as their mandate is fulfilled⁷⁸.
2. If working groups were to be adopted, they would be divided into the main thematic areas that are raised in phase one of the Task Force. If relevant, sub-working groups might be set up, to delve more specifically into certain aspects or sectors of relevance for each work stream of common interest.
3. Each working group would be led by group leader who would be appointed through agreement between the chairpersons and Task Force members. They would lead the work of the working group and ensure the timely development of the shared action plans.
4. Each working group will produce a draft of the shared action plan for the sub-topic of its concern, which will be subsequently discussed in a plenary of all Task Force members. In the context of the plenary, shared action plan will be discussed, revised and agreed upon.

Point 7

Observers

1. Individuals/organisations/public entities may be granted an observer status, in compliance with the horizontal rules, through applying for observer status.
2. Organisations/public entities appointed as observers shall nominate their representatives.
3. Observers and their representatives may be permitted by the Chairpersons to observe the discussions of the Task Force. However, they shall not have voting rights and shall not participate in the formulation of recommendations or advice of the Task Force.

Point 8

Written procedure

1. If necessary, the Task Force's opinion or recommendation on a specific question may be delivered via a written procedure. To this end, the secretariat sends the Task Force members the document(s) on which the Task Force is being consulted.
2. However, if a simple majority of Task Force members asks for the question to be examined at a meeting of the Task Force, the written procedure shall be terminated without result and the Chairpersons shall convene a meeting of the Task Force as soon as possible.
3. As a general rule, working documents will be drafted in English and meetings will be also conducted in English with active and passive interpretation into French.

⁷⁸ Horizontal rules, as set out in C(2016) 3301 (Annex 3). Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2016/EN/3-2016-3301-EN-F1-1.PDF>

Point 9

Chairpersons

1. The Task Force shall be chaired by two high-level members designated by the responsible Commission services (European Union) in consultation and agreement with the African Union.
2. The Task Force shall act at the request of its Chairpersons, in compliance with the Commission's horizontal rules on expert groups ('the horizontal rules')⁷⁹.

Point 10

Secretariat

1. The European Commission shall, in principle, provide secretarial support for the Task Force and any sub-groups. The secretariat will compose of Commission officers from relevant Directorate Generals and Services.

Point 11

Minutes of the meetings

1. Minutes on the discussion on each point on the agenda and on the opinions delivered by the Task Force shall be meaningful and complete. Minutes shall be drafted by the secretariat under the responsibility of the Chairpersons.
2. As a general rule, minutes will be made available in both English and French.

Point 12

Attendance list

1. At each meeting, the secretariat shall draw up, under the responsibility of the Chairpersons, an attendance list also specifying, where appropriate, the Member States' authorities, organisations or other public entities to which the participants belong.

Point 13

Conflicts of interest

1. The chairpersons of the Task Force, remind all members appointed in a personal capacity of their obligation to promptly inform the Commission of any relevant change in the information previously provided, including as regards upcoming activities, in which case they must immediately submit a newly completed declaration of interests describing the change, in order to enable the Commission to assess it in due course, in compliance with the horizontal rules.
2. Should a conflict of interest in relation to an expert appointed in a personal capacity arise, DG MARE shall take all appropriate measures, in compliance with the horizontal rules⁸⁰.
3. Conflicts of interest shall be reported in writing, e.g. in the minutes of the Task Force meeting. Information registered must be adequate, relevant and not going beyond what is necessary for the purpose of the management of the conflict of interest.

⁷⁹ COM(2016) 3301 Article 13.1.

⁸⁰ See Article 11.

Point 14

Correspondence

1. Correspondence relating to the Task Force shall be addressed to DG MARE, for the attention of the Chairpersons.
2. Correspondence for Task Force members shall be sent to the e-mail address which they provide for that purpose.

Point 15

Consultation activities

1. The Task Force shall develop and disseminate stakeholder consultation activities through to obtain wider stakeholder insights and to ensure inclusivity.
2. The views and opinions provided in all consultations will be taken into account in the discussions and reporting of the Task Force.

Point 16

Transparency

1. The Task Force shall be registered on the Register of expert groups.
2. As concerns the Task Force composition, the following data shall be published on the Register of expert groups:
 - a) the name of individuals appointed in a personal capacity;
 - b) the name of individuals appointed to represent a common interest; the interest represented shall be disclosed;
 - c) the name of member organisations; the interest represented shall be disclosed;
 - d) the name of other public entities;
 - e) the name of observers;
 - f) the name of Member States' authorities⁸¹;
 - g) the name of third countries' authorities⁸²;
 - h) the name of [organisations' representatives/ Member States' representatives/ other public entities representatives...]⁸³.
3. Individuals who do not wish to have their names disclosed may submit a request to DG MARE for a derogation from this rule. A derogation shall be granted where justified on compelling legitimate grounds in relation to the specific situation of the individual, in particular where disclosure of the experts' name could endanger their security or integrity.

⁸¹ According to the horizontal rules, it is not mandatory to publish the name of the Member States' authorities, see Article 23.1 (c).

⁸² According to the horizontal rules, it is not mandatory to publish the name of the third countries' authorities, see Article 23.1 (c).

⁸³ According to the horizontal rules, it is not mandatory to publish the name of these representatives, see Article 23.1 (d).

4. The Commission shall make available all relevant documents, including the agendas, the minutes and the participants' submissions, either on the Register of expert groups or via a link from the Register to a dedicated website, where this information can be found. Access to dedicated websites shall not be submitted to user registration or any other restriction. In particular, DG MARE shall publish the agenda and other relevant background documents in due time ahead of the meeting, followed by timely publication of minutes. Exceptions to publication shall only be foreseen where it is deemed that disclosure of a document would undermine the protection of a public or private interest as defined in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) N° 1049/2001⁸⁴.

Point 17

Access to documents

1. Applications for access to documents held by the Task Force shall be handled in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001⁸⁵.

Point 18

Deliberations

1. In agreement with the Commission, the Task Force may, by simple majority of its members, decide that deliberations will be public.

Point 19

Protection of personal data

1. All processing of personal data for the purposes of these rules of procedure will be in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001⁸⁶

⁸⁴ These exceptions are intended to protect public security, military affairs, international relations, financial, monetary or economic policy, privacy and integrity of the individual, commercial interests, court proceedings and legal advice, inspections/investigations/audits and the institution's decision-making process.

⁸⁵ Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).

⁸⁶ Regulation (EC) 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1).

Appendix 7 – COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

COMMUNICATION STRATEGY OF THE EU-AFRICA TASK FORCE FOR POLICY COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE

Overview

This annex presents the communication strategy for the EU-Africa Task Force for Policy Cooperation and Dialogue on International Ocean Governance which will serve as a framework for communications from and with the Task Force throughout its intended duration.

Goals

The strategy will operate under two main communication goals, as shown in the figure below. These top-level goals aim to ensure that the work and results of the Task Force are presented to a wide audience, while also raising awareness of international ocean governance between the Europe and African more generally.


Figure 6.18. Communication goals



Principles

Communications are an important aspect of the work of the Task Force to be as inclusive and transparent as possible. The following set of principles, should guide the Task Force's communication approach:

Figure 6.19. Communication principles



1. **Inclusive** – The Task Force’s communication approach will revolve primarily around the concept of inclusiveness (i.e. the ability to reach a wide and diverse audience). This will comprise information from the Task Force being widely available on a number of different platforms, formats and across multiple geographies.
2. **Objective and transparent** - The Task Force’s communication approach and activities should, at all times, be consistent with the principles of objectivity, openness and transparency. This will ensure that the Task Force is seen to be legitimate at the international level.
3. **Timely and audience appropriate** - In order to be effective, the Task Force communication approach and activities should be aimed at ensuring that timely and appropriate information enters the public domain – both proactively to communicate reports, and reactively in response to questions or criticism.
4. **Consistent messages** - To ensure that the Task Force delivers consistent messages externally, it is essential that internal communications and decision-making are disciplined and well coordinated. As such, the co-chairpersons will ensure throughout the duration of the Task Force, that information which is made publicly available is both accurate and consistent.

Key message

The Task Force will communicate under one key message that presents the main aims and rationale of its work, as presented in the mandate (see section 5.1). The consistency of these messages throughout the duration of that Task Force is imperative to establish and maintain legitimacy at a national and international level.

‘The “blue” Task Force’s core objective is to enhance and increase cooperation between the EU and Africa on international ocean governance. Through the Task Force, the two continents will exchange information, transfer knowledge, share good practices, define subjects of common interest and identify possible concrete actions for the future. The output from the Task Force will be to achieve strategic alignment on the main priorities and objectives between the two continents on ocean-related matters, and also produce a shared action plan to achieve tangible progress on an agreed set of common priorities and objectives.’

Methods and tools

The Task Force will utilise a variety of communication methods and tools, as presented below. The list provided should not be considered as exhaustive but as the most important tools which should be used. If other tools are suggested throughout the course of the Task Force, members can vote on their use, and the audiences they aim to target.

1. Website

The Task Force should consider creating a website to communicate its mandate, objectives, background and general updates on the activities and progress of the Task Force. To provide legitimacy, the website should be created as part of the European Commission’s website⁸⁷ as well

⁸⁷ Examples of other Task Force websites include: Task Force Rural Africa (https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/farming/international-cooperation/africa/eu-africa-partnership_en) and the EU-AU Digital Economy Task Force (<https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/eu-au-digital-economy-task-force>).

as through the African Unions official website. The figure below provides some examples of websites that were developed for existing EU-Africa Task Forces.

Figure 6.20. Examples of existing Task Force websites




The Secretariat should be responsible for ensuring that the website is reviewed regularly to ensure content is up to date, to improve user-friendliness and navigability and to benefit where useful from the latest technology and practices.

2. Social media


Social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn should be considered as a powerful tool for conveying the work of Task Force to a diverse and international audience. Examples of social media coverage is presented in the figure below.

Figure 6.21. Examples of the use of social media



The secretariat of the Task Force should develop and monitor the social media platforms and provide content periodically. Examples of content that could be developed, sharing the activities of the Task Force (i.e. meetings and events), content on specific topic areas (i.e. to spark conversations on key areas) and the output from the Task Force (i.e. any reports or documents that are produced). To realise the potential of social media, three key principles should be followed: Engage, Enable and Share, as shown in the figure below.


Figure 6.22. Principles of social media engagement



3. Physical/ virtual presentations

Presentations at the national, EU and international levels can provide a good opportunity to present the output from the Task Force to a wide audience. An appropriate opportunity would be at the 2022 EU-African Union Summit. If physical conferences are conducted, it is recommended for the presentations to either be recorded or available through a live stream, to further allow for inclusivity of different audiences.

Figure 6.23. Examples of presentations given by existing EU-Africa Task Forces



4. Publication of reports

The publication of reports should be encouraged wherever possible by the Task Force. Throughout the drafting of the reports, the chairpersons, Task Force members, and support from the secretariat should ensure that all reports have clear, comprehensible texts and graphics.

5. Community visits

Potentially impacted communities will be visited and spoken with directly. Representatives of AU and EU in the core group will travel and talk face to face in the environment of the potentially impacted community (at the shore or where they work). This strategy will ensure direct contact with stakeholders, who often tend to lack representation even when attempted to formally, but in practical terms are not and therefore lose livelihood for non-intended reasons. Community visits

can contribute to avoid non-intended negative impacts by high -level policy decisions on vulnerable, often not formalised, groups on the ground⁸⁸.

Target audiences

The primary target audiences of the work of the Task Force will be governments and policy-makers at all levels (i.e. local, national and international). Broader audiences, such as civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the business sector, business associations, local representatives and the wider public, are the secondary target audiences of the Task Force. While the Task Force may not produce derivative products aimed at specific audiences, it may engage with organisations that take elements of the work of the Task Force and communicate them in more audience-specific formats.

Engaging and building relationships with the media is also an important way in which the Task Force to communicate the information contained in its reports. In its communications and outreach activities, the Task Force may choose to take the specific context of different countries into account, which may require tailor-made outreach activities. For instance, this reflects an understanding that the communication needs of developing countries may be different to those of developed countries.

Task Force spokespeople

To ensure objectivity and representation, as well as efficiency and timeliness, authorised spokespeople must be designated for various situations. The chairpersons are the lead spokespeople for the Task Force as a whole, while the secretariat may speak on activities and procedures of the Task Force. People speaking on behalf of the Task Force in an official capacity must focus on communicating a factual, objective presentation of information from the approved Task Force reports and refrain from public statements that could be interpreted as advocacy and compromise the Task Force's reputation for neutrality.

Resources

Communications activities must operate with the resources available in the budget of the Task Force. These may be augmented by additional funding or support from external communications experts, including for specific communications activities at times of heightened media activity, such as around the release of a report.

⁸⁸ It should be caveated that this exercise could incur high costs that may not be feasible under the scope of the Task Force, thus this method should be agreed upon by all Task Members and chairpersons.

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